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Chapter 1
Introduction
In macroeconomics, it is common to use representative-agent models to
study aggregate dynamics. Macroeconomists are, however, also inter-
ested in topics whose study requires the explicit consideration of hetero-
geneity among economic agents. Such topics include the uneven distri-
bution of labor and income, changes in the demographic composition of
the economy, conicts between agents with di¤erent interests, or sub-
group di¤erences in behavior to name but a few. Addressing such topics
theoretically requires the use of heterogeneous-agents models.
This thesis presents four applications of heterogeneous-agents mod-
els. Chapters 2 and 3 present essays on the political economy of the
welfare-state in the presence of income heterogeneity. Chapters 4 and
5 present essays on heterogenous-agents models addressing empirically
observed di¤erences in labor supply by gender, marital status, and wage
potentials.
Chapters 2 and 3 deal with political economy under imperfect in-
formation. Taking into account imperfect information has proven to be
useful in explaining a wide range of seemingly irrational observations in
di¤erent elds of economics (see e.g. Sims 2003 and Veldkamp 2009 for
examples in monetary economics and nance). The essays presented in
Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that two puzzling observations in voting
behavior can be explained within simple models of majority voting when
one incorporates imperfect information.
Choices under imperfect information seem especially relevant in the
eld of political economy. When information is costly, each individual
voter has little incentive to be informed since the impact of individ-
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ual votes is negligible (Downs 1957). In democracy, social choices may
therefore be made by a continuum of poorly informed individuals.
Chapter 2 addresses the relation between the skewness of the in-
come distribution and the redistribution of income by the government.
Full-information models of voting on redistribution state that the degree
of income redistribution should depend positively on income skewness
(Meltzer and Richard 1981). Accordingly, income redistribution should
increase when the skewness of the income distribution increases. Em-
pirically, the opposite is frequently observed (see e.g. Rodríguez 1999
and Kenworthy and McCall 2008). Chapter 2 demonstrates that this
observation can be rationalized in a majority-voting model (in the style
of Romer 1975, Roberts 1977, and Meltzer and Richard 1981) when
incorporating imperfect information.
The chapter presents a model where agents are heterogeneous with
respect to income and have heterogeneous expectations due to imper-
fect information. In this model, it is important to distinguish between
sources of changes in income skewness. Two sources of such changes are
discussed: rising polarization and upward mobility, which both increase
income skewness. In the model, these developments a¤ect redistribution
in di¤erent ways.
Rising polarization, i.e. income growth of the rich, increases the
degree of redistribution sought by agents in the middle of the income
distribution which unambiguously increases the rate of redistribution
implemented in the political process. Upward mobility, i.e. the catching-
up of some agents to richer population groups, additionally shifts voting
power to richer population groups. Under imperfect information, this
can lead to a median voter who votes for less redistribution even though
this voter would in fact gain from more redistribution.
Reasonable degrees of informational imperfection are su¢ cient to
generate increasing income skewness and decreasing redistribution in the
presence of upward mobility. While previous contributions on imperfect-
information models of voting behavior (e.g. Laslier, Trannoy, and van der
Straeten 2003 and Hansen 2005) have focussed on the level of government
size or redistribution, the model presented in Chapter 2 shows that the
imperfect-information framework can also be used to explain seemingly
anomalous changes in these measures.
Chapter 3 of this thesis addresses the asymmetry between the speed
of implementations of public interventions and the speed of their re-
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movals (as observed by e.g. Lindbeck 2003 and Hercowitz and Straw-
czynski 2004). Especially welfare-state measures tend to persist even
when they seem to have become suboptimal due to changes in the eco-
nomic environment. Such persistence seems anomalous in light of voting
models with perfectly informed voters who should remove any subopti-
mal system immediately.
The essay presented in Chapter 3 proposes an information-based ex-
planation for the persistence of the welfare state. The chapter presents
a structural model where rationally inattentive voters decide upon im-
plementations and removals of social insurance. In this model, welfare-
state persistence arises from disincentive e¤ects of social insurance on
attentiveness. The welfare state crowds out private nancial precautions
and with it agentsattentiveness to changes in economic fundamentals.
When welfare-state arrangements are pronounced, agents realize changes
in economic fundamentals later and reforms have considerable delays.
Previous contributions (Hassler, Rodríguez Mora, Storesletten, and Zili-
botti 2003; Beetsma, Cukierman, and Giuliodori 2009) have attributed
welfare-state persistence to the e¤ects of welfare-state measures on the
future distributional conict, whereas the model presented in Chapter
3 demonstrates that, in a set-up similar to Hassler, Rodríguez Mora,
Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2003), welfare-state persistence can also arise
due to informational imperfections.
While it has been important in Chapters 3 and 4 that economic
agents di¤er by income and expectations, Chapters 4 and 5 focus on
heterogeneity by gender and marital status. This part of the thesis
considers labor supply by di¤erent population subgroups. Chapter 4
addresses the observed distinct trends in hours worked by subgroups
formed by gender and marital status. Chapter 5 focusses on married
women and further disaggregates their hours worked by characteristics
of the husband. The models presented in the chapters are collective
household models (Chiappori 1988; Chiappori 1992) which consider the
household as a group of individuals with di¤erent interests rather than
a single decision unit.
Chapter 4 investigates trends in labor supply by gender and marital
status in the US over the last decades. Heterogeneous households and
the possibility to trade home labor are incorporated into a household
model of labor supply (in the style of Jones, Manuelli, and McGrat-
tan 2003). The chapter demonstrates that the observed group-specic
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trends in hours can simultaneously be explained as optimal reactions
to rising attractiveness of outsourcing labor in home production within
such model.
When more households decide to outsource labor in home production,
some agents previously engaged in this activity gain time for market
work. Thus market hours of married women, single women, and single
men increase. The e¤ect on married women is strongest since they tend
to work most in home production due to intra-household specialization.
Married men, by contrast, are a¤ected in the opposite direction. Average
market hours in this group decrease since some married men loose intra-
household bargaining power due to the improved earnings potentials on
the market for home labor which favor their wives.
A quantitative version of the model is successful at matching the
trends in hours by gender and marital status. This version of the model
is used to assess the relative importance of di¤erent explanations for the
trends in hours at the subgroup level. In line with previous studies (see
e.g. Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan 2003 and Eckstein and Lifshitz
2009), the results indicate that gender-specic developments in wages
are important but not su¢ cient to explain the observed trends. Taking
into account increased outsourcing of labor in home production improves
the models predictions for all four subgroups.
Chapter 5 of this thesis investigates the pattern of wiveshours dis-
aggregated by the husbands wage decile. In the US, this pattern has
changed from downward-sloping to hump-shaped (see e.g. Juhn and
Murphy 1997 and Schwartz 2010). The chapter demonstrates that this
development can be explained within a standard model of household
specialization (in the style of Apps and Rees 1997) when taking into
account trends in assortative mating (as documented by e.g. Pencavel
1998 and Morissette and Hou 2008 for education).
The chapter presents a model in which assortative mating determines
the wage ratios within individual couples and thus the e¢ cient time
allocation of spouses. The economy-wide pattern of wives hours by
the husbands wage depends on the degree of assortative mating. With
high degrees of assortative mating, men with high wages are married
to women with high own earnings potentials who, consequently, work
much. The pattern of wiveshours by the husbands wage is therefore
increasing when the degree of assortative mating is high. By contrast,
under random mating, this pattern is decreasing. In this situation, cou-
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ples in which the husbands wage is high have the strongest incentives for
intra-household specialization. Wives in these couples then supply the
fewest market labor on average, as observed in the data in the 1970s.
Intermediate degrees of assortative mating are a mixture of the extreme
situations. With the e¤ects of assortative mating being dominant at the
low end of the wage distribution and the e¤ects of random mating being
dominant at the other end, the pattern of wiveshours by the husbands
wage is hump-shaped as observed empirically in recent years.
A quantitative analysis of the model suggests that changes in the
gender wage gap are responsible for the overall increase in hours worked
by wives. By contrast, the fact that the most pronounced increase has
been observed for wives married to high-wage men is a result of trends
in assortative mating.
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Imperfect Information and
the Meltzer-Richard
Hypothesis
2.1 Introduction
It is a common view that democratically implemented income redistribu-
tion should always favor the receiver of the median income. In this view,
the individually optimal degree of redistribution is a downward-sloping
function of ones income and the median income receiver is thus also
the median voter. A clear-cut prediction that arises from such consid-
eration is the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis (Meltzer and Richard 1981):
the extent of redistribution rises when the mean-to-median ratio of the
income distribution increases since the median voter will then gain more
from redistribution. Income skewness and redistribution should thus be
positively related. In this chapter1, I show that, in a model with imper-
fect information, redistribution can also decrease in response to a rise in
income skewness depending on the source of such rise.
The Meltzer-Richard hypothesis is an important part of economic
arguing. The negative link between income inequality and economic
growth (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson and Tabellini 1994) builds on
this hypothesis. The argument that more unequal societies have slower
growth relies on the disincentive e¤ects caused by more pronounced in-
come redistribution sought by the relatively poorer median voter.
1The chapter is based on Bredemeier (2010a).
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However, empirical evidence regarding the link between income skew-
ness and redistribution is anything as clear as the theoretical prediction.
While a positive relation between income skewness and redistribution is
indeed observed in some empirical studies, there are also studies which
report the opposite. Cross-country studies nd evidence supporting the
Meltzer-Richard hypothesis (Easterly and Rebelo 1993; Lindert 1996;
Milanovic 2000; Mohl and Pamp 2009) as well as contradictory results
(Keefer and Knack 1995; Perotti 1996; Bassett, Burkett, and Putter-
man 1999). Cross-sectional studies within one country reveal evidence
in favor of the hypothesis at the municipality level (Alesina, Baqir, and
Easterly 2000 for the US, Borge and Rattsø 2004 for Norway) or compar-
ing Brazilian states (Mattos and Rocha 2008) but also rejecting ndings
at the level of US states (Gouveia and Masia 1998; Rodríguez 1999).
Concerning time-series evidence, the study by Meltzer and Richard
(1983) supports the theoretical prediction. The authors analyze US time
series data of government spending and conclude that the spending level
is positively related to the mean-to-median income ratio. Subsequent
studies on similar questions arrive at the contrary (Rodríguez 1999; Ken-
worthy and McCall 2008). These studies report situations of increasing
income skewness that are accompanied by cut-backs in the welfare state.
Such episodes include e.g. the reductions in redistributive e¤orts imple-
mented by the Reagan and Thatcher administrations around 1980 when
mean-to-median income ratios were steadily increasing. Such develop-
ments are alien to a standard majority voting model.
In this chapter, I argue that it is not su¢ cient to consider the skew-
ness of the income distribution alone. When income skewness changes,
it is important to distinguish between sources of such changes. I discuss
two developments in the income distribution which have the same e¤ect
on skewness but may a¤ect democratically implemented redistribution
in di¤erent ways: rising polarization and upward mobility. Rising polar-
ization is a development where those who are rich anyway become even
richer. Thus di¤erences between population groups become more severe
and the population more polarized (see e.g. Esteban and Ray 1994).2 In
contrast to this, upward mobility describes a development where initially
poor individuals catch up to richer population groups and move up in
2Polarization would also increase if poor agents became poorer. However, this
would decrease the mean-to-median income ratio. I will thus concentrate on the case
where rich agents become richer and use the term rising polarizationaccordingly.
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the income distribution (see e.g. Bénabou and Ok 2001).
These two developments are illustrated in Figure 2.1. Panel (a) of
the gure shows a log-normal income distribution with its mean (dotted
vertical line) exceeding its median (thin vertical line). In panel (b),
the same distribution is represented by the thin curve. The thick curve
represents the distribution after a rise in polarization, i.e. an income
increase for some agents above mean income. Correspondingly, more
mass lies at the very right tail of the distribution. Mean income rises
while median income is not a¤ected. Finally, panel (c) of the gure
illustrates an example of upward mobility. Here, starting from the log-
normal distribution (thin curve), some agents poorer than the median
move towards richer population groups. Reecting this, less mass lies at
the very left tail of the distribution. Also in this scenario, mean income
increases and median income is constant.
Both developments increase income skewness and therefore have the
same e¤ect on redistribution in a voting model with perfect information.
However, in a model with imperfect information, these developments af-
fect redistribution in di¤erent ways. While rising polarization generates
the standard e¤ect, upward mobility can result in decreasing redistribu-
tion.
The importance of informational imperfections in democratic deci-
sion making has been stressed by Downs (1957). Downs pointed out
that even small information costs can lead voters to be rationally igno-
rant and cause pronounced uncertainty about issues important for the
optimal vote. Understood broadly, imperfect information also comprises
all di¤erences between complete information and information that is re-
ected in behavior (Sims 2003). Such di¤erences can arise from cognitive
di¤erences at any stage in the process between observing an information
and the implementation of the appropriate response. Even with perfect
information available, if voters choose not to use all information, have
di¢ culties guring out the appropriate response, or make mistakes while
translating decisions into behavior, political decisions may appear as if
voters had imperfect information in the rst place. It is an important
feature of the model presented in this chapter that agents who are iden-
tical except for beliefs can vote di¤erently. In the model, this is a result
of imperfect information which may, however, not be the only reason for
the existence of such di¤erences in votes. They would also occur if vot-
ers had perfect information but made random mistakes in determining
8
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Figure 2.1: Three income distributions (thick curves) with mean (thick
vertical line), median (thin vertical line), and baseline log-normal distri-
bution (thin curve).
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the optimal tax rate or, in the terminology of e.g. Shue and Luttmer
(2009), misvoted. Recent papers use concepts related to imperfect in-
formation to study voting behavior, both theoretically (Gershkov and
Szentes 2009; Hansen 2005; Dhami 2003) and empirically (Mullainathan
and Washington 2009; Shue and Luttmer 2009).
This chapter presents a model of direct democracy with selsh voters,
perfect markets, and complete enforcement in which the relation between
income skewness and redistribution depends on the causes of changes in
income skewness. The model is a version of the Romer-Roberts-Meltzer-
Richard model (Romer 1975; Roberts 1977; Meltzer and Richard 1981).
Agents di¤er with respect to their productivity and, in consequence,
income. The main di¤erence to the standard model is imperfect infor-
mation about the productivity distribution. Under perfect information,
the extent of redistribution would be determined by the interest of the
median-income earner with high-income agents wishing less redistribu-
tion and low-income agents more.
In this model, the optimal vote for an agent depends on her own pro-
ductivity and the average productivity in the economy. While the agent
knows her own productivity for sure, she is assumed to be only imper-
fectly informed about productivities of others and thus about average
productivity. Such assumption can be justied by the empirical ndings
of e.g. Betts (1996) and Ellison, Lusk, and Briggeman (2010). Betts
(1996) nd that people tend to misestimate average wages even in their
own industry. Furthermore, perceptions di¤er across individuals with
a variation coe¢ cient of roughly 30%. Ellison, Lusk, and Briggeman
(2010) report even higher variations of beliefs when people are asked to
estimate the income of other population groups.
The model population is populated by three classes of agents who
di¤er by productivity, a lower, a middle, and an upper class. Within
classes, agents are identical except for beliefs about the productivity
distribution. Votes on the degree of income redistribution are based on
these beliefs and consequently even agents with the same productivity
can vote di¤erently. However, this does not happen in the lower and
upper classes. In these classes, agents are sure to be at the bottom or
the top of the distribution no matter how it is shaped. Independent of
their beliefs about the shape of the distribution, these individuals will
vote for either maximum redistribution or none at all.
In the middle class, the informational imperfection is relevant.
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Agents in this class are in the interior of the productivity distribution.
And since votes depend on individualsrelative productivity, the exact
shape of the distribution is important for these voters. Even though
agents in the middle class have the same productivity, they di¤er in
their beliefs about the average productivity of others. In the middle
class, there is thus a distribution of votes around the optimal vote. The
election outcome is determined by the vote of the economy-wide median
voter. Voting powers of the upper and lower classes determine which
vote from the distribution of middle-class votes is decisive.
In this set-up, it is important to distinguish between causes of changes
in the mean-to-median income ratio when analyzing the e¤ect on redis-
tribution. When income skewness rises, the optimal rate of redistri-
bution for the middle class increases. Under rising polarization, this
unambiguously increases implemented redistribution. However, upward
mobility has a second, counter-acting e¤ect. When some agents catch
up to richer population groups, shifts in voting power move the quantile
of the median voter in the belief distribution towards voting for fewer
redistribution. Depending on the magnitude of the informational imper-
fection, the second e¤ect can dominate the rst one and one can observe
a negative relation between income skewness and redistribution.
Upward mobility is more likely to cause decreasing redistribution
the more people disagree in their beliefs about average income in the
economy. A quantication of model parameters shows that empirically
reasonable degrees of disagreement are su¢ cient for the second e¤ect to
dominate. Empirical evidence on developments in the income distribu-
tion like Esteban and Ray (1994) and the key gures of the Luxembourg
Income Study support the view that seemingly anomalous reductions in
redistribution around 1980 were indeed preceded by upward mobility.
Some previous contributions on imperfect information in models of
voting on redistribution have studied related questions. Dhami (2003)
analyzes the e¤ects of inequality on redistribution in a model of repre-
sentative democracy where voters have asymmetric information about
politiciansredistributive ambitions. Hansen (2005) and Laslier, Tran-
noy, and van der Straeten (2003) use similar models to the one presented
in this chapter. Hansen (2005) uses a Romer-Roberts-Meltzer-Richard
type model with imperfect information about government e¢ ciency and
studies biases in the level of government size that can arise due to the
information friction. Laslier, Trannoy, and van der Straeten (2003) ad-
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dress the topic of overtaxation in a model with uncertainty about the
potential productivity of the unemployed. Both studies however do not
cover the relation between changes in income skewness and changes in
redistribution.
Bénabou and Ok (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) have
studied the inuence of a prospect of upward mobility on voting decisions
under perfect information. They demonstrate that such prospect can
lead to less income redistribution. These studies however do not perform
a comparative-static analysis of how election outcomes change once some
agents have actually experienced upward mobility.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2
describes the set-up of the model and solves for individual decisions
and collective choices. Section 2.3 presents a comparative-static analysis
of changes in the mean-to-median ratio distinguishing between rising
polarization and upward mobility. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Model set-up
In this section, I describe the structure of the model. It is a version of
the Romer-Roberts-Meltzer-Richard model (Romer 1975; Roberts 1977;
Meltzer and Richard 1981). Agents di¤er with respect to their produc-
tivity and, in consequence, income. In contrast to the standard model,
agents are imperfectly informed about the productivity distribution.
Preferences and Technology. I consider an economy that is popu-
lated by a mass-1 continuum of agents behaving according to the follow-
ing preferences:
ui = ci   
2
n2i , (2.1)
where ci denotes agent is consumption and ni is the amount of hours
worked. If working, agents produce consumption goods yi with linear
technology
yi = aini, (2.2)
where ai is an agent-specic productivity.
The composition of the economy is characterized by discrete di¤er-
ences in productivity. There are three productivity levels. Agents either
have a low productivity normalized to 0, a medium one, a1, or a high
12
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Figure 2.2: Two examples of a productivity distribution.
one, a2, where a2 =
p
  a1,  > 1. Agents with zero productivity
will decide not to work. The population can thus be split up into three
groups, which are labeled according to their productivities:
(i) an upper class with high-productivity agents, labeled "H" for high
(ii) a middle class with medium-productivity agents, labeled "M" for
medium
(iii) a lower class with agents who do not work, labeled "L" for low
Group sizes are denoted by sL, sM , and sH , respectively, sL + sM +
sH = 1. I assume that no group contains more than mass 12 of agents.
This assumption guarantees that the median gross income falls into
group M .
Note that both,  and sH
sL
are determinants of the skewness of the
productivity distribution, which is illustrated in Figure 2.2. With
p
 =
13
sH+sL
sH
the distribution is symmetric (as in the upper part of the gure
where sH = sL and  = 4 ). If
p
 > sH+sL
sH
, the distribution is skewed
to the right (as in the lower part of the gure where still sH = sL but
 > 4 ) and vice versa. Skewness of the income distribution, which is
key for the extent of redistribution sought by the middle class, jointly
results from the skewness of the productivity distribution together with
endogenous labor supply decisions.
Political Environment. The economy redistributes income through
a linear income tax  , the proceeds of which are to be distributed equally
among the total population. Thus, an agents net amount of consump-
tion is a linear combination of his own gross earnings and the average
earnings in the economy,
ci = (1  )  yi +   y, (2.3)
where y denotes the average gross income.3
The redistribution rate  2 [0; 1] is determined in direct democracy
by pairwise votes over proposals. All agents participate in this vote.
Furthermore, I assume that agents vote truthfully in the sense that they
vote for their individual expected-utility maximizing  . Since any single
voter has zero mass in this model, I abstain from analyzing strategic
voting behavior and assume "sincere" (Bearse, Cardak, Glomm, and
Ravikumar 2009) or "naive" (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1997) voting.
Informational Environment. Agents are aware of the structure of
the economy and know all parameter values except for other agents
productivities. The latter reects the empirical evidence that there is
disagreement about other peoples wages (Betts 1996; Ellison, Lusk, and
Briggeman 2010). For agents in groups M and H, this is tantamount
to not knowing the productivity parameter . This parameter measures
the di¤erence between the middle and the upper class and is one deter-
minant of the skewness of the productivity distribution. The parameter
is drawn from a uniform distribution on (1;1). Agents cannot observe
this draw. After  is drawn, each agent receives an imperfect signal
Si about , which equals the true value in expectation. Agents sig-
3The literature on voting about redistribution usually studies voting on the pa-
rameterization of some given redistribution scheme. In more general set-ups, voting
equilibria may not exist (see e.g. Mueller 2003).
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nals are independently drawn from an identical uniform distribution on
[  "; + "].
Even though agents do not know othersproductivities with certainty,
they know their own group and the ordering of productivities by groups.
I.e. agents know that
a2 > a1 > 0. (2.4)
For analytical simplicity, I will restrict the analysis to parameter con-
stellations which fulll
 > 1 + 2" (2.5)
such that no signal contradicts condition (2.4). Furthermore, under this
condition, beliefs will not be biased. For the main results of the model,
this parameter restriction is innocuous since unbiasedness of beliefs is
not crucial.
Time Structure. The timing of events is the following. First, the
productivity parameter  is drawn. The draw is unobservable for agents.
Second, agents receive signals

Si
	
and update their beliefs. Third, the
election over the redistribution parameter  takes place and the median
vote is implemented. Fourth, agents decide how much to work and
produce gross income. Finally, redistribution is performed and goods
are consumed.
2.2.2 Individual decisions
In this section, I present the optimal decisions of individual agents. De-
tailed derivations of decisions at the individual level can be found in the
appendix.
Labor supply decisions and income distribution. Agents have
to decide on how much they want to work. When taking this decision,
agents take into account the degree of income redistribution. For agents
in group L, it is optimal not to work while agents in the other groups
work positive hours. Equalizing marginal benets and costs from work-
ing, given a tax rate  , results in
ni =
(1  ) ai

8i. (2.6)
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Figure 2.3: Example of a productivity and the corresponding income
distribution ( = 1 

), relative income di¤erence: yH
yM
= .
Redistribution reduces labor supply through a standard disincentive ef-
fect. It has the same e¤ect on aggregate income, which is
y = (1  )  1

 sM  (a1)2 + sH  (a2)2 (2.7)
as a result of individual labor supply decisions.
Labor supply decisions as described by equation (2.6) imply that
income is a quadratic function of productivity as can be seen from Figure
2.3. The mean-to-median income ratio is
y=

(1  )   1  (a1)2

= sM + sH. (2.8)
The income distribution is skewed to the right and the mean-to-median
ratio greater than 1 if  > sH+sL
sH
and vice versa.
Preferred tax rates. When agents vote for a certain tax rate  , they
form rational expectations about the disincentive e¤ects of redistribu-
tion. Rationally anticipating subsequent labor supply decisions of all
agents, an agent votes for the tax rate which maximizes her expected
indirect utility.
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For a non-working agent, i 2 L, transfers are the only source of
income. Since she does not work, expected indirect utility is
Eiui =   (1  )  1

 sMEi (a1)2 + sHEi (a2)2 8i 2 L. (2.9)
The tax rate which maximizes expected indirect utility for this agent is
independent of expected productivities and
 i =
1
2
8i 2 L, (2.10)
which is the La¤er-curve maximizer in this model. For agents in this
group, the optimal rate of redistribution does not depend on the shape
of the income distribution. They are transfer receivers independent of
the exact shape of the distribution.
In contrast to this, the skewness of the distribution matters for the
preferred tax rate of agents in the middle class. Agents in this group
receive their own net income as well as transfers and incur utility losses
from working. Their expected indirect utility is
Eiui =(1  )2 (a1)
2

+   (1  )  sM (a1)
2 + sHEi (a1)
2

  
2
 (1  )
2 (a1)
2
2
8i 2M ,
(2.11)
which is maximized by
 i = max

1  (sM + sHEi)
1  2 (sM + sHEi) ; 0

8i 2M . (2.12)
Equation (2.12) is the belief-vote mapping for middle-class agents. The
term in the round brackets is the expected mean-to-median income ratio.
All agents determine their vote according to their perceived position
relative to mean income. For agents in the middle class, this coincides
to the perceived mean-to-median income ratio. The preferred tax rate
of a middle-class agent is a (weakly) upward sloping function of her
expectation of productivity di¤erences, Ei. When Ei is relatively
high, the agent believes that income di¤erences between the upper and
the middle class are pronounced and that she can gain much from taxing
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the members of the upper class. In the opposite case, when Ei is
relatively low, the agents believes to pay more taxes in order to nance
transfers to the lower class. A middle-class agent i votes for positive
redistribution only if the expected mean-to-median ratio is above 1, i.e.
if she believes the income distribution is skewed to the right.4
Finally, members of the upper class can only loose from redistribu-
tion. Their expected indirect utility,
Eiui =(1  )2 (a2)
2

+   (1  )  sMEi
 
 1=2a2
2
+ sH (a2)
2

  
2
 (1  )
2 (a2)
2
2
8i 2 H ,
(2.13)
is a strictly downward sloping function of the tax rate  , since agents
know for sure that  > 1. Agents in group H therefore vote for
 i = 0 8i 2 H. (2.14)
Considering the expected indirect utility functions (2.9), (2.11), and
(2.13), one can see that all have a unique maximizer on [0; 1]. Thus,
preferences over  are single-peaked for all agents. When determining
election outcomes, the median-voter theorem is therefore applicable.
2.2.3 Belief formation and belief distribution
To determine the median voter, the distribution of votes has to be con-
sidered. Since agents in group M vote based on subjective beliefs, the
distribution of beliefs needs to be determined rst. This distribution
arises as a result of agents belief updating based on their individual
signals.
The structure of the economy is common knowledge. However, before
receiving the signal, agents only know that  is not less than 1. All
values above 1 are equally likely from the perspective of agents. An
agents prior belief about the productivity di¤erence  is thus a uniform
distribution on (1;1).
4The expression on the right hand side of equation (2.12) is also positive if the
expected mean-to-median ratio is less than one half and would then describe a min-
imizer outside [0; 1]. However, this case is excluded by the assumed restrictions on
group sizes.
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The signal Si carries information about values of  which are im-
possible. Specically, after receiving her signal, an agent knows that 
cannot be above si + " or below 
s
i   ". Such values would not have
been compatible with the signal. Under condition (2.5), it holds that
si   " > 1. The support of the posterior distribution is thus
Si   "; Si + "

.
Since the signal is uniformly distributed, the agent can not di¤er-
entiate between values in the support. All values  2 Si   "; Si + "
are associated with the same density for the received signal Si . The
posterior distribution is thus uniform on above support.
Correspondingly, the posterior expectation of agent i is the arith-
metic mean of the upper and the lower bound of the support:
i = Ei [] = 
S
i . (2.15)
Since there is a continuum of agents, each possible signal realization
on [  "; + "] is drawn by an equal mass of agents. According to
(2.15), all agents build mean beliefs equal to their received signals. The
distribution of mean belief is thus identical to the distribution of signals
and given by
g () =
(
1
2"
;   "    + "
0; else
, (2.16)
where g () denotes the density of a specic belief . The distribution
of beliefs is the same across all groups and equal to the economy-wide
distribution described by equation (2.16). Beliefs are unbiased, i.e. the
economy-wide mean belief is true,  =
R
g () d = . Nevertheless,
almost every agent misestimates  in one or the other direction.
2.2.4 Election outcomes
Since preferences over the tax rate  are single peaked, the median vote
is the unique Condorcet winner. The cumulative density F of votes and
the determination of the median voter are illustrated in Figure 2.4. The
distribution of votes in the economy is as follows: On the one hand,
there is a mass of people at both extremes. Fraction sH of agents (the
upper class H) vote for zero redistribution, F (0) = sH . Fraction sL of
agents (the lower class L) vote for the La¤er-curve maximizing tax rate,
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Figure 2.4: The distribution of votes and the election outcome.
F
 
1
2

= 1  sL. On the other hand, there is non-degenerate distribution
of votes between these two extremes. Since beliefs about  di¤er across
agents, votes of agents in the M group di¤er from one another. Beliefs
are unbiased within groups, therefore the optimal tax rate for the middle
class,  optM , is always the median of the vote distribution within the M
group.
Where the economy-wide median voter is located depends on relative
group sizes. As neither group L nor groupH contains at least 50% of the
population, the median voter is surely a member of the M group. The
economy-wide median voter, m; is the agent whose preferred tax rate m
is such thatM -group voters of mass 1
2
 sH opt for less redistribution than
herself since mass sH of voters vote for zero redistribution anyway. Thus
the median voter is at the lower
1
2
 sH
sM
quantile of the vote distribution
within the M group. For agents in the middle class,  i is an upward
sloping function of Ei, see equation (2.12). Therefore, the median
voter is also at the lower qm =
1
2
 sH
sM
quantile of subjective expectations
of income di¤erences .
The distribution of subjective expectations is characterized by equa-
tion (2.16). Since the distribution is uniform on [  "; + "], the lower
qm quantile can be calculated as (1  qm)  (  ") + qm  (+ "). The
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median voters expectation of  is thus
m = +
sL   sH
sM
". (2.17)
If and in which direction the median voters belief di¤ers from the truth,
depends on the relative sizes of the upper and lower class.5 Applying the
belief-vote mapping of the middle class (2.12) to this belief, the preferred
redistribution rate of the median voter and thus the implemented rate
of redistribution is
m = max

1  (sM + sHm)
1  2 (sM + sHm)
; 0

. (2.18)
Positive redistribution occurs when
+
sL   sH
sM
" >
sL
sH
+ 1, (2.19)
i.e. when the median voter believes the income distribution to be right
skewed and, equivalently, the mean-to-median income ratio to exceed 1.
In this framework with imperfect information, implemented redistri-
bution does not necessarily have to be optimal for the median-income
receiver as it would have to be under perfect information. The imple-
mented tax rate given by equation (2.18) coincides with the optimal tax
rate for agents in the middle class only if the lower and the upper class
are of equal size. Then, by coincidence, the median voter will be ex-
actly in the center of the belief distribution of the middle class and have
unbiased beliefs about the productivity distribution.
If upper and lower class are of unequal size, however, the median
voter will be someone who misestimates the skewness of the produc-
tivity distribution and therefore votes for a potentially suboptimal re-
distribution rate. The larger of the two other groups forms a majority
together with a minority of the middle class which misestimates pro-
ductivity skewness. This majority can prevent any lower or higher tax
rate even if it would improve the situation of some of its members (who,
however, are not aware of this).
5To obtain the expression for m in equation (2.17), use that sL + sM + sH = 1.
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2.3 Changes in Income Skewness
Standard models of voting on redistribution predict that the extent of
redistribution increases in the mean-to-median income ratio. The em-
pirical evidence on this prediction is mixed (see Section 2.1). In this
section, I analyze how changes in the mean-to-median income ratio af-
fect election outcomes in this model.
Here, the mean-to-median income ratio can change due to two deve-
lopments. Skewness can change because of rising polarization, i.e. by an
income increase of the rich relative to the middle class (captured by an
increase in the parameter ) or by upward mobility, i.e. by some agents
catching up to richer ones (captured by an increase in sM or sH). While
these two scenarios have similar impact on the skewness of the income
distribution, their e¤ect on the vote distribution di¤ers. The reason is
that while the rst scenario simply moves earnings shares to the right of
the distribution, the second also moves voting power.
2.3.1 Rising polarization
Consider rst the case of rising polarization, i.e. an increase in the rel-
ative productivity of the upper class, and assume the parameter  rises
from  to pol, with pol > . Figure 2.5 illustrates the e¤ects of ris-
ing polarization on income skewness. The left panel shows a symmetric
distribution where mean and median income are identical. A symmetric
distribution is chosen only for illustrational purposes in the gure, subse-
quent results do not require symmetry. The right part shows the income
distribution after a rise in polarization. Due to income growth of the
upper class, mean income (thick dashed line) has risen while median in-
come (thin dashed line) has remained constant. The rise in polarization
has thus led to an increased mean-to-median ratio.
The e¤ects of this change on the implemented redistribution rate are
illustrated graphically in Figure 2.6. The thin dashed line represents the
initial vote distribution with  =  whereas the thick solid line stands
for the new vote distribution associated with  = pol.
Since group sizes are constant, the median voters quantile in the
belief distribution remains unchanged. As the economy-wide mean belief
shifts to pol, the median voters belief, as given by equation (2.17),
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Figure 2.5: Income Distribution, mean (thick dashed line), and median
(thin dashed line) income before and after polarization (pol > ,  =
1 

).
increases as well,
polm = 
pol +
sL   sH
sM
" > m. (2.20)
According to the belief-vote mapping in the middle class (2.12), the
implemented redistribution rate is now
 polm = max
24 1   sM + sHpolm 
1  2

sM + sH
pol
m
 ; 0
35  m
and either larger or equal than with the lower di¤erence in productivities,
.
The intuition behind this result is the following. Since the mean-to-
median income ratio increases, the optimal rate of redistribution for the
middle class rises. Group sizes are constant and thus the median voter
misestimates income skewness by the same absolute deviation. The me-
dian voters belief about the mean-to-median income ratio thus increases
and so does her vote. Consequently, the winning tax rate rises.
Thus, the model predicts that, in reaction to an income increase for
the rich, one observes indeed a positive correlation between the mean-
to-median income ratio and redistribution. This prediction is equivalent
to the standard models one and corresponds to the Meltzer-Richard
hypothesis.
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Figure 2.6: Vote distribution before (thin dashed line) and after (thick
solid line) polarization (pol > ).
2.3.2 Upward mobility
E¤ects are not as clear if the mean-to-median income ratio changes due
to changes in relative group sizes. Consider a scenario where the upper
class grows at the expense of the lower class (for simplicity with constant
size of the middle class). Assume that group sizes change from sL,
sM , sH to sumL , sM , s
um
H , with s
um
L < sL and s
um
H > sH . Figure 2.7
illustrates the e¤ects of upward mobility on income skewness. Starting
from a symmetric distribution (left panel), upward mobility increases
mean income (thick dashed line) while median income (thin dashed line)
is not a¤ected since it lies still in group M . Thus the mean-to-median
ratio is larger after upward mobility (right panel).
The consequences of this scenario on redistribution are illustrated
in Figure 2.8. Again, the thin dashed line stands for the initial vote
distribution and the thick solid line represents the vote distribution after
upward mobility.
Since the compositional change a¤ects the skewness of the income
distribution, it alters the belief-vote mapping of the middle class. For
a given belief about productivity di¤erences, i, the agents expected
mean-to-median income ratio, sM + sHi; increases with sH and so does
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Figure 2.7: Income Distribution, mean (thick dashed line), and median
(thin dashed line) income before and after upward mobility (sumL < sL,
sumH > sH ,  =
1 

).
her vote. Agent i 2M with belief i now votes for
umi = max

1  (sM + sumH i)
1  2 (sM + sumH i)
; 0

  i.
In the gure, this e¤ect is manifested in the movement of the non-
degenerate part of the distribution to the right. This increase in re-
distribution sought by the middle class does, however, not imply that
the winning tax rate necessarily increases as well.
When the upper class increases in size, voting power shifts towards
this group as well. In the gure, this is associated with an upward
movement of the non-degenerate part of the distribution, since more
mass lies at zero redistribution. As a consequence, the position of the
economy-wide median voter within the belief distribution moves to the
left. The median voters belief about productivity di¤erences, as given
by equation (2.17), is now
umm = +
sumL   sumH
sM
" < m.
These two developments result in an ambiguous e¤ect on the imple-
mented redistribution rate. While the increase in redistribution sought
by the middle class tends to increase implemented redistribution, the
shift in voting power has the opposite e¤ect.
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Figure 2.8: Vote distribution before (thin dashed line) and after (thick
solid line) upward mobility (sumL < sL, s
um
H > sH).
Which e¤ect is dominant depends on the degree of informational im-
perfections as measured by the dispersion of the signal, ". To determine
a threshold for ", it is useful to consider the median voters expected
mean-to-median income ratio, sM + sH  m, which is positively linked
to implemented redistribution, see equation (2.18). Using the median
voters belief m from equation (2.17) and eliminating the size of the
lower class, the median voters expected mean-to-median income ratio is
Emy=ym = sM + sH

+
1  sM   2sH
sM
 "

. (2.21)
The e¤ects of upward mobility can be studied by considering the mar-
ginal derivatives of (2.21) to group sizes. When some agents move
from group L to group H, this leads to decreasing redistribution if
" >   sM
sM+4sH 1 . Another, potentially more realistic, case of upward
mobility is a movement of agents from group L to group M . Such deve-
lopment decreases redistribution if
" >
(sM)
2
sH  (1  2sH) , (2.22)
i.e. if informational imperfections are pronounced enough.
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In other words, upward mobility is more likely to cause decreasing
redistribution the more people disagree in their beliefs about the income
distribution in the economy. If condition (2.22) is fullled, an increase in
sM leads to the mean-to-median income ratio and redistribution moving
into opposite directions. The Meltzer-Richard hypothesis is then turned
upside-down.
How likely is it that condition (2.22) is fullled, i.e. that informa-
tional imperfections are strong enough for upward mobility to decrease
redistribution? Suppose that group sizes are equal, i.e. sH = sM = sL =
1
3
. Under this quantication, condition (2.22) gives a threshold value for
" of 1. To put this number into perspective, it is useful to calculate the
variation coe¢ cient of perceived average income for which an empirical
counterpart is reported by Betts (1996). Doing this requires a quan-
tication for  which I derive by matching the empirical US mean-to-
median income ratio. In 2008, the mean-to-median income ratio among
US households was 1:37.6 With equal group sizes, this implies  = 3:12
in this model, according to equation (2.8). Under the belief distribu-
tion (2.16), this quantication for , ", and group sizes gives a variation
coe¢ cient of perceived average income of
qR
(Eiy   y)2 di=y t 14%:
Since Betts (1996) nds that peoplesbeliefs even about average wages
in their own industry di¤er by a variation coe¢ cient of roughly 30%,
this magnitude does not seem implausibly high.
The models prediction concerning the consequences of a rise in in-
come skewness is in general not clear. If income skewness increases due
to increased polarization, redistribution does unambiguously increase.
If, however, an increase in income skewness is caused by upward mobil-
ity, redistribution may decrease. This ambiguity can be seen as a reason
for why, in reality, one sometimes observes positive relationships between
redistribution and income skewness and sometimes the opposite.
2.3.3 Evidence
In this section, I consider some empirical evidence on developments in in-
come distributions in the time around the year 1980 which form a major
anomaly to the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis. The Reagan administration
in the US and the government of Thatcher in the UK were massively
reducing redistributive spending although mean-to-median ratios of pre-
6Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008 American Community Survey.
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tax income distributions were steadily increasing (see e.g. Rodríguez
1999). The model evaluation above proposes to determine the drivers
of the increasing income skewness in that time. I will focus on the late
1970s, the time preceding Reagans and Thatchers rst elections into
o¢ ce (1980 and 1979, respectively). Major reductions in redistribution
occurred shortly after, e.g. in the rst Reagan tax cut (1981) and in
Thatchers rst budget (1979).
Esteban, Gradín, and Ray (2007) study developments in certain mea-
sures of income polarization for di¤erent countries including the US and
the UK. They e.g. report the average income of certain population
groups such as the top 20% or the bottom 40% of the distribution rela-
tive to mean income. These measures are suitable to distinguish between
drivers of increasing income skewness. Rising polarization as discussed
in Section 2.3.1 would increase top relative to medium incomes. Op-
posed to this, upward mobility as discussed in Section 2.3.2 would lead
to a rise in the lowest relative incomes.
For the time period of interest, the results of Esteban, Gradín, and
Ray (2007) point toward upward mobility as the source of increasing
income skewness. The relative income of the top 20% of the distribution
decreased from 1974 to 1979 while the relative income of the bottom
40% increased in both, the US and the UK.
A second source of useful information is the key gures of the Lux-
embourg Income Survey (LIS) which provide some summary statistics
on the income distributions in the US and the UK for di¤erent waves of
the survey. I will focus on two measures of the distribution, the 90/50
percentile ratio and the 50/10 percentile ratio, in the wave years 1974
and 1979.7 The two developments discussed in this chapter, rising po-
larization and upward mobility, a¤ect the mean-to-median ratio in the
same way but the two percentile ratios are a¤ected di¤erently. Rising
polarization would increase the 90/50 ratio but would have no e¤ect on
the 50/10 ratio while upward mobility could decrease the 50/10 ratio
but not a¤ect the 90/50 ratio.
Also the LIS data suggests that rising polarization did not take place
between 1974 and 1979 since the 90/50 ratio actually decreased between
these two years in both, the US and the UK. Concerning upward mobil-
7Data source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Key Figures,
http://www.lisproject.org/keygures.htm, data downloaded on May 31, 2010.
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ity, the evidence is supportive. From 1974 to 1979, the 50/10 percentile
income ratio indeed decreased in both countries.
This evidence suggests the view that increases in income skewness in
the late 1970s have been caused by upward mobility rather than rising
polarization. The succeeding cuts in redistribution can thus indeed be
explained by the model presented in this chapter.
2.4 Conclusion
Despite a sharp theoretical prediction, empirical evidence on the rela-
tionship between the mean-to-median income ratio and redistribution is
mixed. Some empirical studies nd a positive relationship, some studies
nd a negative one. Changes in income skewness are often accompanied
by developments in redistribution into the opposite direction.
I argued that it is important to distinguish between sources of
changes in income skewness. In a model with imperfect information,
rising polarization and upward mobility, though having the same e¤ect
on income skewness, a¤ect redistribution in di¤erent ways.
I presented a model of direct democracy under imperfect informa-
tion in which the relation between the mean-to-median income ratio
and redistribution depends on the sources of changes in income skew-
ness. While rising polarization generates a positive relation between
income skewness and redistribution, upward mobility can have the op-
posite e¤ect.
The mechanism leading to this non-standard result model works
through the existence of extreme voter groups that can lead to a me-
dian voter with biased beliefs. Increases in income skewness lead to
stronger redistribution sought by the middle class. However, if voting
power is shifted to richer population groups, the position of the median
voter moves towards voting for fewer redistribution. For informational
imperfections pronounced enough, the second e¤ect dominates. Then,
the model generates a relationship between the mean-to-median income
ratio and the extent of redistribution that would seem anomalous in light
of standard voting models.
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Appendix
Individual labor supply. At this stage, an agent i chooses consump-
tion ci and labor supply ni to maximize utility (2.1) subject to the budget
constraint
ci = (1  )  ai  ni +   y, (2.23)
which is a combination of (2.2) and (2.3). Denoting the Lagrange mul-
tiplier on the budget constraint as i, the rst-order conditions are
1  1=0
 ni + 1  (1  )  ai=0,
respectively. Combining the two conditions gives optimal labor supply
ni = 
 1  (1  )  ai as in equation (2.6).
Aggregate income. To determine aggregate income (2.7), individual
labor-supply decisions (2.6) are aggregated in the following way:
y=
Z
aini di
= 1  (1  ) 
Z
(ai)
2 di
= 1  (1  )  sL  02 + sM  (a1)2 + sH  (a2)2
=(1  )  1

 sM  (a1)2 + sH  (a2)2
Voting decision. At this stage, an agent i chooses a tax rate  i to
maximize expected utility Ei

ci   2 (ni)2

subject to the buget con-
straint (2.23), equations (2.6) and (2.7) capturing optimal subsequent
behavior of all agents, the condition  =  i capturing the sincerity of
the voting decision, and 0   i  1. Substituting the equality con-
straints into the problem, the Lagrangean reads as
Li=(1   i)2  (ai)2   1 +  i  (1   i)   1  Ei

sM  (a1)2 + sH  (a2)2

 
2
 
 1 (1   i) ai
2
+ i   i + i  [1   i] ,
where i and i are the Lagrange multipliers on the inequality con-
straints. All agents know that the term sM  (a1)2+ sH  (a2)2 is positive
but less than (a2)
2 since condition (2.4) and group sizes are common
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knowledge, i.e. 0 < Ei

sM  (a1)2 + sH  (a2)2

< (a2)
2 8i. The deriva-
tive of the Lagrangean with respect to  i is
@Li
@ i
= 2  (1   i)  (ai)2   1
+(1  2 i)   1  Ei

sM  (a1)2 + sH  (a2)2

+ 1  (1   i)  (ai)2 + i   i.
First note that the inequality constraint  i  1 is never binding. If it
were binding,  i = 1 and i > 0, then the derivative of the Lagrangean
would evaluate as @Li=@ i =   1 Ei

sM  (a1)2 + sH  (a2)2
  i < 0,
i.e. this can not be an optimizer. Therefore it holds for all agents that
i = 0 and  i < 1 in the optimum.
The second inequality constraint,  i  0, can be binding. If it is
binding,  i = 0 and i > 0, then the derivative of the Lagrangean
evaluates as  2  (ai)2   1 +  1  Ei

sM  (a1)2 + sH  (a2)2

+  1 
(ai)
2 + i = 
 1 Ei sM  (a1)2 + sH  (a2)2  (ai)2	+ i. With i > 0,
this expression can only be zero when
Ei

sM  (a1)2 + sH  (a2)2

< (ai)
2 . (2.24)
Since it is sure that (a2)
2 > sM (a1)2+sH (a2)2, this is fullled for agents
in group H. Agents in this group therefore vote for zero redistribution
as stated in equation (2.14).
Condition (2.24) is not fullled for agents in group L having zero
productivity. These agents thus vote for positive redistribution. With
ai = 0 and i = 0, the derivative of the Lagrangean simplies to
(1  2 i)   1  Ei

sM  (a1)2 + sH  (a2)2

,
which is zero for  i = 1=2.  i = 1=2 is therefore the optimal vote for
agents in this group as stated in equation (2.10).
For agents in group M having productivity a1 and expectation
Ei (a2)
2 = Eia1, condition (2.24) is fullled if and only if sM+sHEi <
1. If this is the case, agents in this group vote for zero redistribution, oth-
erwise they vote for positive redistribution. Therefore the voting decision
of agents in this group involves a case distinction. If sM + sHEi  1 ,
the inequality constraint  i  0 is not binding for agents in group M .
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Then, with Ei (a2)
2 = Eia1, the derivative of the Lagrangean simplies
to
(ai)
2 (1   i)   1 + (1  2 i)   1  [sM + sHEi]	 ,
which is zero for  i =
1 (sM+sHEi)
1 2(sM+sHEi) . Since this expression is negative
when the inequality constraint  i  0 is binding, the optimal vote for
agents in group M can be expressed by  i = max
h
1 (sM+sHEi)
1 2(sM+sHEi) ; 0
i
as
stated in equation (2.12).
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Chapter 3
Inattentive Voters and
Welfare-State Persistence
3.1 Introduction
It is a frequently expressed view that the political process features an
asymmetry between the speed of implementations and the speed of re-
movals of welfare-state arrangements. Reforms enhancing the size of
the welfare state seem easily and quickly implemented while opposite
reforms face stronger opposition. Welfare-state measures thus tend to
persist. This chapter1 o¤ers an information-based explanation for such
welfare-state persistence.
Many authors agree that the welfare state is persistent.2 Lindbeck
(2003, page 20) studies welfare-state dynamics and observes "certain
asymmetries between the politics of expansion and retreat". Hassler,
Rodríguez Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2003) describe welfare-state
persistence after the great depression. They observe that the great de-
pression led to increased public intervention in the US, the UK, France,
and Italy. After the economies had recovered, however, public interven-
tion did not diminish. Brooks and Manza (2004) nd similar patterns
in welfare-state dynamics of several OECD countries at the end of the
1The chapter is based on Bredemeier (2010b).
2See e.g. Gavin and Perotti (1997), Agell (2002), Lindbeck (2003), Hassler, Ro-
dríguez Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2003), Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004),
Brooks and Manza (2004), Balassone, Francese, and Zotteri (2009), and Beetsma,
Cukierman, and Giuliodori (2009).
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twentieth century. They summarize that "welfare states within most de-
veloped democracies appear quite resilient in the face of profound shifts
in their national settings" (page 1).
The contribution of this chapter is to o¤er a new explanation for
welfare-state persistence which is based on the e¤ects of the welfare
state on attentiveness. Since the welfare state crowds out private -
nancial precautions, it also reduces incentives to inform oneself about
economic fundamentals such as life expectancy or invalidity risk. These
fundamentals do not only inuence private decisions on savings or insur-
ance but also determine the optimal social choice regarding welfare-state
arrangements.
The frequency with which people inform themselves about funda-
mentals depends on their level of private nancial precaution and the
incentives for private precaution depend on welfare-state arrangements.
If the degree of social insurance is low (high), people engage much (lit-
tle) in private nancial activity such as savings. Therefore, they also in-
form themselves frequently (rarely) about fundamentals. Consequently,
if initial welfare-state arrangements are low, a change in fundamentals
is quickly noticed by a majority of society and translated into appropri-
ate policies. By contrast, the political delay is long when welfare-state
arrangements are pronounced.
This reasoning relies on the presence of information (or rationality)
costs. Information costs can take the form of real resource costs, utility
costs, or cognitive di¢ culties at any stage in the process between observ-
ing an information and the implementation of the appropriate response
(Sims 2003; Mankiw and Reis 2010). Even with perfect information
available, decisions may appear as if agents had imperfect information
in the rst place, for instance if agents choose not to use all information,
have di¢ culties guring out the appropriate response, or make mistakes
while translating decisions into behavior.
The importance of informational imperfections in democratic deci-
sion making has been stressed by Downs (1957). Downs pointed out
that even small information costs can lead voters to be rationally igno-
rant and cause pronounced uncertainty about issues important for the
optimal vote. In political sciences, it is a common view that voters are
usually poorly informed about relevant political measures, see e.g. Lupia
(1994) and McDermott (1997). In economics, many papers have studied
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voting behavior under uncertainty, mostly theoretically.3
In the model presented in this chapter, optimal social choices de-
pend on stochastic fundamentals. Voters have no incentive to inform
themselves about these fundamentals for political purposes because the
importance of any individual vote is negligible. But agents seek in-
formation about fundamentals in order to improve their private savings
decision. The incentives to save and thus the incentives to inform oneself
are, in turn, a¤ected by social choices.
Agents have an exogenous and uncertain income stream and decide
upon savings. Due to the absence of a private insurance market, there
is a precautionary motive for savings. Agents face a risk of receiving no
market income in future periods but the probability of this event is a
random variable itself. Thus, the risk of receiving no market income is an
unknown fundamental in the model which determines optimal savings.
In the political process, agents decide whether to vote in favor of
a social insurance. Agents are ex ante identical such that there is no
distributional motive of social insurance. However, there is potential
demand for social insurance since agents have no access to a private
insurance market. The stochastic income risk is also a determinant of
the optimal social choice because it determines the future dependency
ratio.
Next to the savings and voting choices, a third decision of agents is a
costly and active choice whether to inform themselves about income risk.
Doing so improves both the savings and the voting decision but agents
only value the private benet of improved savings and do not internalize
the social benet of their attentiveness. Thus, the information choice is
only a¤ected by the incentives for private savings which are weakened
by social insurance.
There are two theoretical concepts for modelling costly and active
information choice in a dynamic framework. In the theory of inatten-
tion (Sims 2003), agents decide on the precision of the information they
acquire in any instant of time, while the theory of inattentiveness (Reis
2006a; Reis 2006b) models agentsdecisions on the timing of their in-
frequent acquirement of perfect information. In the model presented in
this chapter, the concept of inattentiveness is used.
3See e.g. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997), Myerson (1998), Shotts (2006), Ger-
shkov and Szentes (2009), and Taylor and Yildirim (2010).
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Empirical support for the inattentiveness hypothesis is provided by
Lusardi (1999) and Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2003) who report sur-
vey evidence that respondents only infrequently react to news and up-
date plans. Carroll (2003) and Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004) ana-
lyze survey data on expectations and nd that news disseminate slowly
throughout the economy.4 Alternatively, similar observations would be
made if agents had full information but faced a cost of changing behav-
ior. Mullainathan and Washington (2009) provide evidence that voters
tend to process information in a biased way such as to conrm previous
voting decisions. Experimental evidence suggests that such behavior is
only given up when incentives are high enough (Festinger and Carlsmith
1959).
Agents in the model are rationally inattentive, i.e. they inform them-
selves infrequently about the state of the world but, if so, perfectly.
When not informing themselves, agents remain completely inattentive
and receive no new information at all. The model economy shifts be-
tween two aggregate states of the world with di¤erent levels of income
risk. I consider a situation where social insurance is socially bene-
cial in only one of the two states. When agents believe this one to be
the current state of the world, they vote in favor of social insurance.
When social insurance is implemented, private savings are lower and,
consequently, agents remain inattentive for longer periods of time. As
a result, the removal of social insurance when a change in the state has
made it suboptimal takes, in expectation, longer than the implementa-
tion of social insurance after a change in the state that makes the welfare
state optimal.
Other papers have proposed explanations for welfare-state persis-
tence under perfect information. One branch of the literature relates
the phenomenon to changes in peoples preferences. Lindbeck (1995)
and Lindbeck and Weibull (1999) argue that welfare-state persistence
is due to gradual changes in social norms regarding the perception of
transfer recipients in society. In political sciences, welfare-state per-
sistence is often attributed to changes in "policy preferences" (see e.g.
4Indirect empirical support for the inattentiveness hypothesis is provided by many
papers showing that inattentiveness helps to explain seemingly anomalous aggregate
phenomena on nancial markets (DellaVigna 2009; DellaVigna and Pollet 2009) and
regarding macroeconomic dynamics (Ball, Mankiw, and Reis 2005; Reis 2006a; Reis
2006b).
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Brooks and Manza 2004). Another line of argument builds on changes
in distributional conicts. Agell (2002) argues that welfare states resist
the pressures of globalization because globalization not only increases
the e¢ ciency costs of the welfare state but also increases the distribu-
tional conict so that some votersdemand for welfare-state measures
increases. Hassler, Rodríguez Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2003)
o¤er an explanation based on the e¤ects of redistribution on the future
income distribution. In their paper, persistence arises from the fact that
even temporary welfare-state measures a¤ect incentives in a way gen-
erating a distributional conict in the future. This in turn generates a
sustained demand for the continuation of the welfare state. Beetsma,
Cukierman, and Giuliodori (2009) present a framework where a median
voter bargains with a richer politician. Their explanation for welfare-
state persistence is that temporary increases in taxes increase the bar-
gaining power of the median voter who afterwards enforces increased
redistribution.
In my model, preferences are stable and there is no distributional
conict since agents are ex-ante identical. The persistence of the welfare
state stems from the fact that it crowds out private nancial precau-
tion and with it attentiveness to changes in the environment. That a
social-insurance system crowds out private nancial precaution has been
modeled by e.g. Rust and Phelan (1997). Empirical evidence supporting
this hypothesis is provided by Bird (2001).
Some papers have studied voting on welfare-state measures under un-
certainty about an underlying state of the world and a given information
structure. For example, Dhami (2003) analyzes voting on redistribution
in a model of representative democracy where voters have asymmetric
but given information. Laslier, Trannoy, and van der Straeten (2003)
and Hansen (2005) study majority-voting models of redistribution with
imperfect information. In Dhami (2003) and Hansen (2005), the infor-
mation structure is exogenously given, while, in Laslier, Trannoy, and
van der Straeten (2003), it is endogenous but taken as given by agents.
By contrast, in the model presented in this chapter, agents face an active
information choice. Finally, the work presented in this chapter is related
to the literature on the determination of social insurance in voting mod-
els, see Persson (1983) and Wright (1986).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2
presents the model. In Section 3.3, the model is solved for individual
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decisions of agents. Section 3.4 describes the aggregate dynamics of the
model. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Model
In the model, agents take intertemporal decisions under uncertainty. The
economy is subject to two frictions. First, information is only available
at a cost such that agents will rationalize on information. Second, there
is a lack of a private insurance market such that there is a precaution-
ary motive for savings and, in principle, demand for distortionary social
insurance. In the political process, agents balance expected costs and
benets of social insurance based on their potentially imperfect informa-
tion.
The model economy is an endowment economy which is populated by
a mass-1 continuum of dynasties. A dynasty consists of an innite stream
of agents who live for two periods each. Each dynasty has one member in
each generation. Generations overlap but do not interact with each other
due to the absence of capital and factor markets. However, generations
are linked through the transmission of information. Specically, each
agent receives all information her dynasty has at the beginning of her
life.
Thus, each generation t consists of a mass-1 continuum of agents who
live for two periods, t and t+ 1. Agents maximize
Ei;t [Ui;t] = Ei;t [u (ci;t;t) +   u (ci;t;t+1)]    di;t, (3.1)
where Ui;t is the lifetime utility of agent i in generation t, ci;t;t denotes
this agents consumption in period t, and ci;t;t+1 is consumption of the
agent in period t + 1. Ei;t denotes the statistical expectation operator
conditional on information available to agent i of generation t. di;t is
an indicator variable describing the choice of the agent whether to be
attentive to new information.  is a xed utility cost of acquiring new
information.
This cost  can be understood as the cost of obtaining information,
processing and interpreting it. It may arise because agents nd the
process annoying or frustrating. Reis (2006a) argues that while some
information may be observed at little cost, the costs of understanding it
and determining the optimal response can be quite substantial. Likewise
this cost could be modelled as a resource cost capturing e.g. payments
to a nancial advisor or as opportunity costs of time.
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A rate of time preference, , is included in equation (3.1) for conve-
nience. To facilitate the exposition, I impose the parameter restriction
 = 1. This restriction does not a¤ect the qualitative results of the
model because political choices do not apply to intertemporal transfers
in this model.
For analytical tractability, I will use a specic functional form for
period utility,
u (ci;t;t+h) = 4  ci;t;t+h   (ci;t;t+h)2 (3.2)
where h = 0; 1.5 This utility function exhibits linear marginal utility,
u0 (ci;t;t+h) = 4   2  ci;t;t+h, and constant curvature, u00 (ci;t;t+h) =  2.
Under the model set-up described below, the maximal amount of con-
sumption in a period is ci;t;t+h = 2. Therefore, the utility function
exhibits positive and decreasing marginal utility for all relevant levels of
consumption.
In the rst period of their life, agents receive a deterministic gross
income yi;t;t normalized to one,
yi;t;t = 1. (3.3)
Income in the second period of life is stochastic. With probability 1 t,
a generation-t agent will receive a gross income of 1 also in period t+1.
With probability t, agent i of generation t will receive an income of 0
in period t+ 1,
yi;t;t+1 =
(
1; prob. 1  t
0; prob. t
. (3.4)
In the following, I will refer to agents receiving a positive gross income
in the second period as "lucky" while agents with zero income in the
second period will be called "unlucky".
The risk of receiving no income in the second period of life, t, follows
an exogenous stochastic process. In particular, t can take two values,
h and l, h > l. Thus there are two states of the world, a "good"
one with low income risk and a "bad" one where income risk is high.
State changes occur with an exogenous probability  < 1
2
at any
period, i.e. they follow a Bernoulli process with Bernoulli parameter
5It is common to assume linear-quadratic (Hassler, Storesletten, and Zilibotti
2003; Chen and Song 2009) or quasi-linear (Tabellini 2000; Borck 2007) preferences
in dynamic political-choice models in order to ensure tractability.
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. Thus, the stochastic process for  can be described as a two-state
Markov process with transition matrix , given by
 =

1   
 1  

. (3.5)
Income risk in period t is the same as k periods ago when the number
of state changes between these two periods, denoted by N (t  k; t), is
even. Note that t is a generation-wide variable determining the risk for
each member of generation t to receive no income in period t+ 1. This
risk is the same for all members of the generation and is determined
between periods t  1 and t.
For agents, there are two ways to cope with income risk, private (pre-
cautionary) savings and social insurance. There is no private insurance
market. Agents have the possibility to save at a gross interest rate of
1, i.e. generation t agent i can store an amount si;t of his income from
period t to period t + 1. Furthermore, each generation t can decide to
implement social insurance. If so, the government evens out income dif-
ferences perfectly. Specically, it collects incomes from all lucky agents
and redistributes incomes equally among the members of the generation.
Thus, the contribution of the lucky agents is  t = 1 when there is social
insurance. It is assumed that the amount of total resources is lower in
the presence of social insurance. This may capture disincentive e¤ects or
government ine¢ ciency, which is modeled in a short-cut way for simplic-
ity. From every unit of contributions collected, the government can only
redistribute e < 1 units. If a generation decides against social insurance,
I will capture this formally as a contribution of zero,  t = 0.
The implementation of social insurance by a generation applies to
both periods of the generations life. In the rst period, social insurance
is a waste of resources since agents are still identical and thus pay the
same contributions and receive the same transfer. However, in the second
period, social insurance reduces income risk at the price of lower expected
income. Formally, net income xi;t;t of an agent i of generation t in the
rst period of her life is given by
xi;t;t = 1  (1  e)  t (3.6)
and net income xi;t;t+1 in the second period of her life is given by
xi;t;t+1 =
(
1   t + (1  t) e t; prob. 1  t
(1  t) e t; prob. t
, (3.7)
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where  t is the contribution implemented by generation t and can be
either one or zero. Equations (3.6) and (3.7) capture both political
environments. When there is social insurance,  t = 1, then rst-period
net income is xi;t;t = e and net income in the second period is xi;t;t+1 =
(1  t) e independent of the agents individual draw of gross income.
In the absence of social insurance,  t = 0, the agent receives net income
xi;t;t = 1 in period t and his second-period net income is either 0 or 1.
Agent i of generation t faces the following budget constraint in her
rst period of life:
ci;t;t + si;t  xi;t;t. (3.8)
Thus, consumption and savings may not succeed her net income. In the
second period consumption may not exceed net income plus savings,
ci;t;t+1  xi;t;t+1 + si;t. (3.9)
Political choices are decided by direct democracy. Each generation
t decides upon whether to implement social insurance, i.e.  t = 1, or
not, i.e.  t = 0, by a direct vote over these two opportunities. The
vote takes place in a general, free, and secret ballot. All agents in gen-
eration t participate in this vote. Furthermore, I assume that agents
vote truthfully in the sense that they vote for their individual expected-
utility maximizing  t.6 The vote of agent i of generation t is denoted by
 i;t 2 f0; 1g.
Individual and public choices depend on income risk t. However,
agents can not costlessly monitor the process determining t. In any
period t, agents can decide to obtain perfect information about t and
to accept a xed utility cost . If an agent decides not to obtain the
information, she will be said to be inattentive. Every agent transmits
the information she has to the next member of her dynasty.
The time structure within periods is as follows. Prior to period t,
income risk t for generation t is determined according to the transition
matrix (3.5). In this period t, an agent of generation t rst receives
information from the member of her dynasty in generation t   1. Sec-
ond, she takes part in the referendum on the implementation of social
insurance of her generation. Third, the agent decides whether or not
6Since any single voter has zero mass in this model, I abstain from analyzing strate-
gic voting behavior and assume "sincere" (Bearse, Cardak, Glomm, and Ravikumar
2009) or "naive" (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1997) voting instead.
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to obtain complete information on income risk t. Fourth, the agent
receives net income xi;t;t, decides how much to save, and consumes the
remaining part of her income.
In the second period of her life, the agent rst bequeaths information
to a member of generation t + 1. After this, she observes and receives
her net income xi;t;t+1, and consumes. The timing of events is illustrated
in Figure 3.1.
Agents decisions are determined by (potentially perfect) beliefs
about the state of the world. Since agents have the possibility to up-
date their beliefs, one has to distinguish between prior and posterior
beliefs. Posterior and prior beliefs are labeled by di¤erent time indices.
The time index t+ refers to beliefs after the updating decision in pe-
riod t, whereas the time index t refers to the time in period t before
the updating decision. An agents prior belief can be represented by the
probabilities the agent assigns to the two possible states of the world,
phi;t = probi;t

t = 
h

and 1   phi;t = probi;t

t = 
l

, where probi;t []
denotes the probability of the event in the brackets conditional on infor-
mation available to agent i of generation t before the updating decision.
Analogously, phi;t+ = probi;t+

t = 
h

denotes the agents posterior be-
lief. When the agent decides to be attentive, she will know the state
of the world for sure after updating, i.e. phi;t+ = 1 or p
h
i;t+ = 0 then.
By contrast, when the agent decides to be inattentive, then phi;t+ = p
h
i;t
and the posterior belief can take any value between zero and one. The
timing of the belief formation can be seen from Figure 3.1.
To summarize, a formal description of the decision problem is as
follows: Agent i of generation t chooses  i;t 2 f0; 1g, di;t 2 f0; 1g, si;t 2
[0; xi;t] sequentially such as to maximize (3.1) subject to (3.8), (3.9), the
information constraints described above and as if  t =  i;t capturing the
sincerity of the voting decision.
Thus the decision problem of an individual agent includes three de-
cision stages and a rst stage where prior beliefs are determined. From
stage to stage, the information set of the agent can change. Since I
will solve the problem by backward induction, I summarize the di¤erent
stages starting with the last one in the temporal ordering but the rst
one to be solved:
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1. Savings decision: At the nal stage, the agent chooses si;t to
maximize Ei;t[Ui;t] based on (potentially perfect) posterior beliefs
phi;t+ about the state of the world and knowing whether there is
social insurance or not. Potential updating costs are sunk at this
stage.
2. Updating decision: At this stage, the agent chooses whether to
update information in order to maximize expected indirect util-
ity (taking into account optimal subsequent savings) having some
prior beliefs phi;t about the state of the world and knowing whether
there is social insurance. When the agents decides not to update,
prior and posterior beliefs are identical, phi;t+ = p
h
i;t.
3. Voting decision: At this decision stage, the agent decides
whether to vote in favor of social insurance in order to maximize
expected indirect utility (taking into account optimal subsequent
updating and savings) having some prior beliefs phi;t about the state
of the world.
4. Belief formation: Prior to all decisions, the agent calculates sub-
jective probabilities of the two states of the world, phi;t and 1  phi;t,
based on the received information.
3.3 Individual Decisions
In this section, I derive the decisions of an agent i of generation t, in
short agent (i; t). Decisions of an agent depend only on her beliefs phi;t
and phi;t+. Thus agents with identical beliefs make identical decisions.
This is the case because income in the second period of life, which is a
source of heterogeneity, realizes after all decisions are taken.
3.3.1 Savings decision
When deciding upon individual savings, si;t, an agent i of generation t
knows whether her generation has implemented social insurance. The
agent furthermore has some belief about the current level of income risk.
Since the updating decision has already taken place at this stage, the
relevant belief is the posterior belief phi;t+. If the agent has decided to be
attentive, she knows the value of t for sure, i.e. phi;h+ = 1 or p
h
i;h+ = 0.
If the agent has decided to remain inattentive to news, the belief is
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uncertain and reects the received information about past income risk
and its precision as a signal about current income risk.
At this stage, updating costs are already sunk. The agent seeks to
maximize
Ei;t+ eUi;t = Ei;t+ [u (ci;t;t) + u (ci;t;t+1)] , (3.10)
which denes eUi;t, based on the posterior belief phi;t+ by choosing indi-
vidual savings, si;t, subject to the two period budget constraints (3.8)
and (3.9). Substituting constraints, the decision problem at this stage
can be written as
max
si;t
Ei;t+ [u (xi;t;t   si;t) + u (xi;t;t+1 + si;t)] .
In this expression, xi;t;t+1 is stochastic and can take four values: If the
state of the world is good, i.e. t = l, the agent can end up lucky and
her net income in period t+ 1 is
xi;t;t+1 = x
l;L = 1   t +
 
1  l e t: (3.11)
However, the agent can end up unlucky even if the state of the world is
good, then
xi;t;t+1 = x
l;U =
 
1  l e t: (3.12)
If the state of the world is bad, i.e. t = h, lucky agents end up with a
net income of
xh;L = 1   t +
 
1  h e t; (3.13)
while unlucky agents receive
xh;U =
 
1  h e t (3.14)
in this case.7
Expected utility depends on the probabilities the agent assigns to
these four scenarios. For instance, the agent believes to receive xl;L with
the probability of having luck conditional on the state of the world being
7Equations (3.11) to (3.14) simplify in both political regimes. If there is social
insurance, then xl;L = xl;U =
 
1  l e and xh;L = xh;U =  1  h e. By contrast,
in the absence of social insurance it holds that xl;U = xh;U = 0 and xl;L = xh;L = 1.
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good multiplied with the probability the agent assigns to the good state
of the world,
probi;t+

xi;t;t+1 = x
l;L

= probi;t+

yi;t;t+1 = 1jt = l
  probi;t+ t = l
=
 
1  l   1  phi;t+ . (3.15)
Analogously, we can calculate
probi;t+

xi;t;t+1 = x
l;U

=l   1  phi;t+ , (3.16)
probi;t+

xi;t;t+1 = x
h;L

=
 
1  h  phi;t+, (3.17)
probi;t+

xi;t;t+1 = x
h;U

=h  phi;t+. (3.18)
If the agent has chosen to be attentive, two of these probabilities (either
(3.15) and (3.16) or (3.17) and (3.18)) are zero.
Using these subjective probabilities, the decision problem becomes
max
si;t
u (1  (1  e)  t   si;t) +
2664
 
1  l   1  phi;t+  u  xl;L + si;t
+l   1  phi;t+  u  xl;U + si;t
+
 
1  h  phi;t+  u  xh;L + si;t
+h  phi;t+  u
 
xh;U + si;t

3775 .
The rst-order condition for this problem is
u0 (1  (1  e)  t   si;t) =
2664
 
1  l   1  phi;t+  u0  xl;L + si;t
+l   1  phi;t+  u0  xl;U + si;t
+
 
1  h  phi;t+  u0  xh;L + si;t
+h  phi;t+  u0
 
xh;U + si;t

3775
(3.19)
which is a consumption Euler equation for the case where the product of
the rate of time preference and the gross interest rate is one. Marginal
utility in the rst period then equals expected marginal utility in the
next period.
For the functional form of period utility (3.2), the consumption Euler
equation can be solved analytically for savings. The optimal amount of
savings for agent i of generation t equalizes expected consumption in the
two periods.
In generations without social insurance, i.e. for  t = 0, optimal
savings,
si;tj t=0 =
ei;t+
2
, (3.20)
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depend only on expected income risk ei;t+ =
 
1  phi;t+
  l + phi;t+  h.
Savings increase with the expected income risk ei;t+ which reects the
precautionary motive of savings. When generation t has decided in favor
of social insurance, i.e. for  t = 1, optimal savings are given by
si;tj t=1 =
e  ei;t+
2
(3.21)
and depend on the level of government e¢ ciency e. It is important that,
since e < 1, savings are lower when there is social insurance. This im-
plies that having better information when choosing savings has a smaller
impact on lifetime utility in the presence of social insurance.8
At the updating decision, the agent takes into account the optimal
subsequent savings behavior. Therefore it is useful to determine ex-
pected indirect lifetime utility net of updating costs which is determined
by the solution to the optimization problem for savings. This expected
indirect utility is a function of individual beliefs and the political regime.
Individual beliefs are perfectly described by the probability assigned to
the bad state, phi;t+ and the political regime is perfectly described by the
contribution rate  t. It is not necessary to distinguish between the states
"attentive" and "inattentive" because the state "attentive" is a special
case where phi;t+ is either one or zero. I will denote expected indirect
lifetime utility net of updating costs by eV  phi;t+ := Ei;t+ heUi;t j  t = 0i
for the case of no social insurance and fW  phi;t+ := Ei;t+ heUi;t j  t = 1i
for the case of social insurance.
Expected indirect lifetime utilities net of updating costs, eV and fW ,
are derived in the following way. First, the optimal savings decision
(3.20), or (3.21) respectively, together with the budget constraints (3.8)
and (3.9) are used to determine the respective consumption levels in
period t and the possible consumption levels in period t + 1. Since
consumption in period t + 1 is stochastic, the subjective probabilities
(3.15) to (3.18) are used to determine expected utility in period t + 1.
Finally, expected lifetime utility net of updating costs is given by the
sum of the expected period utilities, according to equation (3.10).
When there is no social insurance, i.e.  t = 0, expected indirect
8Equations (3.20) and (3.21) are derived in Appendix 3.A.
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lifetime utility is given by
eV  phi;t+ = 6  3ei;t+ +  ei;t+22 (3.22)
and decreases in expected income risk. In the other political state, i.e.
with social insurance,  t = 1, expected indirect lifetime utility is
fW  phi;t+ = 8e  2e2   2ei;t+e+  ei;t+2 e22   e2 Ei;t+ (t)2 , (3.23)
where Ei;t+ (t)
2 =
 
l
2
+phi;t+
 
h
2    l2. Here, expected indirect
utility includes an expectation of the squared income risk because also
net income in period t+ 1 depends on t, see equation (3.7).9
Three properties of the expected indirect utility functions are impor-
tant for the subsequent analysis. First, both expected indirect utility
functions (3.22) and (3.23) are convex in phi;t+, which can take any value
between zero and one,
eV 00  phi;t+=  h   l2 > 0, (3.24)fW 00  phi;t+= e2  h   l2 > 0. (3.25)
The convexity implies that there are potential gains from updating be-
cause, when knowing t for sure, i.e. phi;t+ = 0 or p
h
i;t+ = 1, agents
can choose the appropriate savings level and thus improve relative to
uncertain income risk.
Second, (3.23) is less convex than (3.22), in the sense thatfW 00  phi;t+ < eV 00  phi;t+. In the presence of social insurance, agents save
less and, consequently, the impact of an optimal savings decision on
utility is lower. This implies that gains from updating are smaller when
there is social insurance.
Third, there are constellations where agents would prefer social in-
surance only in one state of the world and not in the other, i.e.eV (0) > fW (0) , eV (1) < fW (1) (3.26)
or eV (0) < fW (0) , eV (1) > fW (1) . (3.27)
9Equations (3.22) and (3.23) and their derivatives are derived in Appendix 3.B.
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Since the focus of this chapter is on changes between political regimes,
I will restrict the analysis to cases where either condition (3.26) or condi-
tion (3.27) is satised. It depends on the parameterization whether the
agent is better o¤with social insurance when income risk is high or when
it is low.10 Increases in income risk have two counteracting e¤ects on the
attractiveness of social insurance. First, rising income risk increases the
probability that the agent will be a beneciary of the social-insurance
system and thus makes this welfare-state measure more attractive. Sec-
ond, rising income risk also a¤ects the dependency ratio decreasing the
benets the agent receives if unlucky in the second period, this second
e¤ect makes social insurance less attractive. The results of the model
do not depend on which of the two e¤ects dominates. The following
illustrations given in gures and examples will refer to the case where
condition (3.27) is fullled. In this case, agents are better o¤with social
insurance when income risk is low.
When condition (3.26) or (3.27) is fullled, there is a unique pos-
terior belief p+ where the agent is in expectations equally o¤ in both
political regimes. Since eV and fW are strictly convex, there are at most
two intersections between the two functions. When condition (3.26) or
condition (3.27) is satised, the number of intersections between eV andfW on (0; 1) is odd. Together, this implies that the two functions inter-
sect exactly once on (0; 1). Two expected utility functions (3.22) and
(3.23) fullling condition (3.27) are illustrated graphically in Figure 3.2.
3.3.2 Updating decision
The agent will update her information whenever her expected indirect
utility is higher when doing so. The agent enters this stage of the decision
problem with knowledge about the political regime and a prior belief phi;t
about income risk. In both political regimes, the decision whether to
update will depend on the prior belief about income risk. When taking
the updating decision, the agent takes into account optimal subsequent
behavior.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the solution of the updating decision for the
case of  t = 0. The agent decides whether to update based on her prior
beliefs about income risk, phi;t. When the agent decides not to update, she
10In Appendix 3.B, I present examples for both, conditions (3.26) and (3.27),
demonstrating that both these constellations exist.
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phi,t+
τt = 0
τt = 1
V˜ , W˜
Figure 3.2: Expected indirect utilities net of updating costs from optimal
savings in the two political regimes (satisfying condition (3.27)).
will choose a savings level according to her prior belief. Consequently,
the agent will then expect to receive a lifetime utility of eV  phi;t since
phi;t+ = p
h
i;t and di;t = 0.
When the agent decides to be attentive, she will know t for sure after
updating, i.e. phi;t+ = 0 or p
h
i;t+ = 1. The agent will then choose savings
individually optimally according to the true income risk. However, in
case the agent updates, her lifetime utility is reduced by the updating
cost . She will then receive either eV (0)    or eV (1)   . Prior to
updating, the agent expects to observe t = h with probability phi;t
and t = l with probability 1   phi;t. Before updating, the agents thus
expects a lifetime utility level of
 
1  phi;t
  eV (0)+ phi;t  eV (1)  in case
she updates.
Since eV is convex in phi;t+, there are potential gains from updating.
The agent will decide to update whenever 
1  phi;t
  eV (0) + phi;t  eV (1)  eV  phi;t > . (3.28)
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1 phi,t0
κ
V˜
p¯0p0
Figure 3.3: Updating decision in the absence of social insurance ( t = 0).
Updating costs could be that large that condition (3.28) would never be
fullled. However, if there is some phi;t 2 (0; 1) for which condition (3.28)
is fullled, then there is a unique updating range between p0 and p0, due
to the strict convexity of eV . Whenever  t = 0 and phi;t 2  p0; p0, the
agent decides to be attentive and to obtain perfect information about
income risk.
In the other political regime,  t = 1, the updating decision works
equivalently. Here, the agent updates whenever 
1  phi;t
 fW (0) + phi;t fW (1) fW  phi;t > . (3.29)
If there is some phi;t 2 (0; 1) for which condition (3.29) is fullled, then
there is a unique range
 
p1; p1

for which (3.29) is fullled since also fW
is strictly convex.
Due to the constant second derivatives of both eV and fW , both up-
dating ranges, if they exist, are symmetric around 1=2. This implies
that p0 = 1  p0 and p1 = 1  p1. This symmetry is the reason why it
is not important whether agents prefer social insurance for high or low
levels of income risk. The length of the range of beliefs for which the
51
agent remains inattentive depends on the political regime but not on the
specic end of the belief support. For instance, in the presence of social
insurance, the agent chooses not to update for beliefs in
 
0; p1

and for
beliefs in
 
1  p1; 1. Both ranges have length p1.
It is important that the updating range is smaller in the presence of
social insurance which is crucial for the di¤erent information choices in
the two political regimes. This results reects that, when  t = 1, savings
are lower and thus choosing savings based on better information has a
lower inuence on lifetime utility. To show this result formally, note
that also the di¤erence function eV  fW is convex in phi;t since eV 00  phi;t >fW 00  phi;t, see equations (3.24) and (3.25). Thus, the left hand side of
(3.28) is always larger than the left hand side of (3.29). Therefore,
whenever phi;t fullls condition (3.29), condition (3.28) is also fullled.
However, there are values of phi;t where condition (3.28) is fullled but
not condition (3.29).
Furthermore, there a values of the information cost  such that con-
dition (3.28) has a solution on (0; 1) but condition (3.29) has not. If this
is the case, the agent would never update on income risk when social
insurance is implemented but sometimes do so when there is no social
insurance. When condition (3.28) is not fullled for any phi;t 2 (0; 1),
then also condition (3.29) is not fullled for any phi;t.
At the voting stage of the decision problem, the agent takes into ac-
count optimal subsequent behavior including optimal updating. There-
fore, it is useful to determine the expected indirect utility function
which arises from optimal savings and optimal updating. I denote this
function as V
 
phi;t

:= Ei;t [Ui;t j  t = 0] for the case of  t = 0 and
W
 
phi;t

:= Ei;t [Ui;t j  t = 1] for the case of  t = 1. In the absence
of social insurance, this function is
V
 
phi;t

=
(eV  phi;t , phi;t =2  p0; p0 
1  phi;t
  eV (0) + phi;t  eV (1)  , phi;t 2  p0; p0 .
Analogously, in the presence of social insurance, expected lifetime utility
as a function of the agents belief is
W
 
phi;t

=
(fW  phi;t , phi;t =2  p1; p1 
1  phi;t
 fW (0) + phi;t fW (1)  , phi;t 2  p1; p1 .
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1 phi,t0 p
0 p1 p¯1 p¯0
V , W
V
W
p∗
τt = 0
τt = 1
Figure 3.4: Indirect utility from optimal savings and optimal updating
as a function of the prior belief in the two political regimes,  t = 0 (solid
line) and  t = 1 (dashed line).
Two expected indirect utility functions V and W fullling condition
(3.27) are illustrated graphically in Figure 3.4. V and W have a unique
intersection p on (0; 1). In the constellation chosen in the gure, this
intersection lies in the updating range.11
3.3.3 Voting decision
At this stage, the agent decides whether to vote in favor of social in-
surance. She takes this choice such as to maximize expected indirect
utility. She thereby takes into account optimal subsequent updating
and savings. When entering this stage, the agent has some prior beliefs
phi;t about the state of the world.
Since voting for one or the other alternative is costless, the voting
decision is rather simple to determine. The agent votes for the political
11This does not necessarily have to hold but is possible which is illustrated in
Appendix 3.B.
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system under which expected indirect utility is higher depending on the
agents prior belief about the state of the world. Agent (i; t) votes in
favor of social insurance whenever
W
 
phi;t

> V
 
phi;t

and votes against it when W
 
phi;t

< V
 
phi;t

.
Revisiting the expected indirect utility functions V andW , it follows
that there is a unique p for which the agent is indi¤erent between the
two political regimes, see Figure 3.4. The voting decision is determined
by whether the agents prior belief phi;t is below or above p
. Whether
she votes in favor of social insurance when phi;t > p
 or when phi;t < p

depends on the parametrization. However, the voting decision changes
when the prior belief passes p.
3.3.4 Belief formation
The prior belief phi;t determines all decisions of the agent. Here I de-
termine how this belief is formed given the information received from
the previous generation. Agent (i; t) receives all information her ances-
tor (i; t  1) had at the beginning of period t. Agent (i; t  1) in turn
received all information from agent (i; t  2) and so on. Consequently,
agent (i; t) knows the time of her dynastys last update on income risk
and knows what the respective member observed at that time.
Consider an agent (i; t) whose dynastys last update on  was in
period t   j. In period t, the probability that income risk is still the
same as at the time of the last update equals the probability that the
number of state changes between t  j and t is even. This probability is
given by
prob [t = t j] =
8<:j! (1  )
jPj=2
n=0
(2)
n
((1 ) 2)n
(j 2n)!(2n)! , j even
j! (1  )jP(j 1)=2n=0 (2)n((1 ) 2)n(j 2n)!(2n)! , j odd ,
(3.30)
which is derived in Appendix 3.C. This probability converges towards
1=2 and, since  < 1
2
, it decreases monotonically in j. This means that
the longer the time since the last update, the lower the probability that
income risk is still the same.
When in the period of the dynastys last update, t   j, the state of
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the world was bad, the dynastys beliefs evolve according to
phi;t = prob [t = t j] (3.31)
until the next update, with prob [t = t j] given by equation (3.30). In
case the state of the world was good in t  j, beliefs evolve as
phi;t = 1  prob [t = t j] (3.32)
until the next update. Beliefs thus converge (from above or below)
towards 1=2. The speed of convergence is the same for both, equations
(3.31) and (3.32). Since phi;t = 1=2 is always in the updating range if such
range exists, beliefs reach the updating range in both political regimes.
Note that explicit updating is not the only source of complete infor-
mation about income risk. Since agents vote truthfully, the outcome of
the referendum in period t is a perfect signal about what agents who
updated in period t   1 observed. When the agent observes an unex-
pected change in the result of the election, this can only be due to the
fact that some agents have observed a change in the state of the world.
This signal is observable for all agents and agentsbeliefs will thus be
identical afterwards. This way, the updating decision will be perfectly
synchronized across the population. As a consequence, all agents within
one generation have identical prior beliefs, phi;t = p
h
t 8i. Since the prior
belief determines all decisions of an agent, also all decisions are taken in
an identical way by all agents within one generation,  i;t =  t, di;t = dt,
phi;t+ = p
h
t+, si;t = st 8i.
3.4 Aggregate Dynamics
In this section, I describe the dynamics of the model. First, I will develop
two important concepts for the dynamics of the model, the duration of
inattentiveness and the political delay. Then, I will present the responses
to a change in the fundamental income risk. I will also explain the
dynamics of the model for an example where no shifts in income risk
occur.
3.4.1 Duration of inattentiveness and political de-
lay
The duration of inattentiveness I () is the time between two updates
and depends on the current political regime described by  . This time
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is only nite when, for some prior belief pht , agents decide to update in-
formation or, technically, when an updating range exists for the current
political regime. If an updating range exists, the duration of inatten-
tiveness can be determined as follows. After an updating period t   j,
agentsbeliefs move into the direction of the updating range according to
equations (3.31) or (3.32). The speed of this movement is independent
of the state of the world in the previous updating period. In addition the
distance to the updating range is independent of the state of the world in
the previous updating period since this range is symmetric around 1=2,
i.e. p0 = 1  p0 and p1 = 1  p1. However, the distance to the updating
range does depend on the current political regime since p0 < p1.
In the absence of social insurance, the duration of inattentiveness
I (0) is the time between the last update and the rst period in which
prior beliefs are within
 
p0; 1  p0,
I (0) = min

t 2 N j prob [t = t j] < 1  p0
	
.
Analogously, in the presence of social insurance, the duration of inatten-
tiveness is
I (1) = min

t 2 N j prob [t = t j] < 1  p1
	
.
Since, if p0 and p1 exist, it holds that p0 < p1, the duration of inattentive-
ness is never longer without social insurance than with social insurance,
I (0)  I (1) .
The political delay is the time between a change in the fundamental
income risk and the implementation of the appropriate policy reform.
The notion of a political delay implies that a certain policy reform is
actually caused by a change in fundamentals. This is ensured when the
expected indirect utility functions V and W intersect in the updating
ranges. Then, a policy reform only takes place when agents actually
observe that the true current state of the world is di¤erent from the
state revealed by their last update.
The political delay then depends on the duration of inattentiveness
and the timing of the change in the fundamental. The maximum delay
is the duration of inattentiveness I and occurs when the change in the
fundamental happens right after agents have updated. Due to the timing
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of events, the minimum delay is one period and occurs when income risk
changes right before agents next update. Since state changes occur
with equal probability each period, all delays between the minimum and
maximum delay are equally likely. The expected political delay is thus
D () = 1
2
 (I () + 1), where  indicates the initial political regime.
Since I (0)  I (1), the expected political delay is never longer in the
absence of social insurance than in the presence of it,
D (0)  D (1) .
This result relies on the disincentive e¤ects of social insurance. In the
presence of this welfare-state measure, agents save less and can thus gain
less from information. As a consequence, agents remain inattentive for
longer periods of time. Changes in income risk are then, in expectations,
realized later and reforms have longer delays.
3.4.2 Welfare-state dynamics
In the following, I present three experiments to illustrate the dynamics
of the model. In all experiments, I consider a constellation where the
duration of inattentiveness is nite in both political regimes. Further-
more, the expected indirect utility functions V and W intersect in their
updating ranges such that reforms only take place after actual changes in
income risk. I consider a case where agents prefer social insurance for low
levels of income risk. As discussed before, the duration of inattentiveness
and the expected political delay are not a¤ected by this assumption. An
example for a parameter constellation yielding the above is l = 0:5,
h = 0:9, e = 0:92,  = 0:1,  = 0:001.
In this parameter constellation, V (0) < W (0) and V (1) > W (1).
The updating ranges are given by p0 = 0:1471, p0 = 0:8529, p1 = 0:1802
and p1 = 0:8198. V and W intersect at p = 0:3095 and thus in the
updating ranges. The duration of inattentiveness is I (0) = 2 in the
absence of social insurance and I (1) = 3 in the presence of social in-
surance. Figures 3.5 to 3.7 are qualitative sketches of the dynamics
under this parameter constellation. The general insights regarding the
duration of inattentiveness and political delays are also valid for other
constellations of l, h, e and  together with  low enough for updating
ranges to exist. For illustrational purposes, the sketches magnify certain
areas while other areas are scaled down. The exact coordinates of belief-
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Figure 3.5: Model dynamics without a change in income risk (1 = 2 =
3 = 
h).
utility combinations sketched in the gures can be found in Appendix
3.D.
In the rst experiment, I consider a scenario where income risk is
constant and, consequently, no policy reform takes place. The second
experiment describes the model dynamics in a scenario where a change in
income risk justies the implementation of social insurance whereas the
third experiment deals with the removal of this welfare-state measure.
Scenario 1: Dynamics without changes in income risk. Con-
sider a scenario where no state change realizes for a certain time such
that income risk is constant at its higher level h, i.e. 1 = 2 = ::: = l.
For this scenario, the dynamics of the model are illustrated in Figure 3.5.
I begin the description of the dynamics in a period 1 where, for their
prior belief ph1 , agents nd it optimal to update. Due to the information
update, agents know for sure that the state of the world is bad, i.e. that
1 = 
h. Their posterior belief is therefore ph1+ = 1. This situation
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corresponds to the point labeled "1+" in Figure 3.5.
One period later, the state of the world has become uncertain since a
state change may have taken place between periods 1 and 2. According
to equation (3.31), the probability assigned to the bad state of the world
is now lower, ph2 < 1, due to the possibility of state change,  > 0. In
Figure 3.5, agents still prefer no social insurance, V
 
ph2

> W
 
ph2

, and
vote accordingly. Furthermore, the information that 1 = h is still
worth that much that agents nd it optimal not yet to update since
ph2 > p
0. Thus, prior and posterior beliefs are identical in the second
period, ph2+ = p
h
2 . This situation corresponds to the point "2" in the
gure.
In the third period, the value of the information that 1 = h has de-
teriorated further such that ph3 < p
h
2 (point "3" in the gure). However,
agents still nd it optimal to have no social insurance, V
 
ph3

> W
 
ph3

.
But agents are now so uncertain about income risk that they nd it op-
timal to update since ph3 < p
0. Agents thus get informed about the true
state of the world where income risk is still 3 = h. Correspondingly,
their posterior belief in period 3 is ph3+ = 1 as in period 1.
Period 4 then begins with the same prior belief as period 2, ph4 = p
h
2 .
Since behavior within periods is solely determined by the prior belief, all
decisions in period 4 are identical to the ones in period 2. By the same
logic, period 5 is identical to period 3 and so on.
Scenario 2: An implementation of social insurance. I will now
present the dynamics of the model after a change in income risk which
makes a social insurance benecial to agents. I will again begin with a
period "1" in which prior beliefs are such that agents decide to update.
The change in income risk happens between periods 1 and 2 and income
risk is constant afterwards, 1 = h, 2 = 3 = ::: = l. Suppose there
is no social insurance in period 1, where it is socially suboptimal. The
dynamics of the model in this scenario are illustrated in Figure 3.6.
Behavior in periods 1 and 2 is as in the previous experiment. In pe-
riod 2, the state of the world is di¤erent than in the previous experiment
but agents nd it optimal not to update and therefore do not notice the
change in fundamentals.
In period 3, the prior belief ph3 is such that agents still vote against
social insurance but now nd it optimal to update. Agents thus observe
the true state of the world and notice that it has changed since their
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Figure 3.6: Model dynamics with an implementation of social insurance
(1 = h, 2 = 3 = ::: = l).
last update, 3 = l. Accordingly, the posterior belief in this period is
ph3+ = 0. Agents would now prefer social insurance, W (0) > V (0), but
have already decided against its implementation.
At the beginning of period 4, the information that 3 = l has lost
in value since it is possible that income risk has changed again between
periods 3 and 4, therefore ph4 > 0. However, agents still believe income
risk to be rather low due to  < 1=2. Consequently, they prefer social
insurance in this period, W
 
ph4

> V
 
ph4

, and implement it,  4 = 1.
In this example, social insurance was implemented with a delay of 2
periods (periods 2 and 3) after the change in fundamentals which jus-
tied the implementation. This absolute delay of the implementation
depends on the parameter constellation chosen and is thus rather unin-
formative. It is more informative to consider the relative delay compared
to a scenario where income risk shifts into the opposite direction. In the
next section, I will present this experiment using the same parameter
constellation underlying Figures 3.5 to 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: Model dynamics with a removal of social insurance (1 = l,
2 = 3 = ::: = 
h).
Scenario 3: A removal of social insurance. This section presents
the dynamics of the model when income risk changes into the opposite
direction than in the previous experiment, i.e. I consider a change from
low to high income risk between periods 1 and 2. After this single state
change, income risk is constant, so that 1 = l, 2 = 3 = ::: = h.
Suppose there is social insurance in period 1, where it is socially optimal.
Figure 3.7 illustrates the dynamics of the model in this experiment.
Suppose again that, in period 1, prior beliefs are such that agents
nd updating optimal. Agents thus observe that the state of the world
is good, i.e. 1 = l. Since this piece of information is sure, agents
posterior beliefs in period 1 are characterized by ph1+ = 0.
At the beginning of period 2, agents are aware of the possibility
that the state of the world could have changed between periods 1 and
2. Consequently, they assign a positive (low) probability to the bad
state of the world, ph2 > 0. However, agents still prefer social insurance,
W
 
ph2

> V
 
ph2

. Furthermore, beliefs are still certain enough such that
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agents decide against updating their beliefs and thus do not notice the
state change that occurred between periods 1 and 2.
At the beginning of period 3, the information 1 = l has further
deteriorated in value, ph3 > p
h
2 , but the social insurance is still believed
to be benecial given agentsexpectations and thus it is not removed.
If there were no social insurance, agents would nd it optimal to update
their beliefs now, since ph3 > p
0. However, since there is social insurance,
gains from updating are lower and agents decide not yet to update,
ph3 < p
1.
Consequently, prior beliefs in period 4 still only reect the possibility
of a state change but not the fact that one state change has actually
taken place. The probability agents assign to the bad state of the world
has further increased, ph4 > p
h
3 , but not su¢ ciently to induce a change
in policy. However, beliefs are now uncertain enough to cause agents
update their beliefs. Observing the true state of the world, agents now
realize that it has changed since their last update, 4 = h. Thus
posterior beliefs are now ph4+ = 1. Agents would now like to change
the political regime but can not do so before the next period.
In period 5, agents eventually change the political regime and re-
move social insurance which is no longer optimal. This political reform
is implemented with a delay of 3 periods (periods 2, 3, and 4) after the
change in fundamentals which justies it. Again, this number alone is
not very informative. But compared to the delay of 2 periods in the
opposite experiment discussed previously, this model evaluation demon-
strates that it takes longer to remove social insurance than to implement
it.
The reason for this asymmetry is that informational incentives di¤er
across political regimes. In the absence of social insurance, agents save
more and update their information more frequently, in this example
every 2 periods. When there is social insurance, private savings are
crowded out and the duration of inattentiveness is longer (3 periods
in this example). Without social insurance, changes in fundamentals
are thus realized and political reforms carried out after two periods at
the latest, while this can take three periods in the presence of social
insurance.
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3.4.3 Numerical evaluation
In this section, I evaluate the duration of inattentiveness and the ex-
pected political delay after changes in fundamentals numerically. Specif-
ically, I analyze how the political delay depends on the information cost
. It is clear from the theoretical considerations that higher updat-
ing costs make agents less attentive and increase both, the duration of
inattentiveness and the political delay. However, it is not possible to
quantify this e¤ect analytically. This section present a numerical quan-
tication of this e¤ect. Furthermore, the numerical evaluation allows to
analyze how the size of the information cost a¤ects the relative duration
of inattentiveness in the two political regimes, I (1) =I (0).
In order to highlight the role of the information cost , I present
results for di¤erent values of  holding constant the other parameters of
the model. Specically, I consider the constellation l = 0:25, h = 0:75,
and e = 0:933. These parameter values imply that the indirect utility
functions V and W intersect at p = 0:5. Thus political reforms are
only implemented after agents have updated beliefs. Furthermore, I set
 = 0:1 implying that the expected duration of a state of the world is
ten periods. Table 3.1 presents the duration of inattentiveness and the
expected political delay for di¤erent values of the information cost .
In order to put the absolute level of the information cost  into per-
spective, the table also reports  relative to full-information lifetime
utility in the good state, =eV (0). The third column expresses the util-
ity cost in terms of consumption, the reported numbers are the relative
reductions of income that would result in a utility loss of  in the good
state of the world without social insurance. The fourth column of the
table reports the time between two updates in the absence of social insur-
ance, I (0), and the fth column reports the duration of inattentiveness
when there is social insurance, I (1). The last two columns report the
expected duration D () between a change in income risk and the appro-
priate change in policy in the two political regimes, where  indicates the
initial political regime. D (0) is the expected delay of an implementation
of social insurance and D (1) is the expected delay of a removal of social
insurance.
In the rst row of Table 3.1, information costs are rather small and
amount to only 0:1% of lifetime utility. In this setting, agents nd it
optimal to update their beliefs in every period in both political regimes.
63
information duration of expected
costs inattentiveness political delay
 =eV (0) cons. equ. I (0) I (1) D (0) D (1)
0.0053 0.10% 0.15% 1 1 1.0 1.0
0.0106 0.20% 0.30% 1 2 1.0 1.5
0.0158 0.30% 0.44% 2 2 1.5 1.5
0.0211 0.40% 0.59% 3 4 2.0 2.5
0.0264 0.50% 0.73% 5 8 3.0 4.5
0.0272 0.52% 0.76% 5 21 3.0 11.0
0.0290 0.55% 0.81% 6 1 3.5 1
0.0317 0.60% 0.89% 1 1 1 1
Table 3.1: Duration of Inattentiveness and Expected Political Delay for
Di¤erent Informations Costs  (l = 0:25, h = 0:75, e = 0:933,  = 0:1)
Thus the time between two updates is 1. Consequently, we also ob-
serve the minimum political delay of one period between a change in
fundamentals and the implementation of the appropriate policy reform.
With higher information costs of 0:2% of expected lifetime utility
(second row of the table), agents still nd it rational to update every
period when there is no social insurance. However, in the presence of
social insurance, gains from updating are lower and agents only update
every second period. Consequently, a change in income risk justifying
the implementation of social insurance is translated into a policy reform
right in the next period. By contrast, removals of social insurance can
have a delay of two periods.
Further increases in the information cost leads to longer durations
of inattentiveness and, in consequence, to longer political delays. Since
gains from updating are always lower in the presence of social insurance,
the duration of inattentiveness and expected political delays are longer
in this political regime.
The next to last row of Table 3.1 presents a scenario where informa-
tion costs (0:029) are such that, without social insurance, agents nd it
optimal to update their beliefs every six periods but never update in the
presence of social insurance. In this case, condition (3.29) is not fullled
for any phi;t 2 [0; 1]. In this scenario, the society implements social insur-
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ance with an expected delay of 3:5 periods. Once this political regime is
implemented, agents decide to be inattentive forever and thus the social
insurance will never be removed independent of the underlying state of
the world. Thus welfare-state persistence is eternal in this scenario.
The same holds in the last row of Table 3.1 where the information
cost is set to 0:0317. Here, agents are also completely inattentive in the
absence of social insurance. Political reforms thus never take place. The
economy remains in its initial political regime forever.
Note that relatively low values for the information cost are su¢ cient
to generate these extreme forms of political persistence. In the scenarios
displayed in the last two rows of Table 3.1, information costs amount to
0:55% and 0:6% of expected lifetime utility under full information in the
good state of the world, respectively, which is equivalent to a loss of less
than 1% of consumption. Reis (2006a) discusses di¤erent parametriza-
tion of his inattentiveness modell with updating costs ranging from 0:2%
to 0:8% of income. Zbaracki, Ritson, Levy, Dutta, and Bergen (2004)
measure updating and planning costs of a rm and nd that these costs
are roughly 1% of total revenue.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has o¤ered an information-based explanation for welfare-
state persistence. The explanation is based on the e¤ects of the welfare
state on attentiveness. I argued that the welfare state crowds out private
nancial precautions and this way reduces incentives to be attentive to
developments in economic fundamentals. Knowledge about fundamen-
tals does not only inuence private decisions on savings or insurance but
is also important for optimal political choices.
When people face a cost of processing information, they will choose
how often to inform themselves about fundamentals. The incentives to
do so depend on their level of private nancial precaution. In turn, the
incentives for nancial precaution depend on welfare-state arrangements.
For instance, if the degree of social insurance is high, people engage
little in private nancial activity. Consequently, they remain inattentive
to news for longer periods. As a result, it takes long until a change
in fundamentals is noticed by a majority of society and translated into
appropriate policies if initial welfare-state arrangements are pronounced.
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I have presented a model where rationally inattentive agents face
an unknown degree of income risk. Agents decide on private savings,
attentiveness to news and whether to vote in favor of social insurance.
When society has implemented social insurance, agents save less and
are, consequently, less attentive to news since choosing savings based
on better information has a lower impact on lifetime utility. This way,
welfare-state persistence arises from the incentive e¤ects of the welfare
state on attentiveness.
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Appendix
3.A Savings decision
Optimal savings when  t = 0. Under  t = 0, xi;t;t+1 can take only
two values: xl;L = xh;L = xL = 1 and xh;U = xl;U = xU = 0. From
the perspective of agent (i; t) after the updating decision, the subjective
probability of these two outcomes are
probi;t+

xi;t;t+1 = x
L

= probi;t+

xi;t;t+1 = x
h;L

+ probi;t+

xi;t;t+1 = x
l;L

= probi;t+

yi;t;t+1 = 1 j t = h
  probi;t+ t = h
+probi;t+

yi;t;t+1 = 1 j t = l
  probi;t+ t = l
=
 
1  h  phi;t+ +  1  l   1  phi;t+
=1  ei;t+
and
probi;t+

xi;t;t+1 = x
U

= ei;t+.
Hence, the consumption Euler equation reads as
u0 (1  si;t) =
 
1  ei;t+
  u0 (1 + si;t) + ei;t+  u0 (si;t) .
Using the functional form of marginal utility, u0 (ci;t;t+h) = 4   2ci;t;t+h,
h = 0; 1, gives
4  2 (1  si;t) =
 
1  ei;t+
  [4  2 (1 + si;t)] + ei;t+  [4  2 (si;t)] .
This equation is solved by
si;t =
ei;t+
2
,
which is the expression for optimal savings in the absence of social in-
surance stated in equation (3.20).
Optimal savings when  t = 1. Under  t = 1, xi;t;t+1 can take only
two values: xl;L = xl;U = xl =
 
1  l e and xh;L = xh;U = xh = 
1  h e. From the perspective of agent (i; t) after the updating deci-
sion, the subjective probability of these two outcomes are
probi;t+

xi;t;t+1 = x
l

= 1  phi;t+
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and
probi;t+

xi;t;t+1 = x
h

= phi;t+.
Hence, the consumption Euler equation reads as
u0 (e  si;t) =
 
1  phi;t+
u0   1  l e+ si;t+phi;t+u0   1  h e+ si;t .
Using the functional form of marginal utility, u0 (ci;t;t+h) = 4   2ci;t;t+h,
h = 0; 1, gives
4  2 (e  si;t) =
 
1  phi;t+
   4  2  1  l e+ si;t
+phi;t+ 
 
4  2  1  h e+ si;t
() 2si;t =
 
1  phi;t+
  l + phi;t+  h e.
This can be simplied to
si;t =
ei;t+
2
e,
which is equation (3.21).
3.B Expected indirect utility
Expected indirect utility when  t = 0. For a savings level si;t,
consumption in period t and in the two possible realizations of net income
in period t+1 are ci;t;t = 1 si;t, cLi;t;t+1 = 1+si;t, and cUi;t;t+1 = si;t when
 t = 0. In the absence of social insurance, expected lifetime utility net
of updating costs is thus
eV := Ei;t+ eUi;t = u (1  si;t) +  1  ei;t+  u (1 + si;t) + ei;t+  u (si;t) ,
which, for (3.2), becomes
eV = 4+4  1  ei;t+  (1  si;t)2   1  ei;t+  (1 + si;t)2 ei;t+  (si;t)2 .
Using the optimal savings (3.20) gives
eV = 4+4  1  ei;t+ 1  ei;t+2
2
  1  ei;t+1 + ei;t+2
2
 ei;t

ei;t+
2
2
.
This evaluates as eV = 6  3ei;t+ +  ei;t+22 ,
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which is equation (3.22). To derive the marginal derivatives of eV with
respect to phi;t+, rst take the derivatives with respect to perceived income
risk ei;t+:
@ eV
@ei;t+
= 3 + ei;t+ < 0 since ei;t  1
@2eV
@
 
ei;t+
2 =1 > 0
eV is thus decreasing and convex in ei;t+. As ei;t+ = l+phi;t+  h   l is
a linear and increasing function of phi;t+, eV is also decreasing and convex
in phi;t+:
@ eV
@phi;t+
=
@ eV
@ei;t+
 @
e
i;t+
@phi;t+
=
  3 + ei;t+   h   l < 0
@2eV
@
 
phi;t+
2 =  h   l2 > 0
Expected indirect utility when  t = 1. For a savings level si;t,
consumption in period t and in the two possible realizations of net in-
come in period t + 1 are ci;t;t = e   si;t, cli;t;t+1 =
 
1  l e + si;t, and
chi;t;t+1 =
 
1  h e+si;t when  t = 1. In the presence of social insurance,
expected lifetime utility net of updating costs is thus
fW : = Ei;t+ eUi;t = u (e  si;t) +  1  phi;t+  u   1  l e+ si;t
+phi;t+  u
  
1  h e+ si;t .
which, for (3.2), becomes
fW =4e  (e  si;t)2 + 4e  1  phi;t+   1  l+ phi;t+   1  h
   1  phi;t+    1  l e+ si;t2   phi;t+    1  h e+ si;t2
=8e  (e  si;t)2   4ei;t+e 
 
1  phi;t+
    1  l e+ si;t2
 phi;t+ 
  
1  h e+ si;t2 .
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Using the optimal savings (3.21) gives
fW =8e  e  ei;t+
2
e
2
  4ei;t+e 
 
1  phi;t+
   1  l e+ ei;t+
2
e
2
 phi;t+ 
 
1  h e+ ei;t+
2
e
2
,
which can be simplied to
fW =8e   1  ei;t+ e2    ei;t+2 e22   4eei;t+
 e2
h 
1  phi;t+
   1  l2 + phi;t+   1  h2i
 e2  1  phi;t+   1  l+ phi;t+   1  h ei;t+
=8e   1  ei;t+ e2    ei;t+2 e22   4ei;t+e
 e2 Ei;t+ (1  t)2  e2ei;t+ + e2  ei;t+2
=8e  e2   4ei;t+e+
 
ei;t+
2
e2
2
  e2 1  2ei;t+ + Ei;t+ (t)2
=8e  2e2   2ei;t+e+
 
ei;t+
2
e2
2
  e2 Ei;t+ (t)2 ,
which is the expression in equation (3.23). The marginal derivatives
with respect to phi;t+ are
@fW
@phi;t+
=
  2e+ e2ei;t+  @ei;t+@phi;t+   e2Ei;t+ (t)
2
@phi;t+
=
  2e+ e2ei;t+   h   l  e2  h2    l2 ,
which is negative since e < 1, ei;t+  1, and h > l, and
@2fW
@
 
phi;t+
2 = e2   h   l2 > 0.
fW is thus decreasing and convex in phi;t+.
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Intersection of V and W . In this appendix, I present two examples
of parameter constellations where the expected indirect utility functions
V and W intersect on (0; 1). V cuts W from below in one example and
from above in the other example. Furthermore, in these examples, V
and W intersect at p = 0:5 which is always in the updating ranges (if
they exist).
Consider rst the parameter constellation l = 0:7749, h = 0:9589,
and e = 0:9355. In this constellation, V (0) ; V (1), W (0) and W (1)
evaluate as V (0) = eV (0) = 3:9755, V (1) = eV (1) = 3:5830, W (0) =fW (0) = 4:0212, and W (1) = fW (1) = 3:5373. I.e. it holds that eV (0) <fW (0) and eV (1) > fW (1). Thus V cuts W from below in this example.
Now consider the parameter constellation l = 0:25, h = 0:75, and
e = 0:9337. In this constellation, eV (0) ; eV (1),fW (0) andfW (1) evaluate
as eV (0) = 5:2813, eV (1) = 4:0313, fW (0) = 5:2321, and fW (1) = 4:0804.
I.e. it holds that eV (0) > fW (0) and eV (1) < fW (1). Thus, in this
example, V cuts W from above.
If V and W intersect in their updating ranges, then this intersection
is at
phi;t =
eV (0) fW (0)eV (0) fW (0)  eV (1) +fW (1) .
In both examples above this expression evaluates as phi;t = 0:5. If an
updating range exists, phi;t = 0:5 is in this range. Provided that  is
small enough that V and W have updating ranges, the two functions
intersect in their updating ranges in both examples.
3.C Belief formation
The probability that  is the same as j periods ago, i.e. t = t j, is
the probability that the number of regime shifts between t   j and t is
even. Using properties of the binomial distribution, this probability can
be calculated as
p [t = t j] =

j
0

 0 (1  )j 0 +

j
2

 2 (1  )j 2
+

j
4

 4 (1  )j 4 + :::
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=8>>>><>>>>:
Pj=2
n=0
 
2n
j
!
 2n (1  )j 2n , j even
P(j 1)=2
n=0
 
2n
j
!
 2n (1  )j 2n , j odd
.
For the case of j being even, this probability can be simplied as follows:
j=2X
n=0

j
2n

 2n (1  )j 2n=
j=2X
n=0
j!
(j   2n)! (2n)! 
 
2
n
(1  )j (1  ) 2n
= j! (1  )j
j=2X
n=0
 
2
n  
(1  ) 2n
(j   2n)! (2n)!
Analogously, for the case that j is odd, the probability can be simplied
to:
(j 1)=2X
n=0

j
2n

 2n (1  )j 2n = j! (1  )j
(j 1)=2X
n=0
 
2
n  
(1  ) 2n
(j   2n)! (2n)!
such that
p [t = t j] =
8<:j! (1  )
jPj=2
n=0
(2)
n
((1 ) 2)n
(j 2n)!(2n)! , j even
j! (1  )jP(j 1)=2n=0 (2)n((1 ) 2)n(j 2n)!(2n)! , j odd ,
which is equation (3.30).
3.D Welfare-state dynamics
This appendix presents the exact probabilities representing agentsbe-
liefs and the exact associated values for expected indirect utility in the
three scenarios in Section 3.4.2. The values can be found in Table 3.2.
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scenario 1 scenario 2 scenario 3
time belief V W belief V W belief V W
1+ 1.000 3.705 3.668 1.000 3.705 3.668 0.000 4.625 4.641
2 0.900 3.790 3.760 0.900 3.790 3.760 0.100 4.526 4.538
2+ 0.900 3.790 3.760 0.900 3.790 3.760 0.100 4.526 4.538
3 0.820 3.861 3.834 0.820 3.861 3.834 0.180 4.449 4.456
3+ 1.000 3.705 3.668 0.000 4.625 4.641 0.180 4.449 4.456
4 0.900 3.790 3.760 0.100 4.526 4.538 0.244 4.390 4.394
4+ 0.900 3.790 3.760 0.100 4.526 4.538 0.900 3.790 3.760
5 0.820 3.861 3.834 0.180 4.449 4.456 0.820 3.861 3.834
Table 3.2: Dynamics of beliefs and expected indirect utility in the scenar-
ios from Section 3.4.2 (l = 0:5, h = 0:9, e = 0:92,  = 0:1,  = 0:001;
scenario 1: 1 = 2 = ::: = h, scenario 2: 1 = h, 2 = 3 = ::: = l,
scenario 3: 1 = l, 2 = 3 = ::: = h).
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Chapter 4
Household Labor Supply in a
Heterogeneous-Agents Model
with Tradable Home Labor
4.1 Introduction
This chapter1 considers labor supply disaggregated by gender and mar-
ital status. Average weekly hours of market work in the US have in-
creased steadily over the last 50 years. An aggregate view, however,
hides a number of important subgroup-specic patterns in labor supply.
In particular, there are pronounced di¤erences in labor supply by gen-
der and marital status. On average, married men work the most hours,
followed by single men and single women. Married women work the
fewest hours. Interestingly, group-specic levels of hours worked have
changed substantially over time. Most striking is the sharp increase in
married womens hours of market work over the last decades. By con-
trast, married men slightly decreased their working time, while singles
of both genders increased their labor supply over time.
Traditional explanations for the developments in hours worked in-
clude overall productivity growth (Mincer 1962; Smith and Ward 1985),
the rise in womens education levels (Olivetti 2006), the closure of the
gender wage gap (Galor and Weil 1996; Jones, Manuelli, and McGrat-
tan 2003; Knowles 2007; Attanasio, Low, and Sánchez-Marcos 2008),
the fertility decline (Chiappori and Weiss 2006), and the decrease in
1The chapter is based on Bredemeier and Juessen (2009).
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the marriage rate (Albanesi and Olivetti 2007). Yet, Eckstein and Lif-
shitz (2009) document that, in an extended version of the Eckstein and
Wolpin (1989) model, a considerable portion of the increase in married
womens labor supply remains unexplained by these traditional explana-
tions. Eckstein and Lifshitz (2009) argue that the unexplained portion
can be attributed to changes in preferences or the costs of childrearing
and household maintenance.2 More generally, the Eckstein and Lifshitz
(2009) paper is a proposal to investigate more closely the set of unob-
servable determinants of family labor supply.
We pick up this general idea and propose a structural model where
non-traditional factors inuence group-specic labor supply, in addition
to some of the traditional determinants mentioned before. Our house-
hold model of labor supply comprises four groups of agents married
women, married men, single women, and single men and aims to gen-
erate the observed developments for married couples and simultaneously
those for male and female single households, respectively. A key mech-
anism in our model relies on the possibility to outsource labor in home
production. Examples for outsourcing home labor abound. For instance,
when we think of home production being cleaning and washing, hiring
housekeepers is an alternative to own labor. Considering child care or
geriatric care, the assignment of babysitters or nannies and the use of
outpatient care is not unusual. We propose that outsourcing home labor
has become more attractive to households over time and that taking into
account this development on the market for tradable home labor helps
to understand the observed trends in labor supply at the subgroup level.
Outsourcing of home labor is related to the idea that home produc-
tion has been replaced by the consumption of market-produced substi-
tutes. Such marketization of home production has been shown to ex-
plain long-run trends (Ngai and Pissarides 2008; Rogerson 2008) as well
as cross-country di¤erences (Freeman and Schettkat 2005) in aggregate
market hours. In this chapter, we develop a similar line of argument to
explain the distinct subgroup-specic developments in labor supply by
2Further examples for what Eckstein and Lifshitz (2009) refer to as "other" expla-
nations are provided by e.g. Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005) who show
that technological improvements in home production a¤ect female labor supply or
by Attanasio, Low, and Sánchez-Marcos (2008) who analyze reductions in child care
costs. Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) and Fernández (2007) nd that social
norms are determinants of gender-specic labor supply.
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gender and marital status.
Considering four groups of agents (couples and single households)
simultaneously distinguishes our contribution from others that have also
examined married womens labor supply in the framework of household
decision making involving wife and husband but have not considered
single households (Knowles 2007; Attanasio, Low, and Sánchez-Marcos
2008; Eckstein and Lifshitz 2009). Our model of labor supply is similar to
the household model of Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003) who also
consider all four groups of agents simultaneously. They primarily focus
on explaining the substantial increase in married womens labor supply
and nd that the closure of the gender wage gap plays an important
role for this development. However, the closure of the gender wage gap
alone is not su¢ cient to explain the patterns in labor supply of married
couples and single households simultaneously.
In our framework, the possibility to outsource home labor implies
that households can take advantage of two forms of specialization: First,
in marriages, spouses can decide to specialize on paid market work or
home production, respectively. Second, couples as well as single house-
holds face the opportunity to hire labor used as an input in home pro-
duction. In a heterogeneous-agents model of household labor supply, we
show that the observed patterns in group-specic labor supply can be
understood as optimal reactions to rising attractiveness of outsourcing
home labor.
In our model, we distinguish between two labor markets. On a "rst
market", labor is used for the production of usual consumption goods,
whereas on a "second market", labor is used as an input for home pro-
duction. Since there are two markets, agents have the possibility to
specialize. Some agents may supply home labor on the second market,
while others nd it more attractive to work on the rst market solely,
depending on the wages they can earn on each market. To address these
relations, our model features another dimension of heterogeneity in addi-
tion to heterogeneity by gender and marital status. In particular, agents
in our model di¤er with respect to the wages they can earn on the rst
labor market. The presence of wage heterogeneity implies that agents
with relatively high wages will delegate home production either to their
spouse or to other agents (i.e. outsource home labor) in order to realize
an e¢ ciency gain. The possibility to trade home labor explains level
di¤erences in hours worked among married men, married women, single
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men, and single women as the result of specialization decisions.
Yet, trading home labor di¤ers from trade on other markets. So-
cial norms, trust, and personal attachments to tasks play an important
role when home labor is outsourced. For instance, parents may prefer
self-supplied child care (Davis and Henrekson 2004). Outsourcing child
care, or geriatric care, is also subject to social norms (Fernández 2007).
Furthermore, employing a housekeeper requires trust because employers
need to open their homes (Brück, Haisken-DeNew, and Zimmermann
2006). Another example for why trading home labor di¤ers from trade
on other markets is a lack of market transparency because a substantial
part of the trade in home labor occurs in the shadow economy (Dortch
1996). Such aspects may prevent people from hiring home labor who
could in principle a¤ord it.
When modelling a market for home labor, we pick up the general
idea by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) and capture these market
particularities as a wedge that distorts the decision to outsource home
labor. Specically, we introduce costs of outsourcing home labor which
add to wage costs. We label the di¤erence between the price and the
wage for home labor "home labor wedge". The existence of a home
labor wedge implies that there are agents who do not outsource home
labor although they could a¤ord the wage costs. If the home labor wedge
declines, outsourcing home labor becomes more attractive to households.
In our model, a declining home labor wedge has the same qualitative
e¤ects as relative productivity growth on the market for home labor.
Both developments make outsourcing home labor more attractive. This
is similar to Eckstein and Lifshitz (2009) who do not distinguish between
technological developments and changes in social norms as determinants
of female labor supply.
A main result of our model is that rising attractiveness of outsourc-
ing home labor (due to relative productivity growth or a declining home
labor wedge) can explain the observed labor market trends at the sub-
group level for all four population groups simultaneously. When out-
sourcing home labor becomes more attractive, more households decide
to hire labor for home production instead of doing these tasks on their
own. The respective singles and wives gain time to work on the rst
market. Being released of house work has a particularly strong impact
on married womens labor supply because married women tend to work
more in home production than singles due to intra-household specializa-
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tion. Husbands, on the contrary, record a decrease in average market
hours if the home labor wedge declines. Some husbands work more in
the household and less on the market because they loose intra-household
bargaining power due to increased earnings opportunities for their wives.
This e¤ect in an important di¤erence between our contribution and
the ones by Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005) and Attana-
sio, Low, and Sánchez-Marcos (2008). In Greenwood, Seshadri, and
Yorukoglu (2005) and Attanasio, Low, and Sánchez-Marcos (2008),
agents also gain time for market work by substituting away from own
time in home production. However, the supply of the substitute (home
capital or child care, respectively) is not modeled. In our model, ef-
fects on the supply side of the market for home labor are important for
subgroup-specic hours worked.
In the second part of the chapter we confront the model with US labor
market data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). We calibrate
the model to trace changes in hours worked by gender and marital status.
We thereby take into account di¤erent channels a¤ecting group-specic
labor supply, such as the marriage decline, overall productivity growth,
improvements in home capital, and the closure of the gender wage gap,
as well as the channel emphasized in the theoretical part of the chapter,
the rising attractiveness of trading home labor.
We nd that the calibrated model is successful at matching the series
of hours worked. Since our model is able to trace well the observed
patterns in group-specic labor supply, we use it to assess the relative
importance of di¤erent determinants of labor supply at the subgroup
level. In line with Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003), we nd
that the closure of the gender wage gap plays an important role when
accounting for the rise in hours. Our quantitative exercise also shows
that, without taking into account developments that make outsourcing
home labor more attractive, one can hardly account for the increases of
hours worked by singles of both genders. In particular, the wage-gap
closure cannot explain why the working time of single and married men
evolved in di¤erent directions.
Accounting for an observed moderate relative productivity growth
on the market for home labor (as documented by e.g. Ngai and Pis-
sarides 2008) improves the models predictions for all four population
groups. However, to fully trace the patterns in hours, the rise in the at-
tractiveness of this market needs to be more pronounced than reected
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by productivity growth alone. Put di¤erently, we can match the group-
specic trends in hours worked when we allow for reductions in the home
labor wedge. The decline in the home labor wedge may e.g. reect deve-
lopments in social norms which lead to rising acceptance of outsourcing
home labor. Fernández (2007) has documented that such developments
in social norms have actually occurred over the last decades. An em-
pirical implication of the declining home labor wedge is that the market
for household-related services has grown over time. Such sectoral shift
in the composition of the US economy has been documented by e.g. Lee
and Wolpin (2006), Ngai and Pissarides (2008), and Autor and Dorn
(2009).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next sec-
tion briey summarizes empirical facts on labor supply in the US over
the last decades. Section 4.3 describes the theoretical model. Section
4.4 solves the model and analyzes the equilibrium response to a rising
attractiveness of the market for home labor. The quantitative analysis
is presented in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter and an
appendix follows.
4.2 Empirical Facts
To provide the empirical background of our analysis, we recapitulate the
observed patterns in US labor market data to which we will compare
our model. Figure 4.1 shows average hours of market work by gender
and marital status. The data stems from the March Supplement of the
CPS, from 1962 to 2007, in the format arranged by Unicon Research.3
We dene working age as 18 to 65 and restrict the sample to the civilian
population of that age.
Over the last decades, labor supply of married women increased sub-
stantially. In the early 1960s, they worked on average just a little more
than 10 hours per week. Until 2006, this number more than doubled to
over 20 hours a week. At the same time, labor supply of married men
slightly fell from somewhat below 40 hours per week to approximately
37.5 - a decrease of 6%. Both single men and women tended to work less
than married men, but more than married women. On average, male
singles worked slightly above, female singles slightly below 25 hours a
week. Both time series showed an upward trend in the 1970s and 80s.
3Details are provided in Appendix 4.A.
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Figure 4.1: Average weekly market hours by gender and marital status
in the US (March CPS, Persons aged 18-65)
Our model aims at replicating the ordering of hours worked by popu-
lation groups, as well as the direction and magnitude of changes in hours
over time. Specically, we want to replicate the following three facts:4
1. Levels of hours worked by groups: On average, married men
work the most hours of all four population groups, followed by
single men and single women. Married women work the fewest
hours on average.
2. Directions of changes over time: Over time, average market
hours of married men decreased while all other population groups
record increasing hours.
3. Magnitude of changes over time: The most pronounced
change over time is the increase in married womens hours.
4These three results are highly signicant (see Appendix 4.A).
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4.3 Model Environment
In this section, we introduce a market for home labor into a collec-
tive model of household labor supply. We transfer the framework of
Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003) into a heterogeneous-agents
model where households di¤er with respect to their potential wages on
the rst market. The decision process within households is modeled
using a stylized version of endogenous bargaining positions (Chiappori
1988; Chiappori 1992).
Our model aims at tracing developments in hours worked by gender
and marital status. We therefore include di¤erent determinants of group-
specic labor supply, such as the marriage rate, overall wages, gender
di¤erences in wages, home technology, and the home labor wedge. This
means that from the list of traditional explanations we consider all but
fertility. Changes in education appear as changes in wages in our model.
4.3.1 Population composition
The population consists of women (mass 1) and men (also mass 1). An
exogenous fraction s of both genders are singles, the remaining fraction
(1 s) is married to an individual of the other gender. Households di¤er
with respect to their wages on the "rst market" where consumption
goods are produced. Home goods are produced within households using
own time and labor which can be traded at a "second market".
We incorporate heterogeneity with respect to rst-market wages by
assuming a continuum of agents with a continuous wage structure. In
order to be able to derive results analytically, we rst assume that wages
on the rst market (denoted by a) are distributed uniformly.5 The wage
distributions di¤er by gender and have supports [0; 1] for men and [0; ]
for women, respectively,  < 1.6 We assume that rst-market wages are
exogenous, thus we abstain from modelling an explicit education choice.
5In the quantitative part of the chapter, we relax this assumption and assume a
more realistic log-normal distribution for rst-market wages.
6Empirical evidence that wage distributions have gender-specic supports is pro-
vided by Albanesi and Olivetti (2006), who observe that among top-salary receivers
men earn more than women. More generally, there is considerable empirical evidence
that, even after controlling for a number of observable characteristics, womens wages
are lower than mens, see e.g. Goldin (1990), Blau and Kahn (1997b), Blau (1998).
Gender di¤erences in wages can be due to various factors, such as discrimination
(Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan 2003).
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This means that our model does not disentangle changes in education
levels from the closure of the gender wage gap for given education. In
our model, a rise in education levels appears as a rise in rst-market
wages.
Other than on the rst market, all agents are assumed to earn the
same wage on the second market. This simplifying assumption is moti-
vated by the observation of Brück, Haisken-DeNew, and Zimmermann
(2006) that household work typically requires only low skills and no for-
mal qualications. One may therefore argue that wages are determined
by supply and demand rather than by individual characteristics.
We introduce subscripts to indicate an individuals gender, marital
status, and her position in the wage distribution. Genders are coded
by F (or f) for female and M (or m) for male. Capital letters indicate
that the respective person is married, whereas lower-case letters stand
for singles. For instance, the index (M; 0:25) refers to a married man
located at the lower .25 quantile of the wage distribution on the rst
market.
We assume that marital status and wages are independent and that
mating occurs in a perfectly assortative way (Becker 1973).7 As a conse-
quence of assortative mating, rst-market wages are perfectly correlated
in marriages, i.e. a wifes wage is a constant fraction of her husbands
one,
aF;i =   aM;i, (4.1)
such that we can use the subscript i 2 [0; 1] for the entire household,
reecting its position in the wage distribution. Given the assumption
of assortative mating, the distribution parameter  determines intra-
household wage di¤erentials between husbands and wives. Equation
(4.1) implies that there are households where both spouses earn high
wages, but there are also households where both partners have rather
low wages. Thus, not every woman is earning less than every man, but
every wife is earning less than her husband (if both work on the rst
market).
7Becker (1973) shows that such sorting is the only stable outcome of a perfect
marriage market when marital surpluses are supermodular (i.e. if there are mar-
ital complementarities). Fernández, Guner, and Knowles (2004) provide empirical
evidence for marital sorting and nd that the correlation of wifes and husbands ed-
ucation levels is remarkably high across Europe and both North and South America.
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With the uniform distribution of wages on [0; 1] and [0; ] for men
and women, respectively, we have:
aM;i = i, aF;i = i, am;i = i, af;i = i (4.2)
4.3.2 Preferences and technology
We assume that preferences of agents are given by the individual utility
function
Ug;i =
0BB@
264

 
 +
1=
(cg;i)
 1

+
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1=
(dg;i)
 1

375

 1
1CCA
( +)
 (lg;i)(1   ) ,
g =F;M; f;m,
(4.3)
where cg;i denotes an individuals consumption of market goods, dg;i
her consumption of home goods, and lg;i her time spent on leisure. The
utility function is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator over consumption and
leisure, where consumption is a CES aggregator over home and mar-
ket consumption.
In the theoretical part of the chapter, we use the parameter restric-
tion  ! 1 which results in log utility.8 We do so to isolate the e¤ects
of outsourcing home labor. In the quantitative part of the chapter, we
refrain from this parameter restriction.
First, we consider the decision problem for married couples. We
assume that a couple i realizes an e¢ cient intra-household bargaining
solution. This is equivalent to assuming the household would maximize
Ui = F;i  uF;i + M;i  uM;i, (4.4)
which is a weighted sum of the individual log utilities of the two spouses,
uG;i = lnUG;i. If the weights on individual utilities, F;i and M;i, are en-
dogenous, this is a version of the collective household model initially in-
troduced by Chiappori (1988, 1992). In order to endogenize the weights,
we assume that an individuals bargaining position depends on his or her
outside options. As a simple specication of this idea, we assume that a
8With this parameter restriction, the utility function is decision-equivalent to
ug;i =  ln cg;i +  ln dg;i + (1     ) ln lg;i.
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spouses weight is equal to her relative contribution to the households
full income:
F;i =
WF;i
WF;i +WM;i
, M;i =
WM;i
WF;i +WM;i
(4.5)
Full incomes, WF;i and WM;i, should be understood as the amount of
earnings on both markets if the entire time endowment was spent on
paid labor and thus depend on wages and on the agents choice of labor
market. For the intra-household decision process it makes no di¤erence
whether the full incomes are actually earned or not, i.e. WF;i and WM;i
are hypothetical incomes.9
A wife has a time endowment of one, which can be used for leisure
lF;i, rst-market labor n
1;S
F;i , labor at home hF;i, and labor at the sec-
ond market n2;SF;i (superscript S indicating supply). Husbands face an
equivalent constraint:
lG;i + n
1;S
G;i + n
2;S
G;i + hG;i  1; G =M;F (4.6)
Home goods have to be produced using capital ki and labor as in-
puts. Labor in home production of a partnership is a weighted sum of
husbands (hM;i) and wifes labor (hF;i) and the amount of hired labor
(n2;Di ):
dF;i + dM;i  A (ki)

hF;i + hM;i +   n2;Di
1 
(4.7)
In this model, own and hired labor are perfect substitutes.10 This
is similar to the existence of market-produced substitutes to home-
produced home goods as in Gronau (1977, 1980) and Ngai and Pis-
sarides (2008). The parameter  measures the relative productivity of
9If utility weights were xed, wivesleisure would decrease when the gender wage
gap closes, which is counterfactual to what is observed, see Knowles (2007). Knowles
argues that, when female wages rise, not only becomes her leisure more expensive
to the household, but also improves her intra-household bargaining position due to
better outside opportunities. Equation (4.5) is a stylized version of utility weights re-
ecting outside options. This decision rule allows us to solve the model in closed form.
Other decision rules such as Nash Bargaining or Equal Surplus Splitting (Knowles
2007) lead to analytically non-tractable solutions of our model.
10Olivetti (2006) has also studied the e¤ects of external services in home produc-
tion (production of "child quality" in her case), but in her model these services are
complements to own labor. We model hired home labor as substitutes to own labor,
such that it can actually "free up" time to use for market labor.
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hired home labor compared to own house work. For instance, for  > 1,
one unit of hired time does replace more than one unit of own time,
which would reect that professional service providers produce home
goods more e¢ ciently than household members themselves.
The home production function (4.7) implies that replacing one unit
of ones own time in home production costs w=, where w is the wage
rate for external home labor. A frictionless market for home labor would
have a strong e¢ ciency implication. Individuals whose opportunity cost
of time is higher than w= should not work at home at all. Since  is
likely to be larger than 1, all individuals facing higher wage rates than
the wage rate for home labor should employ personnel if the market
for home labor was perfect. Furthermore, every individual would either
supply or demand home labor at the market. Obviously, this is not how
people behave.
There seem to be forces at play that distort the decision whether to
outsource home labor. In the spirit of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2007), we capture such forces as a wedge. Specically, we introduce a
"home labor wedge" 1 +  into agentsbudget constraints. This wedge
implies that a household, that wishes to hire home labor for a certain
amount w  n2;Di , has to bear total costs of (1 + )  w  n2;Di .
The budget constraint in terms of the market good for couple i then
reads as:
cF;i+cM;i+q ki+(1 + )w n2;Di  aF;i n1;SF;i+aM;i n1;SM;i+w (n2;SM;i+n2;SF;i ),
(4.8)
where q is the relative price of home capital.
The home labor wedge may be due to several reasons. One is disutil-
ity when outsourcing home labor. For instance, parents who outsource
child care may su¤er from being apart from their children (Davis and
Henrekson 2004). Another form of utility costs is related to discrimina-
tion, for instance when child care or geriatric care are outsourced.11 The
need for mutual trust makes employing household personnel more di¢ -
cult (Brück, Haisken-DeNew, and Zimmermann 2006). The home labor
wedge can also be due to a lack of market transparency because a sub-
stantial part of the trade in home labor occurs in the shadow economy
11This point is emphasized by Fernández (2007), who argues that female labor
supply "may depend on how a woman conceives of her role in the household, [...] or
how she is treated as a result of her choice" (p. 6).
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(Dortch 1996).
Our preferred interpretation of the home labor wedge is that out-
sourcing home labor involves utility costs. To provide a formal justi-
cation for this interpretation, we consider a version of the model (see
Appendix 4.C) using a di¤erent utility function under which the equi-
librium time allocation is the same as in our baseline model using the
resource costs in the budget constraint (4.8).
The decision problem for couples is to maximize (4.4) by choosing
consumption levels, time allocations, and demand for home capital and
home labor subject to (4.6), (4.7), and (4.8) for given q, w, ai. Singles
face a similar decision problem as couples. They maximize individual
utility (4.3) without the possibility of intra-household specialization sub-
ject to the following constraints (for g = f;m):
lg;i + n
1;S
g;i + n
2;S
g;i + hg;i  1 (4.9)
dg;i  A  (kg;i)  (hg;i +   n2;Dg;i )1  (4.10)
cg;i + q  kg;i + (1 + )  w  n2;Dg;i  ag;in1;Sg;i + w  n2;Sg;i (4.11)
4.4 Allocation of Time
In this section, we discuss how we derive group-specic hours. In
Section 4.4.1, we discuss decisions at the household level for given
prices exploiting information from optimality conditions. We aggre-
gate these household-level decisions in Section 4.4.2 and determine the
labor-market equilibrium in Section 4.4.3. In Section 4.4.4, we analyze
comparative-static properties of the equilibrium.
4.4.1 Decisions at the household level
This section presents and discusses householdsoptimal decisions on time
allocations and demand for home labor. All decisions presented in this
section are derived formally in Appendix 4.B. In the appendix, decisions
are derived for a general  whereas, in this section, we present decisions
for the special case ! 1.
Depending on the relation between rst and second market wages,
households take discrete labor market choices, i.e. they decide on which
market to work. Given the composition of the economy, couples split up
into four groups of households regarding their behavior on the market
for home labor. Households with high rst-market wages demand home
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labor while, for those with low rst-market wages, it is optimal to supply
one or both spouseslabor on the second market. Other couples will not
act on the market for home labor at all.
Individualspotential rst-market wages determine to which group
an individual belongs. Agents with rst-market wages lower than the
wage on the second market, w, will decide to supply home labor.
The wage threshold for demanding home labor depends on the total
costs of outsourcing one unit of home labor. When solving the model, it
is convenient to explicitly distinguish between the price for outsourcing
one unit of home labor and the wage received for supplying one unit. A
household that wishes to replace one unit of its own time by hired home
labor has to pay an e¤ective price, p, given by
p = (1 + )  w, (4.12)
where
1 +  =
1 + 

. (4.13)
Agents whose rst-market wages exceed this price p will not work in
home production themselves. For these agents, it is rational to outsource
home labor and gain time for market work since their wages exceed the
total costs of outsourcing. Agents with rst-market wages between p
and w will not act on the market for home labor at all.
Considering equation (4.12), it is apparent that the di¤erence be-
tween the wage received for home labor and its e¤ective price is equiva-
lent to a distortionary tax on the second-market wage. When solving the
model, we thus refer to the relative di¤erence,  ; between price the p and
wage w for home labor as an "as-if" tax. The "as-if" tax consists of the
home labor wedge  and the relative productivity of hired home labor
 (see equation (4.13)) and measures the attractiveness of the market
for home labor. It is also apparent that reductions in the home labor
wedge  and increases in relative productivity of hired home labor, ,
respectively, have the same qualitative e¤ects.
Table 4.1 summarizes optimal labor supply and demand decisions of
the four groups of couples. Group sizes can be read from the rst column.
While we will derive the decisions of the rst group of couples explicitly,
we will sketch only briey the mechanisms leading to the decisions of
the other groups and those of singles.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
male hours female hours labor 2
market 1 market 2 market 1 market 2 demand
n1;SM;i n
2;S
M;i n
1;S
F;i n
2;S
F;i n
2;D
i
group 1  +  0  +  0 (1 + )
i 2 [ p ; 1] (1  ) ip
group 2  +  0  +  0 0
i 2 [w ; p ]   1(1  )
group 3  +  0 0  +  0
i 2 [w; w ]  (1  ) iw
group 4 0  +  0  +  0
i 2 [0; w]
Table 4.1: Summary of coupleslabor supply and demand decisions
Singles do not have the possibility of intra-household specialization
and split up into three groups. For high-wage singles, it is rational
to hire home labor in order to gain time to work on the rst market.
Singles with a medium rst-market wage neither demand nor supply
home labor. Low-wage singles supply home labor. Within the groups,
decisions are the same for both men and women. The only di¤erence
is that for men, more individuals belong to the rst two groups, due to
the gender-specic wage distributions. Table 4.2 presents a summary of
labor supply and demand decisions of singles.
Group 1: Top-wage couples. For households with i > p

(see rst
row of Table 4.1), it is rational to hire home labor and to supply own
labor only on the rst market since both their wages (husband and wife)
exceed the e¤ective price for hired home labor, i > p. Consequently,
both spouses neither supply labor on the second market (n2F;i = n
2
M;i =
0) nor work in home production themselves (hF;i = hM;i = 0). The
remaining time-use decisions can be derived by considering the shares
of wealth the household devotes to the goods which provide utility. The
full (potential) income of a household of this type is the sum of the two
wages, Wi = aF;i + aM;i = (1 + )i. The expenditure shares for specic
goods are determined by the corresponding utility weights.
88
For instance, husbands leisure multiplied with its opportunity costs
is a constant fraction of full income in the optimum:
lM;i  aM;i = M;i(1     )Wi (4.14)
Since M;i =
WM;i
WF;i+WM;i
=
aM;i
aF;i+aM;i
, leisure of the husband is lM;i =
1       and, analogously, the wife spends lF;i = 1       on leisure
time.
As both spouses do not work at home, they spend their remaining
time working on the rst market:
n1;SM;i = n
1;S
F;i =  +  (4.15)
For the amount of hired home labor, total opportunity costs have to
equal a constant fraction of total income that is determined by the corre-
sponding utility weight and the e¢ cient share of labor in the production
of the home good, such that:
n2;Di = (1 + )  (1  )
i
p
(4.16)
Group 2: High-wage couples. Couples with wages in the range
w

< i < p

do not act on the second labor market since it is neither ra-
tional to hire nor to supply home labor. Spouses consume equal amounts
of leisure time, as all couples do. For non-leisure time, household op-
timization results in di¤erences between spouses. Due to husband-wife
wage di¤erentials it is e¢ cient to specialize. Married women in this
group supply less labor on the rst market than their husbands but
spend more time on home production to provide their husbands with
home goods as well, see the second row of Table 4.1.
Group 3: Low-wage couples. In households with w < i < w

, hus-
bands work on the rst labor market solely, whereas wives work on the
second market and at home. As husbands in this group do not work
at home, they spend their non-leisure time entirely on the rst market.
Women, however, spend some time in home production and devote only
the remaining non-leisure time to paid second-market work. As before,
the reason for intra-household di¤erences in market hours is specializa-
tion.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
range range hours labor 2
for women for men market 1 market 2 demand
n1;Sg;i n
2;S
g;i n
2;D
g;i
group a i 2 [ p

; 1] i 2 [p; 1]  +  0 (1  ) ag;i
p
group b i 2 [w

; p

] i 2 [w; p]  +  0 0
group c i 2 [0; w

] i 2 [0; w] 0  +  0
Table 4.2: Decisions of singles (g = f;m); af;i =   i, am;i = i
Group 4: Bottom-wage couples. Households with i < w have po-
tential rst-market wages which are so low that both, husband and wife,
decide to work on the second market. Since wages are equal on this
market, there is no incentive to specialize within the household for these
couples and both spouses could engage in home production. As wages
on the second market do not di¤er by gender, the allocation of working
times across spouses is indetermined. We can only state how much they
will supply together. In the following, we will assume that households
in the bottom-wage group split both types of labor equally among wife
and husband.12
Group a: High-wage singles. Singles earning higher rst-market
wages than the e¤ective price for home labor, ag;i > p, hire home labor.
Equivalent to the decisions of couples discussed above, all singles con-
sume a constant amount 1       of leisure time. Since singles in the
high-wage group do not work at home themselves, they spend their re-
maining time on the rst market. Similar to top-wage couples, demand
for home labor depends positively on the ratio of a singles individual
wage to the price for home labor, see the rst row in Table 4.2.
Group b: Medium-wage singles. Singles with medium wages, w <
ag;i < p, neither demand nor supply home labor. They work on the
rst market and at home. They do not take advantage of any form
of specialization, neither within nor among households. Singles in this
group therefore work less on the market than singles in group a because
12For the following analysis, it is su¢ cient that households in this group split labor
equally on average.
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they work in home production on their own. Their time allocations
solely reect utility weights and production elasticities.
Group c: Low-wage singles. Singles whose potential wages on the
rst market fall short of the wage on the second market, ag;i < w ,
decide to supply home labor. This group di¤ers from the previous one
only with respect to market choice. The allocation of time to leisure,
home production, and market work is identical.
4.4.2 Average labor supply of population groups
We derive average market hours by gender and marital status by ag-
gregating individual decisions. Market hours refer to total compensated
work and consist of rst- and second-market labor supply. Average mar-
ket time of married men are derived by integrating columns (2) and (3)
of Table 4.1:
NM =  +    (1  )  w (4.17)
When the wage for home labor increases, compensated male labor de-
creases since group 4 grows and, in this group, men do also work in the
household and less on the market than men in other groups.
Average compensated hours of wives are calculated by integrating
labor supply as given in columns (4) and (5) of Table 4.1:
NF = +

1  w


 +
w


 
 p

  w

 1 + 

(1  )  
Z w=
w

(1  ) i
w

di
= +    (1  )  2 +  1 p+ (1  )  2
2
+
1
2

w
(4.18)
Wiveshours increase in the wage w for home labor but decrease in the
price p. When w rises, more women receive male help in the household
(group 4 grows) and some women (those in group 3) face rising oppor-
tunity costs of non-market time. When p rises, group 1 becomes smaller
and, in this group, wives work the most.
Integrating total labor on both markets as given in columns (4) and
(5) of Table 4.2, one can see that average compensated labor of female
singles decreases in the second-market price p and is independent of the
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second-market wage w:
Nf =  +    (1  )  p

(4.19)
The wage for home labor w does not a¤ect hours of single women
because changes in w only induce some women to change the market
(women changing from group b to group c). But these women still keep
working the same amount of time. However, decreases in p motivate
some women to hire someone for doing house work and to increase their
activity on the rst market (women changing from group b to group a).
Analogously to female singles, we derive average market hours of
single men by integrating total labor of both types, as given in columns
(4) and (5) of Table 4.2, taking into account the group sizes for males
reported in column (3):
Nm =  +    (1  )  p (4.20)
Average hours of single men also decrease in p and are independent of
w. The reasons are the same as for women. Mens response to a change
in the second-market e¤ective price p is weaker than that of women as
 < 1.
Considering individual decisions in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 and aggregated
hours given by equations (4.17) to (4.20), it is apparent that time-use
decisions neither depend on the price for home capital, q, nor on total
factor productivity, A (see Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003) for
a detailed discussion). These properties are an implication of Cobb-
Douglas technology and preferences and they do not necessarily hold
under di¤erent assumptions. In the quantitative part of the chapter, we
relax the parameter restriction ! 1 in the utility function (4.3), which
allows q and A to a¤ect hours decisions.
4.4.3 Equilibrium
We now analyze the equilibrium of the market for home labor and its
dependency on the attractiveness of the market for home labor as mea-
sured by the "as-if" tax  dened in (4.13). Having solved for equilib-
rium prices, p and w, we can analyze average market hours by gender
and marital status as given by equations (4.17) to (4.20).
An equilibrium is an allocation of goods and timen
cg;i; dg;i; kg;i; lg;i; n
1
g;i; n
2;S
g;i ; hg;i; n
2;D
g;i
o
; g 2 fF;M; f;mg ; i 2 [0; 1]
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together with prices w and p which satisfy optimal decisions as
discussed in Section 4.4.1. Furthermore, market clearing for goods
requires (1  s)  Pg=F;M R 10 ag;in1g;idi + s  Pg=f;m R 10 ag;in1g;idi =
(1  s)  Pg=F;M R 10 (cg;i + q  kg;i) di + s  Pg=f;m R 10 (cg;i + q  kg;i) di.
The market for home labor is cleared when (1  s) Pg=F;M R 10 n2;Sg;i di+
s Pg=f;m R 10 n2;Sg;i di = (1  s) Pg=F;M R 10 n2;Dg;i di+s Pg=f;m R 10 n2;Dg;i di.13
The market-clearing e¤ective price and wage on the second market
for a given   0 are:
p = (1 + )1=2 

(1 + )D1
S1 + (1 + )D1D2
1=2
(4.21)
w = (1 + ) 1=2 

(1 + )D1
S1 + (1 + )D1D2
1=2
; (4.22)
where D1 := 12(1   ), D2 :=  1 +  2 + s    2s, and S1 :=
( 1 + 1)( + )   1
2
(1   s)( 2   1)(1   ) are positive compos-
ite parameters. The e¤ective price for home labor p is increasing in the
"as-if" tax  , while the respective wage w decreases in this measure of
the attractiveness of the second market.14
4.4.4 Hours worked in equilibrium
The data suggests the following three observations with respect to mar-
ket hours by gender and marital status (see Section 4.2): (i) Husbands
work the most, followed by male singles and female singles. Married
women work the fewest hours. (ii) Husbandshours decreased and all
other groupshours increased over time. (iii) Comparing the magnitudes
of the changes, wiveschange was by far the strongest.
We now show that the model outlined in Section 4.3 is able to gen-
erate the ordering of hours, i.e. NM > Nm > Nf > NF . Moreover,
the model generates the direction and relative magnitude of the changes
over time as a (comparative-static) response to a decrease in the "as-if"
tax on the market for home labor,  . The "as-if" tax decreases when the
relative productivity of hired home labor, , increases or the home labor
13Note that we take q as given by technology.
14The derivation of equilibrium prices and their marginal derivatives with respect
to  can be found in Appendix 4.D.
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wedge, , decreases, see (4.13). Thus, increases in  and reductions in 
have the same qualitative e¤ects. These properties of the model follow
from average market hours by gender and marital status as given by
equations (4.17) to (4.20) and the reactions of price and wage for home
labor to changes in the "as-if" tax  , @p=@ > 0, @w=@ < 0. Analytical
proofs of all statements can be found in Appendix 4.D.
1. Levels of hours worked by groups. In the labor-market equi-
librium, average market hours by population groups fulll NM > Nm >
Nf > NF .
On average, married men work more hours on the market than sin-
gle men because fewer married men have to work in home production
due to intra-household specialization. On the other hand, male singles
spend more time on market work than their female counterparts because
more single men than single women can a¤ord to outsource home labor.
Finally, single womens average market time exceeds that of married
women because some wives work more in home production providing
this commodity also to their husbands. Thus, the ordering of average
labor supply by groups is as in the data.
2. Directions of changes over time. If the market for home labor
becomes more attractive, and thus the "as-if" tax  declines, average
hours of market work of married men decrease while all other groups
average hours increase.
When the "as-if" tax declines, the wage for home labor w increases
and the e¤ective price for this type of labor, p, decreases. Since outsourc-
ing home labor is associated with lower costs, more households decide to
use this opportunity. This is freeing up time for those agents who previ-
ously worked in home production. Therefore, average market hours by
singles of both genders and by married women increase. Married men,
by contrast, are a¤ected in the opposite way. In households which decide
to outsource home labor after the reduction in  , the husband did not
work in home production anyway. However, some other husbands begin
to work in the household and reduce market hours because there are
no longer intra-household market-wage di¤erentials due to the increased
earnings opportunities on the second market which favor their wives.
3. Magnitude of changes over time. The change in married
womens market hours is the strongest one of all four population groups.
As before, we consider a decline in the "as-if" tax  : In those house-
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holds where husbands start to work in home production, wives at least
compensate their husbandsmarket-hours decrease by own increases.
Total market-labor supply of these households thus increases because
opportunity costs of non-market time increase due to the wage rise on
the second market. All other husbands record constant hours in this sce-
nario, whereas there are some other wives who also increase their market
time, e.g. because outsourcing is freeing up time. Thus the change in
married womens market hours dominates the change in married mens
hours in absolute terms.
The increase in hours for married women is also stronger than the in-
duced increase for singles. When  decreases, wives are a¤ected stronger
than single women because the married women involved did work more
at home than singles as they provided their husbands with home goods
as well. Female singles, on the other hand, are more strongly a¤ected
than male singles. Since the wage distribution for women is more com-
pressed than the one for males, more female singles fall into the range of
households that decide to outsource home labor after the decrease in  :
4.5 Quantitative Analysis
We now calibrate our model to trace the developments in hours worked
by gender and marital status. We then use the model to assess the rel-
ative importance of di¤erent explanations for the group-specic trends
in hours. Group-specic labor supply depends on several developments,
such as the fertility and marriage decline (Chiappori and Weiss 2006;
Albanesi and Olivetti 2007), overall productivity growth (Mincer 1962;
Smith and Ward 1985), technological improvements in home produc-
tion (Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu 2005), and the closure of the
gender wage gap (Galor and Weil 1996; Jones, Manuelli, and McGrat-
tan 2003; Knowles 2007; Attanasio, Low, and Sánchez-Marcos 2008).
If trading home labor has become more attractive over time, this is an
additional explanation for trends in hours, see Section 4.4.4.
In our model, trading home labor can become more attractive due
to two developments: relative productivity growth of hired home labor
and reductions in the home labor wedge. While the former development
corresponds to increases in the parameter  in the home production
function (4.7), the latter development is captured by reductions in the
parameter  in equations (4.8) and (4.11). The technology parameter
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 can in principle be observed, while there is no directly observable
counterpart for the home labor wedge .
As argued by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), wedges can rep-
resent several structural characteristics of markets. In our setting, the
home labor wedge represents, for instance, disutility from outsourcing
home labor and is thus not directly observable. Therefore, we use our
model to quantify it. A second key point of Chari, Kehoe, and Mc-
Grattan (2007) is that wedges are time varying. In our setting, the
home labor wedge is likely to have experienced changes over time due to
changes in social norms. When quantifying the home labor wedge , we
therefore allow for time variation in this parameter. We use our model to
determine a sequence for  under which the model generates the closest
t to the observed trends in hours. This means that, per point in time,
we want to match four moments (hours worked by population groups)
by choosing one free parameter (the home labor wedge) in a structural
model, taking into account changes in other, observable variables.
We then use the calibrated model to quantify the relative contribu-
tions of the di¤erent channels when accounting for the group-specic
trends in hours. First, we insert information on observables, such as de-
mographic changes, the wage-gap closure, and technology changes, into
our model one-by-one. Then, we assess the inuence of the home labor
wedge.
4.5.1 Wage distribution
For the quantitative analysis, we should make the specication of the
wage distribution more realistic than the one used in the theoretical
part of the chapter. So far, we have assumed a uniform distribution of
wages, which allowed us to solve the model in closed form and to derive
comparative-static properties analytically. For the quantitative analysis,
we replace the uniform distribution by a log-normal one.
Analogously to our previous specication with a uniform distribution,
we capture male-female wage di¤erentials by assuming that the female
wage distribution is a downward spread of the male one in the sense that
G(a) = F
 a


, (4.23)
whereG is the female cumulative log-normal density and F the male one.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the relation between F and G. For any particular
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Figure 2: Relation between Male and Female Wage Distributions
where µ is the mean and σ the standard deviation of the respective distribution of log
wages. Relation (24) is shown by Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss (2009) as a stylized
empirical result and allows us to describe the wage structure in our model by just one
variance. The entire wage structure at a specific point in time can thus be described by
three parameters, mean and variance of the male wage distribution as well as the gender
difference α. Under assortative mating, a husband with first-market wage a is paired
with a woman earning α · a.
The choice of wage distribution does not affect individual decisions for given prices.
By contrast, it does affect aggregation and equilibrium prices.
5.2 Calibration
We match our model to average hours by population groups in the five decades from the
1960’s to now, i.e. t = 1961-69, 1970-79, 1980-89, 1990-99, 2000-06. By pooling the CPS
data decade-wise, we are confident to filter out developments that occur at business-
cycle frequency and we consider the five decades as separate equilibria. Table 3 presents
a summary of the parameter choices.
Technology and demography. To quantify the fraction of singles in the economy,
s, we compute the share of non-married individuals decade-wise from the CPS. We
calculate the relative price of home capital, q, as the ratio of the deflators for durable
and non-durable goods in the National Income and Product Accounts.15
15The NIPA data are available online under www.bea.gov.
20
Figure 4.2: Relation between Male and Female Wage Distributions
wage a0, more wome than me fall s ort of this wag , which implies
that G  F 8a. Th men are earning more than women in the sense of
rst-order dominance.
Under assumption (4.23), it holds that
female;t = male;t (4.24)
and female;t = male;t + lnt, (4.25)
where  is the mean and  the standard deviation of the respective
normal distribution of log wages. Relation (4.24) is shown by Browning,
Chiappori, and Weiss (2010) as a stylized empirical result and allows us
to describe the wage structure in ur model by ju t one variance. The
e tire wage structure at a specic point in time can thus be described
by three parameters, mean and va iance of the ale wage distribution
as well s the gender di¤er nce . Under perfectly assortative mating, a
husband with rs -market wage a is paired with a woman earning   a.
The choice of wage distribution does not a¤ect individual decisions
for given prices. By contrast, it does a¤ect aggregation and equilibrium
prices.
97
4.5.2 Calibration
We match our model to average hours by population groups in the ve
decades from the 1960s to now, i.e. t = 1961-69; 1970-79; 1980-89; 1990-
99; 2000-06. By pooling the CPS data decade-wise, we are condent to
lter out developments that occur at business-cycle frequency and we
consider the ve decades as separate equilibria. Table 4.3 presents a
summary of the parameter choices.
Technology and demography. To quantify the fraction of singles
in the economy, s, we compute the share of non-married individuals
decade-wise from the CPS. Similarly to Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan
(2003), we calculate the relative price of home capital, q, as the ratio of
the deators for durable and non-durable goods in the National Income
and Product Accounts.15
The capital share in home production, , is taken from Knowles
(2007), who calibrates this number to 0:08 in order to match equipment
spending as a share of total consumption. To quantify the parameters
determining productivities in home production, we use the results of
Ngai and Pissarides (2008) that productivity of marketized home pro-
duction has grown at an annual rate of 0:4% while there has been no
productivity growth in self-made home production. In our model, this
implies that A is a constant (which we normalize to 1) and that  grows
roughly with rate 4% per decade.
Preference parameters. We determine preference parameters by
model calibration. In the theoretical part of the chapter, we have im-
posed the parameter restriction !1 in order to isolate the e¤ects of 
and . In the quantitative part of the chapter, we relax this restriction
and allow 6=1. The resulting labor supply and demand decisions are
presented in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 in the appendix.
We calibrate the preference parameters ,  , and  to match mean
levels of hours worked by groups. The chosen parameterization (see
Table 4.3) implies that home and market consumption goods are com-
plements. Furthermore, agents allocate roughly one half of their weekly
time endowment (which we set to 80 hours) to leisure.
15The NIPA data are available online under www.bea.gov.
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Finally, we need to determine the home labor wedge t and a set
of parameters characterizing the distribution of rst-market wages, t,
2t , t. In order to ensure that our quantitative exercise is consistent
with the underlying structural model, we have to take into account the
models predictions on labor market choices. For this reason, the distri-
bution parameters are determined within the calibration procedure for
t described in the next paragraph.
Home labor wedge and wage distribution. Labor market choices
determine whether rst-market wages of agents are actually observable
or not. According to our model, agents having lower rst-market wages
than wt decide to work on the market for home labor and, consequently,
their rst-market wages should not be observable in year t. Since the
equilibrium value for wt depends on the home labor wedge t, labor
market choices and the observability of rst-market wages depend on
this parameter as well.
In order to ensure consistency, we determine t and the wage-
distribution parameters in an iterative way. The iterative procedure is
performed separately for pooled decade data, t = 1961-69; 1970-79; 1980-
89; 1990-99; 2000-06, and can be described as follows.
1. To obtain a rst guess for the parameters of the wage distribution
in a specic decade t, we t log-normal distributions to all strictly
positive hourly wages in our selected sample in this decade using
Maximum Likelihood. We do so for both genders separately in
order to obtain gender-specic means, female;t and male;t, of log
wages. The gender wage di¤erence t is calculated as
t = exp(female;t   male;t). (4.26)
Then, we use the parameters of the tted male distribution and
approximate the female one by g(a) = f
 
a


. Since the entire wage
structure in our model economy is described by the parameters
referring to the male wage distribution along with , we drop the
index male and denote the wage distribution parameters by t, t,
and t.
We dene a vector t containing the parameter values of our model
(except for t) for decade t:
t =
 
st qt  A t   t t t
0
(4.27)
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2. Taking the values in t as given, we determine the value for t that
best enables the underlying structural model to match mean hours
worked by gender and marital status in decade t. We choose that
t that minimizes a measure of the distance between the model
and empirical moments, whereas the vector of moments comprises
mean hours worked by gender and marital status. We calculate
the theoretical moments for a given t by aggregating household-
level decisions in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 (multiplied with the respective
densities of the wage distribution) as in Section 4.4.16
Formally, let Nt(t) denote the vector of model moments for a
given t and a given parameter vector t, and let N^t denote the
corresponding empirical moments calculated from decade-t data.
Our estimate bt is the solution to the quadratic minimization prob-
lem
min
t
 (t) =
h
N^t  Nt(t)
i0
 
 1t 
h
N^t  Nt(t)
i
, (4.28)
where 
 1t is the inverse of a diagonal matrix with the sample
variances of mean hours worked by gender and marital status along
the diagonal. Thus, in each decade, we have an overidentied
system with four moments to be matched and one parameter to
be estimated. Minimization is carried out using a direct search
method.
3. With the value for bt resulting from step 2 and the current para-
meter vector t, we identify those agents who decide to work on
the second market. Observed wages for those agents should not in-
uence the identication of the distribution of rst-market wages.
For men, the fraction of individuals working on the second market
evaluates as F (w), for women as F
 
w


. To update the parameters
of the wage distribution we use a censoring routine. This censoring
routine ts log-normal distributions to the upper 1  F (w) quan-
tile of male wages and to the upper 1   F  w


quantile of female
wages. The Maximum-Likelihood estimation thereby takes into
account that it deals with left-censored data. As in step 1, the
16When doing so, we need to determine the equilibrium second-market wage
wt (t). We determine the equilibrium wage numerically.
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gender di¤erence t is calculated as t = exp(female;t   male;t).
The parameters t and t are again taken from the tted male
distribution (the one obtained using censored data).
As long as the new values for t, t and t are not su¢ ciently close
to the ones in t, we update t with the new wage distribution
parameters.17 We then proceed with step 2 using the updated
parameter vector t.
The nal parameterization reects a combination of wage-
distribution parameters, t, t, t, and the home labor wedge, t, for
which the resulting labor market choices are consistent with the selection
criterion to determine the parameters of the wage distribution. When
the iterative procedure has converged, we proceed with the next decade.
The resulting sequence for t (reported in Table 4.3) indicates that
the home labor wedge has decreased substantially over time. This im-
plies that outsourcing home labor has become more attractive to house-
holds, as non-wage costs of outsourcing home labor have declined.
Table 4.3 also reports the rst guess for the gender wage gap t
(which we derived from the entire data set without taking into account
labor market choices) as well as the nal parametrization for this para-
meter, which results from the iterative procedure described above. The
sequence for  indicates that women are catching up to men in terms of
rst-market wages. Compared to the rst guess, our nal parameteriza-
tion shows similar gender di¤erences in wages. The developments of the
distribution parameters  and 2 reect moderate average wage growth
and rising inequality, respectively.
Calibration Results. Figure 4.3 displays the actual time series of
hours worked by gender and marital status, together with the series of
hours worked implied by our model under the calibration reported in
Table 4.3. Empirical moments from the CPS are solid lines, while the
dashed lines are their model counterparts. One can see that, under this
calibration, the model is able to trace group-specic hours worked. The
model does not only capture mean levels of hours worked by groups
but, most importantly, it is able to predict the distinct changes in labor
supply over time for all four groups. Since our model is successful at
17We stop the iteration if the Euclidian distance between t in the current and the
previous iteration does not exceed a pre-specied (small) value.
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 Figure 4.3: Per-capita hours under calibrated model versus empirical
per-capita hours in the CPS
matching the series of hours worked, we use it to assess the relative
importance of di¤erent determinants of labor supply at the subgroup
level.
4.5.3 Accounting for the changes in hours
To assess the relative importance of di¤erent explanations for the group-
specic trends in hours, we insert the time series for st, t, 
2
t , qt, t, t,
and t reported in Table 4.3 into our model one after another, holding
the other parameters at their 1960s level. This way, we rst shut down
all but the marriage-decline channel and then include the other channels
in a cumulative way.18
The results of this accounting exercise are summarized in Table 4.4.
The rst row displays the observed changes in group-specic labor sup-
18Eckstein and Lifshitz (2009) also present an accounting exercise for labor supply
but restrict their attention to female labor supply when comparing various explana-
tions for the observed trend. Unlike Eckstein and Lifshitz (2009), we do not measure
the e¤ect of changes in fertility. Eckstein and Lifshitz (2009) nd that the contribu-
tion of fertility to female employment is relatively small.
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ply from the 1960s to the 2000s, i.e. a beginning-to-end-of-period com-
parison using CPS data. Rows 2 to 7 display group-specic changes
predicted by our model when we incorporate parameter changes one by
one.
In our model, the marriage decline can be captured by an exogenous
increase in the parameter s. The second row in Table 4.4 refers to
the case where we use the full time series for this parameter but x
the other variables at their 1960s levels. Under this scenario, average
market hours do not change by much within groups formed by gender
and marital status.19
If we additionally allow the parameters of the wage distribution to
change over time, hours worked of married women and singles increase.
Capital enhancing improvements in home technology, represented by
reductions in the relative price for home capital q, result in further in-
creases in hours.
In our model, the parameter  measures the gender wage gap.20 The
fth row displays the changes in hours when we allow the wage gap to
change over time, in addition to s, , , and q. In line with Jones,
Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003) and Eckstein and Lifshitz (2009), the
table shows that the closure of the gender wage gap plays an important
role when accounting for the rise in hours at the subgroup level. Women
increase their labor supply due to higher opportunity costs and, in the
case of married women, also due to improved intra-household bargaining
positions. Concerning married men, the increase in  leads to reduced
labor supply.
The fth line of the table also shows that, without taking into account
developments that make outsourcing home labor more attractive, one
can hardly account for the increases of hours worked by singles of both
genders. In particular, the model does predict hardly any increase in
labor supply of single men. The wage-gap closure cannot explain why the
working time of single and married men evolved in di¤erent directions.
The nding that the traditional explanations are not su¢ cient to
explain trends in hours is in line with Eckstein and Lifshitz (2009). They
focus on the rise in female labor supply and nd that a considerable
19This does not preclude compositional e¤ects on groups formed by gender alone.
20Note that, in our model, we cannot study changes in wages and changes in
education separately. Eckstein and Lifshitz (2009) make this distinction and nd
that both determinants are important and a¤ect labor supply in the same direction.
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portion remains unexplained by the factors schooling, wages, fertility,
and marital status. Eckstein and Lifshitz (2009) discuss developments
in household technology and social norms as potential explanations for
the remaining portion.
Our model encompasses two of such non-traditional determinants of
labor supply: productivity of hired relative to own home labor and the
home labor wedge. In our model, accounting for an observed moder-
ate relative productivity growth on the market for home labor improves
the predictions for all four population groups. This can be seen from
the sixth line in the table, where we allow for changes in the relative
productivity of hired home labor, . Our model suggests that the in-
crease in  is a source for a signicant rise in hours worked by single
men. At the same time, allowing for increases in  brings the models
predictions for the other three groups closer to what is observed in the
data. However, to fully trace the patterns in hours for married couples
and single women, the rise in the attractiveness of this market needs to
be more pronounced than reected by 4% relative productivity growth
per decade.
The last row in Table 4.4 shows the results when we allow the home
labor wedge  to change over time. This parameter has been determined
to provide the best t of the model with respect to all four moments
considered, given the other model parameters. It can be seen from Table
4.4 that the resulting sequence for  explains a considerable part of the
rise in hours by married and single women in our model. Concerning
single men, however, our model overstates the increase in hours when
we allow for time-variation in . Yet, the accounting exercise reported
in Table 4.4 suggests that, to fully trace the group-specic trends in
hours worked, we have to take into account that the home labor wedge
has declined over time. Reductions in  imply that non-wage costs of
outsourcing home labor have declined. Thus, this decline reects that
outsourcing home labor has become more attractive to households.
The rising attractiveness of the market for home labor has two impli-
cations for the sectoral composition of the economy. With rising attrac-
tiveness of outsourcing home labor, the home-services sector increases
in relative size. Furthermore, wages in this sector increase relative to
average wages. Both implications are supported by empirical ndings
for the US. For instance, Blau (2001) documents that the market for
child care arrangements has grown. Lee and Wolpin (2006) document
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growth in the service sector between 1950 and 2000. Similarly, Rogerson
(2008) provides evidence on the sectoral composition of the US economy,
reporting decreases in working time in the goods sector and increases in
the services sector. Considering relative wages, Autor and Dorn (2009)
investigate the growth of low-skill service jobs in the second half of the
twentieth century. They nd that wages exhibit above-average growth
rates in this sector.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated patterns in labor supply by gender and
marital status in the US. We have shown that the observed group-specic
trends in hours can be explained as optimal reactions to outsourcing
labor in home production becoming more attractive to households over
time.
To investigate the role of tradable home labor, we have introduced
a market for home labor into a household model of labor supply. This
model comprises four population groups: married women, married men,
single women, and single men. Agents can decide whether to work in
home production on their own or to hire someone for doing it. A prereq-
uisite for such specialization is the presence of heterogeneity in wages.
On the basis of individual householdslabor supply and specialization
decisions, we have solved for an aggregate equilibrium. The model is
able to generate the ordering of hours at the subgroup level, and to gen-
erate the direction and relative magnitude of the changes in hours over
time.
We have calibrated the model to trace the developments in hours
worked by gender and marital status. Since our model is successful
at matching the group-specic hours worked, we have used it to assess
the relative importance of di¤erent determinants of labor supply at the
subgroup level in an accounting exercise.
Our model has captured rising attractiveness of the market for home
labor through two channels: rst, by taking into account relative pro-
ductivity growth on the market for home labor; second, by allowing for a
time-varying home labor wedge. Our quantitative analysis has revealed
that accounting for an observed moderate relative productivity growth
on the market for home labor helps understanding the patterns in hours
for all four population groups. To fully trace the patterns in hours
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for married couples and single women, the rise in the attractiveness of
this market needs to be more pronounced than reected by productivity
growth alone.
The documented decline in the home labor wedge may be due to sev-
eral developments. For instance, it may reect rising social acceptance
of outsourcing child care or geriatric care. Another reason for the decline
of the home labor wedge may be an increase in market transparency due
to government programs that aimed at pulling home services out of the
shadow economy. We leave the task of assessing the relative merits of
each of these interpretations for future research.
Overall, such developments reect that non-wage costs associated
with hiring home labor have declined over time and that the market
for home labor has therefore become more attractive. The chapter has
shown that taking the rising attractiveness of outsourcing home labor
into account is important for understanding the trends in hours worked
at the subgroup level.
Appendix
4.A CPS Data
Data description. We use data from the Current Population Survey
(CPS) in the format arranged by Unicon Research.21 The CPS is a
monthly household survey conducted by the Bureau of the Census. In
the CPS, respondents are interviewed to obtain information about the
employment status of each member of the household 16 years of age and
older. Survey questions covering hours of work, earnings, gender, and
marital status are covered in the Annual Social Economic Supplement,
the so-called March Supplement Files.
The sample of the CPS is representative of the civilian non-
institutional population. Our selected sample comprises civilians aged 18
to 65, which is a standard denition of working-age population. The time
period spanned by our data is 1962-2007. Data on hours and earnings
is retrospective and refers to the previous year. In all our calculations,
we use weights.
Our quantitative analysis is based on cross-sectional rst moments
measuring average hours per capita by gender and marital status. Figure
21See http://www.unicon.com/.
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4.1 displays time series for these variables. The weekly hours variable is
"hours worked last week at all jobs", which is the only information on
hours worked which is available for all years and comparable across years.
Other studies have documented that this variable yields similar results
as the variable "usual weekly hours by number of weeks worked", which
is not available for all years, see e.g. Knowles (2007) and Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante (2008).
In the quantitative analysis presented in Section 4.5, we pool the
CPS data decade-wise in order to lter out developments that occur at
business-cycle frequency. Specically, our empirical analysis considers
the ve decades from the 1960s to now, t = 1961-69, 1970-79, 1980-89,
1990-99, 2000-06:
We dene a person as being married if the respondent answered the
relevant question with "married, spouse present" (after Unicon recode).
All other individuals are dened as being singles. The share of singles
in our data is reported in Table 4.3.
We compute wages as annual earnings divided by annualized hours
worked. In the CPS, gross annual earnings are dened as income from
wages and salaries including pay for overtime. Nominal earnings are
deated with the CPI and expressed in 1992 dollars. Annual hours
worked are calculated as the product of weeks worked last year and
hours worked last week. When computing wage rates, we restrict the
sample to people who worked at least 10 hours a week.
Signicance of di¤erences and trends in hours. Figure 4.4 shows
a 2 standard deviations band around hours worked by gender and
marital status on a yearly basis. The gure illustrates that hours worked
di¤er signicantly among subgroups. The bands of single women and
married women come close to each other in the 2000s but p-values of
tests of the hypothesis that average hours of single women are higher
than average hours of married women are essentially zero in these years.
The upper part of Table 4.5 presents the time trends in log aver-
age hours by gender and marital status. N^G;t denotes average hours of
group G in year t. Married men are captured by M; married women
by F , single men by m, and single women by f . All four time series
have a signicant time trend, which is negative for married men and
positive for the three other groups. The lower part of Table 4.5 presents
empirical results on the di¤erences in time trends. To test whether the
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Figure 4.4: Average weekly market hours 2 standard deviations by
gender and marital status in the US (March CPS, Persons aged 18-65)
estimated growth rates of hours worked by singles are signicantly lower
than the growth rate of married womenhours, we estimate the time
trends in log

N^F;t

  log

N^f;t

and log

N^F;t

  log

N^m;t

. To test
whether the increase in hours of married women is signicantly stronger
than the decrease in hours of married men, we estimate the time trend
of log

N^F;t

+ log

N^m;t

. These three variables have signicantly pos-
itive time trends documenting that the rise in married womens hours
worked is signicantly stronger than the developments in hours of all
other groups.
4.B Formal derivation of optimal decisions
Couples. A couple i chooses cF;i, cM;i, dF;i, dM;i, n
1;S
F;i , n
2;S
F;i , hF;i, lF;i,
n1;SM;i, n
2;S
M;i, hM;i, lM;i, n
2;D
i , and ki in order to maximize (4.4) subject to
(4.6), (4.7), (4.8), and non-negativity constraints for all decision vari-
ables. The concavity of the utility function ensures that consumption
levels and leisure are always positive for both spouses. Positive leisure
in turn ensures that the upper bound of 1 is never binding for any other
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dependent estimated standard
variable time e¤ect deviation t-value
log

N^M;t

-0.18 0.04 -4.75
log

N^F;t

1.81 0.06 30.79
log

N^m;t

0.27 0.05 5.40
log

N^f;t

0.40 0.04 9.33
log

N^F;t

+ log

N^M;t

1.64 0.06 29.54
log

N^F;t

  log

N^m;t

1.54 0.06 26.94
log

N^F;t

  log

N^f;t

1.41 0.06 22.12
Table 4.5: Estimated time trends in hours worked by gender and marital
status (estimated equation: dep. var. = o + 1  t+ "t, estimated time
e¤ects and standard deviations in percent per year,  indicates that the
estimated e¤ect is statistically signicant at the .99 signicance level).
time use. Finally, ki  0 will never be binding since the home production
function fullls the Inada conditions. The Lagrangean of the couples
problem can thus be written as
L=F;i  uF;i + M;i  uM;i
+$i;1

A (ki)


hF;i + hM;i +   n2;Di
1 
  dF;i   dM;i

+$i;2

aF;i  n1;SF;i + aM;i  n1;SM;i + w  (n2;SM;i + n2;SF;i )
 cF;i   cM;i   q  ki   (1 + )  w  n2;Di

+$i;3
h
1  lF;i   n1;SF;i   n2;SF;i   hF;i
i
+$i;4
h
1  lM;i   n1;SM;i   n2;SM;i   hM;i
i
+i;1  n1;SF;i + i;2  n2;SF;i + i;3  hF;i + i;4  n1;SM;i + i;5  n2;SM;i
+i;6  hM;i + i;7  n2;Di ,
where the $s are Lagrange multiplier on the equality constraints and
the s are Lagrange multipliers on the relevant inequality constraints.
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The decision problem is solved sequentially in the following steps.
We rst determine the choice of the labor market for both agents. Then
we determine the cost-minimal input combination to produce one unit
of the home consumption good. Due to the constant-returns-to-scale
property of the home consumption function, this yiels a couple-specic
relative price of home consumption. In a third step, we determine the
optimal combination of market and home consumption given the relative
price of home consumption. Fourth, we determine the couples demand
for leisure and total consumption. Fifth, we deduce the relevant time-use
and demand decisions.
1. Labor-market choice. The rst-order conditions for n1;SF;i and n
2;S
F;i
are
$i;2aF;i  $i;3 + i;1=0
$i;2w  $i;3 + i;2=0.
Note that one of the two non-negativity constraints will always be bind-
ing when aF;i 6= w. Assuming that only one non-negativity constraint
is binding (i.e. that the wife will always supply some positive amount
of labor), we get i;1 > 0 and n
1;S
F;i = 0 when aF;i < w and i;2 > 0 and
n2;SF;i = 0 otherwise. Thus, the wife works only on the market where she
can earn a higher wage. For the husband, we can analogously derive the
equivalent result. With the wage structure expressed in the main text,
we can state the following labor-market choices for couples: In couples
with aM;i > w=, both spouses work on the rst market. In couples with
w < aM;i < w=, the husband works on the rst market but the wife
works on the second market. In couples with aM;i < w, both spouses
work on the second market.
2. E¢ cient home production. Having determined labor-market
choice, we can denote an agents e¤ective wage as !G;i which is either w
or aG;i depending on labor-market choice. Using this notation, we can
merge time and budget constraints to
cF;i + cM;i + q  ki + (1 + )  w  n2;Di
+!F;i  (lF;i + hF;i) + !M;i  (lM;i + hM;i)  !F;i + !M;i. (4.29)
The decision problem at this stage is to maximize (4.4) subject to (4.7),
(4.29) and the remaining non-negativity constraints, which is represented
by
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L=F;i  uF;i + M;i  uM;i
+$i;1

A (ki)


hF;i + hM;i +   n2;Di
1 
  dF;i   dM;i

+$i;5

!F;i + !M;i   cF;i   cM;i   q  ki   (1 + )  w  n2;Di
 !F;i  (lF;i + hF;i)  !M;i  (lM;i + hM;i)

+i;3  hF;i + i;6  hM;i + i;7  n2;Di .
The rst-order conditions for the three possible labor inputs into home
productions read as
0 = $i;1  fH  $5;1  !F;i + i;3
0 = $i;1  fH  $5;1  !M;i + i;6
0 = $i;1    fH  $5;1  (1 + )  w + i;7
() 0 = $i;1  fH  $5;1  (1 + )  w +  1  i;7,
where fH is the marginal derivative of home production to e¤ective labor
input Hi = hF;i + hM;i +   n2;Di and 1 +  =  1 (1 + ). Due to the
wage structure expressed in the main text, !M;i is never lower than !F;i.
Thus the non-negativity constraint on n2;Di is only not binding when
!F;i > (1 + )  w which is the case for couples with aG;i > (1 + )  w
since we consider cases where  > 0. We can thus denote p = (1 + ) w
as the e¤ective price of hired home labor. Couples demand home labor
when the wifes rst-market wage is higher than this e¤ective price.
All other couples produce home consumption with own time input. In
couples with aM;i > w, the husband works on the rst market and thus
!M;i > !F;i. In these couples, the non-negativity constraint on hM;i is
therefore always binding and hM;i = 0. In couples with aM;i < w, both
spouses work on the second market and !M;i = !F;i = w. Opportunity
costs of time spent in home production are therefore the same for both
spouses and intra-household specialization is not e¢ cient. As stated in
Section 4.4.1, assume that spouses split labor equally in this situation. In
the following, we express the e¤ective costs of labor in home production
(the cost of the chosen labor input) as i.
Summarizing the discrete decisions solved so far, couples split up into
for groups:
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1. Group 1 with aM;i > p, where both spouses work on the rst
market and who demand marketized home labor (!F;i = aF;i,
!M;i = aM;i, i = p, Hi = n
2;D
i ).
2. Group 2 with p > aM;i > p=, where both spouses work on the rst
market and the wife additionally in home production (!F;i = aF;i,
!M;i = aM;i, i = aF;i, Hi = hF;i).
3. Group 3 with p= > aM;i > w=, where the husband works on the
rst market and the wife works at the second market and at home
(!F;i = w, !M;i = aM;i, i = w, Hi = hF;i).
4. Group 4 with aM;i < w, where both spouses work on the second
market and at home (!F;i = !M;i = i = w, Hi = hF;i + hM;i).
E¢ cient production of a level di of home consumption solves
minki;Hi q  ki + i  Hi subject to A (ki) (Hi)1  = di. Since the home
production function is of Cobb-Douglas type, this yields the following
cost function of home production in terms of market goods:
P di = A
 1 
q

  i
1  
1 
.
The e¢ cient level of labor input is
Hi = (1  ) P
d
i
i
di. (4.30)
3. E¢ cient combination of home and market consumption.
Consumption is a CES aggregate of market and home consumption
CG;i =
h
 
 +

(cG;i)
 1
 +


 +

(dG;i)
 1

i 
 1
. The price level for this
CES aggregate is Pi =
h
 
 +

(P c)1  +


 +
  
P di
1 i 11 
, where
P c is the price of home consumption. Since the home consumption
good is the numéraire, P c = 1, the price level simplies to Pi =h
 
 +

+


 +
  
P di
1 i 11 
. Given a total amount of consumption
CG;i, the demand for home consumption is
dG;i =


 + 

P di
Pi
 
CG;i. (4.31)
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4. Demand for leisure and consumption. With the above results,
the constraints of the decision problem can be merged to
!F;i + !M;i  PiCF;i + PiCM;i + !F;i  lF;i + !M;i  hM;i:
Futhermore, the utility weights can be expressed as F;i =
!F;i= (!F;i + !M;i) and M;i = !M;i= (!F;i + !M;i). The outer utility
function U (CG;i; lG;i) is of Cobb-Douglas type and its logarithm is
( + )  lnCG;i+(1     )  ln lG;i. The decision problem can therefore
be expressed by
L= !F;i
!F;i + !M;i

h
( + )  lnCF;i + (1     )  ln (lF;i)1   
i
+
!M;i
!F;i + !M;i

h
( + )  lnCM;i + (1     )  ln (lM;i)1   
i
+$i;6 [!F;i + !M;i   PiCF;i   PiCM;i   !F;i  lF;i   !M;i  hM;i] .
With log utility, optimization requires that the expenditure share on a
certain good equals the respective utility weight. E.g.
!F;i  lF;i= (!F;i + !M;i) = (1     )  !F;i
!F;i + !M;i
and equivalently for the husband. It follows that both spouses spent an
equal amount of leisure time, lF;i = lM;i = 1      , independent of
the couplesposition in the wage distribution. Analogously, the couples
total amount is consumption
Ci = CF;i + CM;i = ( + )  (!F;i + !M;i) =Pi. (4.32)
5. Time input to home production and labor supply. Couples
demand home labor according to equations (4.30), (4.31), and (4.32),
which results in
Hi = (1  ) ( + ) (!F;i + !M;i)
'i +  

1
A
   q

   1
1 
1 
(i)
1 
 1
 1 . (4.33)
For couples in group 1, this is demand for marketized home labor, n2;Di =
Hi with i = p. For couples in groups 2, it holds hF;i = Hi with i =
aF;i. For couples in group 3, house work of the wife is hF;i = Hi with
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i = w. Eventually, in group 4, spouses work in the household according
to hF;i = hM;i = Hi=2 with i = w.
Market work can be determined as 1   lG;i   hG;i. For agents not
working in home production (husbands in groups 1, 2, 3 and wives in
group 1), this gives
h1;SG;i =  + .
For wives in groups 2, working time is given by
h1;SF;i =  + (1  )( + )
(!F;i + !M;i)
aF;i +  

1
A
   q

   1
1 
1 
(aF;i)
1 
 1
 1
and, for wives in group 3, labor supply is
h2;SF;i =  +   (1  )    ( + ) 
(!F;i + !M;i)
w +  

1
A
   q

   1
1 
1 
w
1 
 1
 1 .
Husbands and wives in group 4 both work on the second market, their
hours are given by
h2;SF;i = h
2;S
M;i =  + (1  )( + )
1
 +  

1
A
   q

   1
1 
1 
w1 
 1 ,
which uses that, in this group, !F;i + !M;i = 2w.
These time-use and demand decisions are summarized in Table 4.6,
where !F;i + !M;i is abbreviated by Wi. For the parameter restriction
! 1, they simplify to the decisions expressed in Table 4.1.
Singles. A single (g; i) chooses cg;i, dg;i, n
1;S
g;i , n
2;S
g;i , hg;i, lg;i, kg;i, and
n2;Dg;i to maximize (4.3) subject to (4.9), (4.10), (4.11), and non-negativity
constraints. The problem for a single can be solved analogously to that
of couples with the exception that singles have no possibility of intra-
household specialization. As married agents, singles work on the market
where they can earn a higher wage. They demand marketized home
labor when ag;i > p. Singles thus split up into three groups:
1. Group a with ag;i > p, who work on the rst market and demand
home labor (!g;i = ag;i, g;i = p, Hg;i = n
2;D
g;i ).
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2. Groub b with p > ag;i > w, who work on the rst market and at
home (!g;i = g;i = ag;i, Hg;i = hg;i).
3. Group c with ag;i < w, who work on the second market and at
home (!g;i = g;i = w, Hg;i = hg;i).
Then, all steps can be solved like in the problem of couples. Leisure
is lg;i = 1      for all singles and the time input to home production
is
Hg;i = (1  )    ( + )  !g;i
'g;i +  

1
A
   q

   1
1 
1 
(g;i)
1 
 1
 1 ,
(4.34)
which is derived analogously to (4.33). Thus, singles in group a work
n1;Sg;i =  + 
on the rst market and demand home labor according to (4.34) with
g;i = p and !g;i = ag;i. Singles in groups b and c work  + Hg;i. For
group b, this results in
n1;Sg;i = +    (1  )    ( + )

24 +   1
A

q

  ag;i
1  
1 ! 135 1 ,
which uses !g;i = ag;i. For group c, labor supply is
n1;Sg;i = +    (1  )    ( + )

24 +   1
A

q

  w
1  
1 ! 135 1 ,
which uses !g;i = w. These decisions of singles are summarized in Table
4.7. For ! 1, they simplify to the decisions presented in Table 4.2.22
22To see that the decisions reported in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 simplify to the ones in
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 when  ! 1, note that the terms in the square brackets Tables
4.6 and 4.7 are all  +  for  = 1.
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4.C A model version with utility costs of outsourc-
ing home labor
In this appendix, we present a version of the model using a utility func-
tion which includes utility costs of outsourcing home labor. We show
that, in this model version, the equilibrium time allocation is the same
as in our baseline model using the utility function (4.3) and the resource
costs in (4.8).
Without loss of generality, we consider the optimization problem for a
non-married individual as described in Section 4.3. The proof for couples
proceeds analogously. The Lagrangean for a single household reads as
Lg;i =Ug;i (cg;i; dg;i; lg;i)
+$g;i;1
h
f

kg;i; hg;i + n
2;D
g;i

  dg;i
i
+$g;i;2
h
ag;in
1;S
g;i + w  n2;Sg;i   cg;i   q  kg;i   (1 + )  w  n2;Dg;i
i
+$g;i;3
h
1  lg;i   n1;Sg;i   n2;Sg;i   hg;i
i
+ g;i;1  n1;Sg;i + g;i;2  n2;Sg;i + g;i;3  hg;i + g;i;4  n2;Dg;i ,
where the $s are Lagrange multiplier on the equality constraints and
the s are Lagrange multipliers on the relevant inequality constraints.
The rst-order condition with respect to hired home labor n2;Dg;i is
$g;i;1fH  $g;i;2 (1 + )w + g;i;4 = 0, (4.35)
where fH is the marginal productivity of e¤ective labor in home produc-
tion.
Now consider a problem where individual utility is negatively a¤ected
by hiring home labor. Specically, consider an otherwise identical model
with the utility function
Ug;i =
0BB@
264

 
 +
1= 
cg;i   wn2;Di
 1

+


 +
1=
(dg;i)
 1

375

 1
1CCA
( +)
(lg;i)(1   ) (4.36)
instead of (4.3) and with no home labor wedge,  = 0 in (4.11). The
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rst-order condition with respect to n2;Dg;i is
  @Ug;i
@

cg;i   wn2;Dg;i
  w +$g;i;1fH  $g;i;2w + g;i;4 = 0. (4.37)
Evaluating the derivatives, one obtains
@Ug;i
@

cg;i   wn2;Dg;i
 = @Ug;i
@cg;i
.
In the optimum, marginal utility of market consumption has to equal
the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint, $g;i;2:
@Ug;i
@cg;i
= $g;i;2
Replacing @Ug;i=@

cg;i   n2;Di

in (4.37) by $g;i;2 yields (4.35). Since
all other derivatives of the Lagrangean are the same in the problem with
the utility function (4.36) and the one with the home labor wedge in
(4.11), the optimal time allocations are identical.23
4.D Proofs of Static and Comparative-Static Re-
sults
Equilibrium prices and marginal derivatives. Integrating the
home-services supply and demand decisions of couples reported in Table
4.1 and those of singles reported in Table 4.2, and accounting for their
respective masses ((1  s) for couples, s for singles, respectively), yields
total demand for and supply of home labor in the economy:
N2;D =
1
2
(1  ) 1
p
  1 +   ( 1 +  2 + s   2s)p2 (4.38)
N2;S =

( 1 + 1)( + )  1
2
(1  s)( 2   1)(1  )

w (4.39)
Using the denitions of D1, D2, and S1 stated in Section 4.4.3, equal-
izing supply and demand for home services results in the expressions for
23To obtain identical systems of derivatives replace @Ug;i@cg;i by$g;i;2 in the derivatives
with respect to cg;i.
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p and w in equations (4.21) and (4.22). The e¤ective price p for home
labor is increasing in the "as-if" tax  and the second-market wage w is
decreasing in  :
@p
@
=
1
2
 (1 + ) 1=2  S1  ((1 + )D1)
1=2
(S1 + (1 + )D1D2)3=2
> 0 (4.40)
@w
@
=  1
2
 (1 + ) 3=2  (S1 + 2(1 + )D1D2)  ((1 + )D1)
1=2
(S1 + (1 + )D1D2)3=2
< 0
(4.41)
Levels of hours worked by groups. Average market hours by gen-
der and marital status are given by equations (4.17) to (4.20). Since
p > w, it holds that NM > Nm. One can also see that Nm > Nf because
p

> p. It remains to show that Nf > NF , which can be simplied to:
0 >  (1  ) 2p+ (1  )

 2
2
+
1
2

w
() 0 >  p
2
+
w
22
+
w
2
() 0 >1 + 
2
+
1
22
+
1
2
() 0 >  1
2
   + 
2
2
,
(4.42)
which is true for any non-negative  since  < 1. Therefore, the ordering
of average market hours is NM > Nm > Nf > NF .
Directions and magnitudes of changes in hours. Average market
hours by gender and marital status are given by equations (4.17) to
(4.20). Taking derivatives of average hours by groups with respect to 
yields:
@NM
@
=  (1  ) @w
@
> 0 (4.43)
@NF
@
= (1  )  
 2 + 1
2
 @w
@
  (1  )   2 +  1  @p
@
< 0
(4.44)
@Nm
@
=  (1  ) @p
@
< 0 (4.45)
@Nf
@
=  (1  )   1  @p
@
< 0 (4.46)
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Since  1 > 1, we can state that
@Nf@  > @Nm@ . Comparing the absolute
value of the derivatives for husbands and wives reveals that
@NF
@
 >@NM
@
 because  2+1
2
> 1. Finally, since  2 +  1 >  1, it also holds
that
@NF
@
 > @Nf@ . Thus the change in married womens market hours
is the strongest one of all groups.
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Chapter 5
Assortative Mating and
Female Labor Supply
5.1 Introduction
Hours worked of married women in the US increased substantially over
the second half of the last century. The most prominent explanation
for rising hours of wives is the closure of the gender wage gap, i.e. the
catching-up of female wages relative to mens wages, see e.g. Galor and
Weil (1996), Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003), Knowles (2007),
and Attanasio, Low, and Sánchez-Marcos (2008). According to house-
hold models of labor supply (see Chiappori 1988; Apps and Rees 1997;
Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac, and Meghir 2007), labor supply of a wife
depends on both the wifes and the husbands characteristics. Many
empirical studies estimate cross-wage elasticities of female labor supply
and nd a signicant inuence of husbandswages on working hours
of wives, see Blau and Kahn (1997a), Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir
(1998), Devereux (2004, 2007), and Morissette and Hou (2008).
In this chapter1, we investigate wives hours disaggregated by the
husbands wage decile. Juhn and Murphy (1997) have performed an em-
pirical stratication of wiveshours by the husbands wage and document
a clearly downward sloping relation for the late 1960s and for the 1970s.
Juhn and Murphy (1997) also nd that the increase in hours worked
of wives over time has been strongly non-uniform among all groups of
married women, with wives of middle- and high-wage men experiencing
1The chapter is based on Bredemeier and Juessen (2010).
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more pronounced increases in hours than wives married to low-wage hus-
bands. As a consequence, the pattern of wiveshours by the husbands
wage has changed from negative to hump-shaped. Similar ndings are
reported by Morissette and Hou (2008) and Schwartz (2010).
Thus, a view on disaggregated labor supply of married women re-
veals the following two stylized observations. First, the pattern of wives
hours by the husbands wage has changed from downward-sloping to
hump-shaped. Second, women married to men with high wages have
experienced the strongest increases in hours worked. This chapter aims
at explaining these two empirical observations.
We highlight the role of assortative mating for understanding the
economy-wide pattern of wiveshours by the husbands wage decile. As-
sortative mating is the tendency of spouses with similar characteristics
to marry each other. The relevance of assortative mating for spouses
labor-supply decisions has been emphasized by Pencavel (1998) and De-
vereux (2004) who stress that, when seeking to interpret the observed
relation between husbandscharacteristics and wiveswork decision, one
needs to take into account that husbandsand wivescharacteristics are
usually correlated.
In this chapter, we demonstrate that a standard household model of
labor supply (Chiappori 1988; Apps and Rees 1997; Blundell, Chiappori,
Magnac, and Meghir 2007) can generate the observed economy-wide pat-
tern of wiveshours by the husbands wage when one takes into account
trends in assortative mating. We measure assortative mating in terms
of wage potentials. For a low degree of assortative mating (i.e. mat-
ing is almost random), our model generates a downward-sloping pattern
of wives hours by the husbands wage. By contrast, this pattern is
hump-shaped for more pronounced assortative mating. Thus, when the
degree of assortative mating increases, this induces a non-uniform change
in wiveshours worked by the husbands wage decile. Specically, the
increase in hours is most pronounced for women married to top-wage
husbands.
The economy-wide pattern of wiveshours by the husbands wage
can change due to two reasons: rst, changes in the relation between
the husbands wage and the wifes labor supply at the household level
and, second, compositional e¤ects which may arise because the fractions
of spouses marrying in di¤erent ways changes. In our model, the relation
at the micro level is stable but the aggregated pattern of wiveshours
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by the husbands wage depends on assortative mating.
Specically, patterns in hours in our model depend on the joint dis-
tribution of wages in marriages, i.e. on the marginal distributions of
gender-specic wages and the association between spouseswages. Cou-
ples face a specialization decision with respect to market work and home
production. Within a couple, the e¢ cient time allocation depends on
the wage ratio of the two spouses. Only when the wifes relative wage
is high enough, the couple opts for labor market participation of both
spouses. Conditional on participation, hours of the wife are an increasing
function of her relative wage.
To illustrate the e¤ects of assortative mating, consider rst the ex-
treme cases of perfect sorting and random mating. Under random mat-
ing, every husband is on average married to the wife earning the average
female wage independent of his own wage. Therefore, the relative wages
are on average lowest for wives married to top-wage husbands. As a con-
sequence, these wives work the fewest hours and the pattern of wives
hours by the husbands wage is downward-sloping.
Under perfect sorting, there exist only marriages where both wife
and husband are from the same quantile in the respective gender-specic
wage distribution. Husbands and wifes wages are thus perfectly corre-
lated though not necessarily identical. The pattern of wiveshours by
the husbands wage will then also depend on the marginal distributions
of gender-specic wages. For example, with identical gender-specic
distributions and perfect sorting, the wage ratio is one in each couple.
Consequently, all wives work the same and the pattern of wiveshours
by the husbands wage is at. By contrast, when there is a gender wage
gap, the wifes relative wage can also be increasing in the husbands
wage. The reason is that an absolute wage gap is less important in rela-
tive terms when absolute wages of the two spouses are high. In couples
where the husbands wage is relatively low, the wage gap translates into
pronounced relative wage di¤erences between husband and wife. Since
the wifes relative wage can be increasing in the husbands wage, also
hours worked of the wife can be increasing in the husbands wage.
We can imagine intermediate sorting as a combination of the two
extreme cases, a fraction of the population marrying randomly and a
fraction marrying in a perfectly assortative way. The resulting pattern of
wiveshours worked by the husbands wage decile is therefore a weighted
average of the patterns in the two extreme cases.
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For the fraction of the population marrying in a random way, the pat-
tern of wiveshours by the husbands wage decile is downward sloping
independent of the wage gap. By contrast, for the fraction of the popula-
tion marrying in a perfectly assortative way, the pattern can be upward
sloping with the steepness depending on relative wage di¤erences be-
tween husband and wife. The pattern is strongly increasing where wages
are low and relative wage di¤erences are thus pronounced. The pattern
is almost at for couples with high absolute wages and thus low relative
wage di¤erences. The resulting economy-wide pattern of wiveshours by
the husbands wage decile can therefore be hump-shaped depending on
the relative sizes of the two population groups marrying randomly and
perfectly assortatively, respectively. Trends in assortative mating thus
alter the pattern of wiveshours by the husbands wage decile observed
in the aggregate and consequently lead to a non-uniform change in hours
worked by wives.
From previous studies, there is much evidence that assortative mating
in the US has indeed become stronger over time. Most studies have
investigated assortative mating in terms of educational attainment and
found that husband and wife have become more similar with respect to
education over time, see Mare (1991), Kalmijn (1991a), Kalmijn (1991b),
Qian and Preston (1993), Pencavel (1998), Qian (1998), Schwartz and
Mare (2005), Sánchez-Marcos (2008), and Schwartz (2010). Cancian and
Reed (1998) and Schwartz (2010) report increased assortative mating by
income. Sweeney and Cancian (2004) provide evidence for an increasing
correlation between wifes wage and husbands income. Herrnstein and
Murray (1994) report increased sorting by academic ability in higher
education and by intelligence. We use data from the Current Population
Survey (CPS) to measure trends in assortative mating in terms of wage
potentials. We nd strong evidence that assortative mating in terms of
wages has increased substantially over time.
To investigate whether empirically observed trends in the marginal
and joint distributions of wages imply patterns in hours that are consis-
tent with the empirical developments, we feed the observed distributions
of wages into our model. We measure the association between spouses
wages in terms of the number of marriages that exist between di¤erent
deciles of the gender-specic marginal wage distributions. By measuring
assortative mating in terms of wage deciles, we can disentangle changes
in the marginal distributions of husbandsand wiveswages from changes
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in the association between spousal wages.
The data shows a closure of the gender wage gap and a clear trend
towards stronger assortative mating in terms of wages. Our empirical
investigation suggests that trends in the marginal wage distributions are
responsible for the overall increase in hours worked by wives. By con-
trast, the fact that wives married to high-wage men experienced the most
pronounced increase is primarily a result of trends in assortative mating
rather than being due to changes in the marginal wage distributions.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2,
we present the empirical facts on married womens labor supply we aim
to explain as well as empirical evidence for increasing marital sorting in
terms of wages. Section 5.3 presents the theoretical model that uses as
an input the association between spousal wages to predict optimal labor
supply decisions. Section 5.4 provides an quantitative analysis where we
use the empirically observed joint distributions of wages. Section 5.5
concludes.
5.2 Wiveshours by the husbands wage decile and
trends in assortative mating
In this section, we present the empirical facts we aim to explain. The
key observation we address is that the increase in married womens labor
supply has not been uniform among all wives. We also illustrate in
this section that assortative mating in terms of wages has increased
substantially over time.
The non-uniform increase in womens hours has been documented by
e.g. Juhn and Murphy (1997) and Schwartz (2010) and is illustrated in
Figure 5.1. The data are from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
in the US. The left panel shows average weekly hours worked of wives
married to men in the 10 deciles of the male wage distribution. The
gure compares two periods of time, 1975-1979 (darkly shaded bars)
and 2000-2006 (white bars). We form subperiods of more than one year
to control for business cycle e¤ects. The sample consists of matched
husband-wife pairs of ages 30-50. Details on the data employed can be
found in Appendix 5.A.
During the 1970s, there has been a clear downward-sloping pattern of
wiveshours by the husbands position in the wage distribution. Women
married to high-wage men tended to work less hours. In the more recent
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period, this relationship has changed with wives of men in the middle
of the wage distribution working the most. Thus, the pattern of wives
hours by the husbands wage has changed from downward-sloping to
hump-shaped.2
The right panel in Figure 5.1 shows the change (between the two
periods) in weekly hours worked by married women disaggregated by
the husbands wage decile. One can see that hours worked of wives
increased substantially among all groups of married women over time.
However, the increase has been strongly non-uniform across husbands
wage deciles. Increases in hours have been largest for wives of middle-
and high-wage men. By contrast, the increase in labor supply was rela-
tively weak among wives of men in the low wage deciles.
The empirical facts we aim to explain can thus be summarized as
follows:
1. The aggregate pattern of wiveshours by the husbands wage has
changed from downward-sloping to hump-shaped.
2. The increase in hours worked of wives has been strongly non-
uniform among all groups of married women, with increases in
hours of wives of middle- and high-wage men being more pro-
nounced than for wives of men married to low-wage husbands.
In this chapter, we seek to explain these developments as a result of
changes in the wage structure in the economy. Specically, the aggregate
pattern of wiveshours by the husbands wage predicted by our model
will depend on the joint distribution of wages in marriages, i.e. on
the marginal distributions of gender-specic wages together with the
association between spouseswages.
While most studies focused on assortative mating along education
levels (see e.g. Mare 1991, Fernández, Guner, and Knowles 2005,
Schwartz and Mare 2005, and Schwartz 2010), we consider sorting in
terms of spousal wages. Thereby we face the problem that, in the data,
we can observe an individuals wage only if the person is participating
in the labor market. In our model, by contrast, wages are measures of
earnings potentials. To measure assortative mating in terms of potential
wages, we therefore have to impute wages for non-working individuals.
2A similar picture emerges when one considers changes in participation rates in-
stead of changes in hours worked.
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Figure 5.1: Wivesweekly hours by the husbands wage decile.
Our model implies that the participation decision is not random.
We therefore need to predict wages for non-working wives that would
be observed in the absence of non-participation. To do so, we use a
Heckman (1976, 1979) selection model. The Heckmanmodel is estimated
separately for the periods 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994,
1995-1999, and 2000-2006.3 Appendix 5.B presents details on the wage
imputation.
When measuring assortative mating, one has to take into account
that simple correlation coe¢ cients between the absolute levels of the
variable of interest can be poor measures for describing trends in assor-
tative mating, see Mare (1991) and Hou and Myles (2007). The problem
of correlation coe¢ cients is their inability to distinguish changes in the
marginal distributions of husbandsand wiveswages from changes in
the association between spousal wages. For example, the correlation co-
e¢ cient between absolute wages would change in response a change in
the marginal distributions even when the association between spousal
wages were unchanged.
We overcome this problem by calculating the correlation between
husbands and wifes position in the respective gender-specic wage dis-
tribution, rather than between the absolute levels of their wages. Specif-
3To check for robustness, we also consider alternative ways to handle the missing-
data problem. A rst strategy is to delete the entire couple from the sample if one of
the spouseswages is not observed. We refer to this specication as listwise deletion.
A second strategy is to use wage predictions from simple OLS estimates.
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Figure 5.2: Correlation coe¢ cient between spousal wage decile positions.
ically, we consider the association between spousesdecile positions in
the gender-specic wage distributions. At each point in time, there are
10% of individuals of a given gender in each wage decile independent of
the wages earned in the specic decile. Thus, the distribution of decile
positions is by construction constant over time. Changes in the cor-
relation between these relative positions of husband and wife therefore
reect changes in assortative mating.4
Figure 5.2 shows the change in the correlation coe¢ cient between
husbands and wifes wage decile positions over time for di¤erent ap-
proaches to handle the missing-data problem. Both for simple regression-
based and Heckman-based imputation, respectively, there is a pro-
nounced and steady increase in the correlation coe¢ cient between
spousal wage decile positions. In fact, the correlation coe¢ cient al-
most doubles from 1975-79 to 2000-06. When we abstain from imputing
4An alternative approach to disentangle changes in the association from changes
in the marginal wage distributions is to estimate a crossings model, see e.g. Mare
(1991) and Schwartz (2010). An advantage of measuring assortative mating in terms
of wage decile positions is that this association has a structural interpretation and
can be used directly as an input in our model later on.
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wages and restrict the sample to couples were both husband and wife
are participating, we nd a similar development with a marked increase
in the wage correlation between 1975-79 and 1995-99.
It is instructive to investigate in more detail the joint distribution of
spousal wage decile positions. This allows us to see in which areas of the
distribution the association between husbands and wifes wage decile
positions has become stronger over time. We summarize the association
between spousal wages by a 10 10 association matrix S containing the
observed frequencies of the 100 possible combinations of spouseswage
deciles. Entry sij in this matrix gives the fraction of marriages in which
the husband belongs to the ith decile of the male wage distribution
while the wife is in the jth decile of the female wage distribution.
To highlight changes over time, Table 5.1 shows the relative changes
of the frequencies of the di¤erent combinations of wage deciles from
1975-79 to 2000-06,
 
s2000 06ij   s1975 79ij

=s1975 79ij , using the Heckman-
imputed wages for non-working wives.5 Positive values indicate that
in 2000-06 the number of couples with the specic combination of wage
deciles has increased relative to 1975-79. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 in Appendix
5.C show the association matrices separately for the two periods of time.
From Table 5.1 it can be seen that the number of couples where
husband and wife di¤er by much with respect to their relative positions
in the respective wage distributions has decreased substantially. For
example, the number of couples where the husband is from the top decile
of the male distribution and the wife is from the lowest decile of the
female distribution has decreased by about 30%. In general, Table 5.1
shows a clear pattern that most entries distant from the main diagonal
are negative. By contrast, decile combinations on and close to the main
diagonal tend to be observed more often, highlighting that couples have
become more similar in terms of gender-specic wage positions.
These results show that assortative mating in terms of wages has
increased substantially over time. In the next section, we present a
theoretical model that highlights the role of changes in the wage struc-
ture for explaining the non-uniform increase in hours worked by married
women and the resulting change in wiveshours worked disaggregated
by the husbands wage decile.
5Results using OLS-imputed wages and from listwise deletion are very similar.
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5.3 The model
5.3.1 Decision problem of a couple
We consider an economy populated by couples which di¤er by the wages
of the two spouses. First, we will present the decision process for indi-
vidual couples. Thereafter, we will aggregate their decisions.
A couple consists of two spouses. We denote spouseswages by w1
and w2 and order spouses by these wages such that the index i = 1
refers to the primary earner and i = 2 to the secondary earner. Note
that the index does not necessarily refer to the gender of the respective
spouse. For the decisions at the couple level, gender is not relevant. For
instance, labor-force participation of the secondary earner will depend
on his or her relative wage independent of gender.
There are two commodities in the model, a private "market" con-
sumption good and a "home" consumption good that is public to the
couple. We assume that individualspreferences over the two commodi-
ties are characterized by the additively separable utility function
ui = ln ci +  ln d , (5.1)
where ci denotes consumption of the market good and d stands for con-
sumption of the home or domestic good. d does not wear an index
indicating an individual since the home good is public.
Market goods can be earned through market labor by both spouses.
We denote the time spent on market work by ni. The couples budget
constraint is thus given by
c1 + c2 = w1  n1 + w2  n2. (5.2)
Home goods are produced within the household using both spouses
labor (denoted by h1 and h2, respectively) as inputs with a production
function f (h1; h2) = (h1)
1=2 (h2)
1=2. Correspondingly, the home con-
sumption constraint takes the form
d = (h1)
1=2 (h2)
1=2 . (5.3)
We impose equal exponents on both labor inputs. A priori, there is there-
fore no di¤erence between the two spouseslabor in home production.
However, the household can decide to use the two inputs in di¤erent
quantities depending on opportunity costs.
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Both spouses have a time endowment of 1 which can be used for
market work and home production, i.e.
ni + hi = 1; i = 1; 2. (5.4)
The couple chooses the time allocations of both spouses and the
distribution of the resulting consumption possibilities. Thus the couple
chooses h1, h2, n1, n2, d, c1, and c2. Constraints are given by equations
(5.2) to (5.4).
While the distribution of market consumption is subject to the spe-
cic process of household bargaining, we can determine the time alloca-
tions by e¢ ciency considerations alone. Since the focus of this chapter
is on labor-supply decisions, we do not need to specify a household bar-
gaining process. For our purposes, it is su¢ cient to assume that the
outcome of the bargaining process is e¢ cient.
5.3.2 Decision making
In collective models of household behavior, households are assumed to al-
locate their resources e¢ ciently (Chiappori 1988; Chiappori 1992). Con-
sequently, given a desired amount of home consumption, the household
will produce it with minimal opportunity costs. Given the desired level
of home consumption, the cost minimization determines time spent in
home production for both spouses. In our set-up, spouses spend their
remaining time on paid market work. Accordingly, we proceed by solv-
ing for a familys optimal level of home consumption and then deduce
labor-supply decisions.
For e¢ ciency, the marginal costs to produce the public home good
(in terms of foregone market consumption) has to be equal to the sum
of both spouses marginal rates of substitution which corresponds to
Samuelsons (1955) rule for e¢ cient public-good provision,
MRS1 (c1; d) +MRS2 (c2; d) =MC (d) , (5.5)
where MRSi (ci; d) = @ui@ci =
@ui
@d
is spouse is marginal rate of substitution
between home and market goods. MC (d) denotes the marginal costs of
home production for the couple in terms of market goods. In order to de-
termine the optimal level of home consumption which satises (5.5), we
need to consider the couplesmarginal costs of producing the home good
as well as spousesmarginal rates of substitution. Detailed derivations
of decisions at the couple level can be found in Appendix 5.D.
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Marginal costs of home consumption. The marginal cost function
MC (d) results from the production of d units of the home good with
minimal costs. In this minimization problem, the household has to re-
spect that no member can work more than one unit of time in home
production:
h1 1 (5.6)
h2 1 (5.7)
In e¢ cient allocations, total opportunity costs of home production as a
function of the consumption level d are the value function of the mini-
mization problem
min
h1;h2
w1h1 + w2h2
subject to the home production function (5.3) and the two time con-
straints (5.6) and (5.7). Technically, marginal costs are the derivative of
this value function.
Due to the inequality restrictions (5.6) and (5.7), the marginal cost
function is not globally di¤erentiable. In the range where (5.6) and (5.7)
do not bind, production of the home good exhibits constant marginal
costs due to the constant returns to scale property of the production
function. Marginal costs in this range are given by 2  (w1)1=2  (w2)1=2.
The cost-minimal time inputs are h1 =

w1
w2
 1=2
d and h2 =

w1
w2
1=2
d.
The couple can only produce with constant returns to scale and thus
with constant marginal costs as long as both spouses can still increase
their time spent in home production. From the point where one spouse
spends her or his entire time endowment in home production, further
increases in home production can only be realized by increases in the
other spouses time input. Since w1 > w2, the time constraint of the
secondary earner (5.7) will be binding rst. This is at the point where
d =

w2
w1
1=2
. From there on, marginal costs are given by the inverse
of the primary earners marginal productivity multiplied by his or her
wage. Since h2 = 1 in this range, the marginal productivity of the
primary earner is given by 1
2
(h1)
 1=2. For d >

w2
w1
1=2
, the required
amount of h1 to produce d is h1 = d2. Marginal costs are therefore
2  w1  d in this range. Since both spouses time endowments are 1,
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the maximum quantity of home consumption is 1. The marginal cost
function (in terms of foregone market consumption) is thus given by
MC (d) =
8>>><>>>:
2  (w1)1=2  (w2)1=2 ; d <

w2
w1
1=2
2  w1  d;

w2
w1
1=2
< d < 1
1; d > 1.
(5.8)
The corresponding total (opportunity) cost function is
C (d) =
8>>><>>>:
2  (w1)1=2  (w2)1=2  d; d <

w2
w1
1=2
w2 + w1  d2;

w2
w1
1=2
< d < 1
1; d > 1.
(5.9)
Sum of the marginal rates of substitution. We now turn to the
spousesmarginal rates of substitution between market and home con-
sumption. The marginal rates of substitution depend on spousesindi-
vidual marginal utility of market consumption. The coupless marginal
willingness to pay will therefore in general depend on the intra-couple
distribution of private consumption which is subject to bargaining. With
log utility, however, intra-household bargaining does not a¤ect the cou-
ples willingness to pay for home consumption. Since the marginal rates
of substitution are linear with this specic formulation of utility and the
home good is public, marginal rates of substitution can be added up
to a function of the couples total consumption levels of the two goods
independent of the distribution across spouses. In particular, it holds
that
MRS1 (c1; d) +MRS2 (c2; d) =   c1
d
+   c2
d
=   c
d
, (5.10)
where c = c1 + c2. Redistributing private consumption lowers one
spousess marginal rate of substitution but increases the other spouses
one by the same amount. Changes in the distribution of private con-
sumption within the couple therefore do not a¤ect the sum of the two
marginal rates of substitution.
With e¢ cient production of the home good, the constraints (5.2),
(5.3), and (5.4) can be combined to
w1 + w2 = c+ C (d) .
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Thus, the choice of either c or d determines the other as well. The
couples total level of market consumption, c, can then be expressed as
c = w1 + w2   C (d). We can therefore express the sum of the two
marginal rates of substitution (5.10) as a function of the level of home
consumption only:
2X
i=1
MRSi =
8>>><>>>:
 w1+w2
d
  2 (w1)1=2  (w2)1=2 ; d <

w2
w1
1=2
 w1 (d
 1   d) ;

w2
w1
1=2
< d < 1
 1; d > 1
(5.11)
5.3.3 Labor-supply decisions
By the condition for e¢ cient provision of the public good (5.5), the
optimal level of home consumption is at the intersection of (5.8) and
(5.11). Labor-market participation of the secondary earner will depend
on whether or not the couple wishes a level of home consumption that can
be produced without using the entire time endowment of the secondary
earner. Technically, the secondary earner will participate if (5.5) is solved
by a d that falls below

w2
w1
1=2
. We can thus derive a participation
condition on the secondary earners wage relative to the primary earners
one. The participation threshold for the secondary earner is
w2 >
 
2
 w1. (5.12)
The secondary earner only participates in the labor market if his or
her relative contribution to the couples potential income exceeds some
threshold value determined by the valuation of home consumption. The
higher the wage of the primary earner, the higher the wage of the sec-
ondary earner has to be for participation of both spouses.
Conditional on participation of the secondary earner, her or his mar-
ket hours are
n2 =
2
2 +  
   
2 +  
 w1
w2
(5.13)
and the primary earners hours are
n1 =
2
2 +  
   
2 +  
 w2
w1
. (5.14)
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If the secondary earner does not participate, the primary earner works
constant hours on the market, given by
n1 =
2
2 +  
. (5.15)
Note that none of the labor-supply decisions described by equations
(5.12) to (5.15) depend on the absolute wage of one of the two spouses.
Instead, all decisions depend on the wage ratio between the two spouses
within the couple.
Now we consider a couple with a wife F and husbandM , whose wages
are denoted by wF and wM , respectively. The wife is the secondary
earner if wF < wM and vice versa. Summarizing labor-supply decisions
at the couple level as described by equations (5.12) to (5.15), we can
express hours worked by a wife F as a function of the wage ratio within
the couple, ! = wF
wM
,
nF (!) =
8><>:
0; ! <  
2
2
2+ 
   
2+ 
 ! 1;  
2
 ! < 2
 
2
2+ 
; !  2
 
. (5.16)
We impose the parameter restriction
 < 2
such that there are wage ratios for which both, husband and wife, par-
ticipate in the labor market, see equation (5.16).
5.3.4 The role of assortative mating
We now illustrate the inuence of the mating structure on the aggregate
pattern of wiveslabor supply. In the next section, we aggregate indi-
vidual decisions formally to obtain the aggregate pattern of wiveshours
by the husbands wage predicted by our model.
Equation (5.16) describes the relation between the husbands wage
and the wifes labor supply at the household level. This relation is
negative and independent of the mating structure. By contrast, the
aggregate pattern of wiveshours by the husbands wage also depends
on assortative mating because assortative mating a¤ects the aggregation
of individual decisions.
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Figure 5.3: Wiveshours of market work for di¤erent husband-wife wage
combinations (iso-hours lines and areas, resp.; the darker, the more
hours) and two joint distributions of wages with identical marginal dis-
tributions (scenario 1: imperfect sorting (non-lled circles); scenario 2:
perfect sorting (lled circles)).
Figure 5.3 illustrates the relation between wifes hours and the wages
of the two spouses in the couple given by equation (5.16). The gure
shows some selected iso-hours lines where darker colors correspond to
more hours of the wife. The dark gray area in the upper left part of the
gure contains couples who decide that only the wife works for pay. In
the light gray area in the lower right corner of the gure, wives do not
participate in the labor market. Between these two areas, hours of wives
continuously decrease from the upper left to the lower right as the wifes
relative wage decreases.
The circles in the gure indicate couples with di¤erent husband-wife
wage combinations. We illustrate the role of assortative mating on the
aggregate pattern of labor supply using these couples as examples. We
consider three women and three men who are matched to each other in
two di¤erent ways. Across scenarios, the gender-specic marginal distri-
butions of wages are identical but the joint distribution of spousal wages
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di¤ers. In scenario 1 (non-lled circles), marital sorting is imperfect
while it is perfect in scenario 2 (lled circles). Marital sorting is perfect
in the second scenario as the woman with the highest potential wage
(woman 3) is married to the man with the highest wage (man 3), and
so on.
First note that, in the example, the increase in assortative mating
alters the aggregate participation rate. In scenario 1, the couple in the
lower right of the gure (woman 1 and man 3) decides against labor-
market participation of the wife. Intra-household wage di¤erentials are
su¢ ciently pronounced that it is rational to use the wifes time solely
in home production. In the other two couples, both spouses participate
on the labor market. The aggregate participation rate of wives is 2/3 in
this scenario.
In scenario 2 (lled circles), although the marginal distributions of
wages have not changed, the aggregate participation rate is 1. Sorting
is perfect in this scenario, i.e. the top-wage wife is matched with the
top-wage husband and so on. As a consequence, in the example, there is
no more couple where intra-household wage di¤erentials are su¢ ciently
large for husband-only participation.
Changes in assortative mating a¤ect the aggregate pattern of wives
hours worked by the husbands wage positions. In scenario 1, the wife
married to the husband with the highest wage (man 3) works the fewest
hours while the other two women work the same. In scenario 2, this
pattern is ipped upside down with the wife married to the top-wage
husband supplying the most labor and the other two women working
the same.
5.3.5 Aggregate pattern of wiveshours by the hus-
bands wage positions
We now use our model for a stratication analysis as performed in Sec-
tion 2 for the CPS data. Specically, we study the aggregate pattern of
wiveshours by the husbands wage predicted by our model for di¤erent
forms of assortative mating.
We can use the joint distribution of wages in marriages as an input to
our model, i.e. the marginal distributions of gender-specic wages and
the association between spouseswages. We allow for the possibility that
the marginal distributions are not the same across genders. Specically,
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we allow for a gender wage gap. To highlight the role of changes in the
association between husbands and wifes wages, we consider uniform
marginal distributions in the theoretical part of the chapter. In the next
section, we feed the empirically observed marginal and joint distributions
of wages into our model.
In general, marginal distributions may di¤er by gender. With a gen-
der wage gap, the wage of the representative man in the ith decile of the
male distribution, WM (i) ; is higher than the wage of the representative
woman in the ith decile of the female distribution, WF (i). We denote
the absolute di¤erence between gender-specic wages by  and assume
here that this wage gap is constant across deciles.
We normalize the marginal distribution of female wages so that its
support has length 1, i.e. female wages are distributed uniformly on
(wmin; wmin + 1) with wmin  0. Correspondingly, male wages are dis-
tributed uniformly on (wmin + ;wmin + 1 + ). We apply the parameter
restriction
wmin
wmin + 
  
2
,
which ensures that in a couple where both husband and wife earn the
lowest gender-specic wages, respectively, the wife participates in the la-
bor market. It furthermore implies that, whenever husband and wife are
at the same quantile of the respective wage distributions, both spouses
participate.
We model assortative mating similar as in Kremer (1997). It is as-
sumed that a proportion  of agents marries a spouse from the same
wage quantile whereas everyone else marries randomly. Perfect sorting
and random mating are special cases where  = 1 or  = 0, respectively.
For a husband with wage wM , the probability of being married to a wife
with wage wF = wM  is  while all other wages of the wife are equally
likely with a total probability of 1  .
The economy-wide pattern of wiveshours by the husbands wage
positions results from (i) the relation between the husbands wage and
the wifes labor supply at the household level described by equation
(5.16) and (ii) the mating structure in the economy. To determine the
aggregate pattern, we calculate average hours of wives married to hus-
bands earning a certain wage wM . We do so by integrating individ-
ual decisions (5.16) taking into account the density function of wages,
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nF (wM) =
R
nF

wF
wM

 f (wF j wM) dwF , where nF (wM) denotes aver-
age hours worked of wives married to husbands earning a wage wM . The
densities f (wF j wM) depend on assortative mating. Given the marginal
and joint distributions of wages, average hours of wives married to hus-
bands earning a wage wM are
nF (wM)= (1  ) 
Z  
2
wM
wmin
0 dwF| {z }
no participation of wife
+(1  ) 
Z 2
 
wM
 
2
wM

2
2 +  
   
2 +  
 wM
wF

dwF| {z }
both spouses participate
(5.17)
+(1  ) 
Z wmin+1
2
 
wM
2
2 +  
dwF| {z }
only wife participates
+  

2
2 +  
   
2 +  
 wM
wM   

| {z }
fraction marrying perfectly assortatively, both participate
which evaluates as (see Appendix 5.D)
nF (wM) = 	 + (1  )  g (wM) +   k (wM) , (5.18)
where 	 = 2
2+ 
+ (1  )  2
2+ 
 wmin and
g (wM)=   
2 +  


1 + ln
4
 2

 wM
k (wM)=   
2 +  
 wM
wM    .
Wives hours by the husbands wage are thus a constant plus the
weighted sum of two functions of the husbands wage. g (wM) is a down-
ward sloping and linear function while k (wM) is an upward sloping and
concave function for  > 0 and a constant for  = 0. The weights for
g (wM) and k (wM) are determined by the parameter  measuring the
degree of assortative mating. The pattern of wiveshours by the hus-
bands wage decile thus depends on the degree of assortative mating and
the gender wage gap.
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Figure 5.4: Patterns of wiveshours by husbandswage deciles for dif-
ferent degrees of assortative mating (illustration using uniform marginal
distributions).
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Figure 5.4 illustrates the pattern of wiveshours by the husbands
wage deciles for six di¤erent scenarios. To illustrate the possible pat-
terns, we use example parameter values.6 When we compare model
predictions to empirical observations in the next section, we use the
empirically observed marginal and joint distributions of wages.
Here, we distinguish between two cases concerning the wage gap
( = 0,  > 0) and three di¤erent degrees of assortative mating ( = 1 ,
 = 0, 0 <  < 1). The left column in Figure 5.4 refers to the case of
no wage gap ( = 0), while the right column shows the results when a
wage gap is present ( > 0). The rows in Figure 5.4 refer to the three
cases of assortative mating (perfect sorting, random mating, intermedi-
ate sorting).
Consider the case of perfect assortative mating,  = 1, which is
illustrated in the rst row of Figure 5.4. In this situation, there exist
only marriages where both wife and husband are from the same quantile
in the respective gender-specic wage distribution.
Without a gender wage gap,  = 0, this implies that the wage ratio
in each couple is !j = 1. Consequently, all wives work the same, which
can be seen from equation (5.18) for  = 1 and  = 0,
nF (wM) = 	     
2 +  
.
This case is illustrated in the upper left panel of Figure 5.4.
By contrast, when there is a gender wage gap,  > 0, the average
wage ratio, (wM   ) =wM , is increasing in the husbands wage. As a
consequence, with a gender wage gap and perfect assortative mating,
average hours worked by wives are increasing in the husbands wage.
This is illustrated in the upper right panel of Figure 5.4 and can be seen
from equation (5.18) for  = 1 and  > 0:
nF (wM) = 	     
2 +  
 wM
wM    .
6For the gure, the parameter  measuring the valuation of home consumption
is set to 0:5 and the marginal distribution of female wages is uniform on [0:1; 1:1],
thus wmin = 0:1. For the cases with a gender wage gap (right column), we set
 = 0:3, otherwise  = 0. The parameter  measuring the degree of assortative
mating is 1 (rst row), 0 (second row), or 0:5 (third row), respectively. The weekly
time endowment is set to 40 hours.
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In the other extreme case,  = 0 , mating is completely random.
Here, all possible combinations of wages within a marriage exist with
same frequency. Hence, every husband is on average married to the
wife earning the average female wage wF independent of his own wage
position. Therefore, the average wage ratio wF=wM is decreasing across
the male wage distribution. As can be seen from equation (5.18) for
 = 0, this results in a downward-sloping pattern of wiveshours by the
husbands wage, independent of the wage gap,
nF (wM) = 	   
2 +  


1 + ln
4
 2

 wM .
This case is illustrated in the second row of Figure 5.4.
The third row of Figure 5.4 represents an intermediate case of assor-
tative mating where  = 0:5. In this intermediate case, both functions
g (wM) and k (wM) are given non-zero weights in equation (5.18). For
 = 0, wiveshours by the husbands decile are then the sum of a down-
ward sloping function and a constant,
nF (wM) = 	  (1  )   
2 +  


1 + ln
4
 2

 wM      
2 +  
,
and thus downward sloping in the male wage, see the lower left panel of
Figure 5.4. In the presence of a gender wage gap,  > 0, female hours
by male wage decile are the sum of a downward sloping linear function
and a concave upward sloping function,
nF (wM) = 	  (1  )   
2 +  


1 + ln
4
 2

wM      
2 +  
 wM
wM    .
(5.19)
The function nF (wM) is thus concave and can be hump-shaped, depend-
ing on the specic value for . In Appendix 5.D, we show that for any
combination of the parameters  , wmin, and  > 0, there exists a degree
of assortative mating, , such that the pattern of wiveshours by the
husbands wage is hump-shaped.
The role of assortative mating for the pattern of wiveshours by the
husbands wage becomes apparent when comparing the three panels in
the right column of Figure 5.4. In all three scenarios, the marginal distri-
butions of gender-specic wages are identical. However, the patterns in
wiveshours di¤er depending on the association between spouseswages.
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5.4 Quantitative analysis
The analysis in the previous section has shown that our model is able to
generate the empirical patterns documented in Section 5.2: The aggre-
gate pattern of wiveshours by the husbands wage has been downward-
sloping in 1975-79 like in the middle row of Figure 5.4. In 2000-06 this
pattern has changed to being hump-shaped as in the lower right panel
of Figure 5.4.
The patterns in hours predicted by the model depend on the joint
distribution of wages in marriages, i.e. on the marginal distributions of
gender-specic wages and the association between spouseswages. We
now feed the empirically observed joint distributions of wages into our
model and investigate whether observed trends in these distributions
imply patterns in hours that are consistent with the empirical develop-
ments.
As in Section 5.2, we measure the association in terms of the number
of marriages that exist between di¤erent deciles of the gender-specic
marginal wage distributions. The 10  10 association matrix S intro-
duced in Section 5.2 contains the relative frequencies of the 100 possible
combinations of deciles in a marriage. As discussed in Section 5.2, the as-
sociation between husbands and wifes wage has changed towards more
pronounced assortative mating.
Since we consider deciles, all columns (and all rows) in S contain 10
percent of the overall population. By construction, our analysis in terms
of wage deciles controls for changes in the marginal gender-specic wage
distributions that could otherwise distort the measurement of changes
in assortative mating. Put di¤erently, by measuring assortative mating
in terms of wage deciles, we can disentangle changes in the marginal dis-
tributions of husbands and wifes wages from changes in the association
between spousal wages.
The gender-specic mean wage levels associated with the deciles are
denoted by WF (i) and WM (i), respectively, where i is a decile number.
Table 5.2 shows the marginal distributions of spousal wages for the two
periods of time we consider, 1975-79 and 2000-06. For both genders,
wages have increased over time whereas the increase has been stronger
for women. The gender wage gap closed by 12 percentage points on
average over all deciles. The table also shows that changes in wages and
the gender wage gap have not been uniform across wage deciles. For
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both genders, wages in the upper deciles have grown stronger than wages
in the lower deciles. Similarly, the closure of the gender wage gap has
been strongest in the upper half of the wage distribution.
Finally, we have to choose a value for the parameter  measuring the
valuation of home consumption and a value for the weekly time endow-
ment. We set the relative valuation of home consumption to  = 0:5,
a value in the range commonly used in the literature for comparable
utility functions, see e.g. Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003). This
value implies that the ratio of time spent on home production and time
spent on market work is about 60%, which is in line with empirical nd-
ings. For instance, McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1997) estimate a
household utility function with home production and their results imply
that the ratio of home to market hours is 15=27. The weekly time en-
dowment has a pure scaling e¤ect on labor supply and is set to 40 hours.
The weekly time endowment is the total working time of agents in our
model since leisure is absent from the model.
To calculate the economy-wide pattern of wiveshours by the hus-
bands wage decile predicted by our model for a given joint distribution
of wages fWF ;WM ; Sg, we proceed as follows. We rst determine fe-
male labor supply for all 100 possible combinations of decile positions
in a 10 10 matrix H: To determine hours worked by the wife hij in a
specic cell ij we plug the ratio of gender-specic average wages in this
cell, !ij = WF (j) =WM (i), into equation (5.16). Average hours worked
by wives married to men in decile i are then given by (hi  s0i) =
P10
j=1 sij,
where hi is the ith row of the female hours matrix H and si is the
corresponding row in the association matrix S.
Figure 5.5 shows wiveshours by the husbands wage decile predicted
by our model when we use the empirically observed marginal and joint
distributions of spousal wages in 1975-79 and 2000-06, respectively. The
right panel shows the relative change in married womens hours by the
husbands wage decile between the two periods. Thus, the gure is the
models counterpart to the stratication analysis performed using CPS
hours displayed in Figure 5.1.
For 1975-79, the model predicts a decreasing pattern of wiveshours
by the husbands wage decile as observed in the data. For 2000-06, the
model predicts a higher level of hours worked by wives. From the right
panel of the gure, one can see that the predicted increase in hours
is not uniform across husbands wage deciles. As in the data, wives
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Figure 5.5: Predicted wifes weekly hours by husbands wage decile.
married to high-wage men experience the strongest increases. However,
the increase is not su¢ ciently non-uniform to change the pattern in the
left panel from downward sloping to hump-shaped.
The patterns in Figure 5.5 result from e¤ects of changes in the mar-
ginal distributions of gender-specic wages as well as from e¤ects due
to changes in the association of spousal wages. To disentangle these
e¤ects, we perform a series of counterfactual experiments. Figure 5.6
summarizes the results. Each panel in the gure corresponds to a di¤er-
ent counterfactual setting and shows the change in wiveshours by the
husbands decile (the gures are thus the analogs to the right panel in
Figure 5.5).
In a rst experiment, we hold constant the association matrix S at
its 1975-79 level but allow the marginal distributions to change over
time. This way, we shut down e¤ects of trends in assortative mating.
From the upper left panel in Figure 5.6 it can be seen that, when we do
not allow for change in assortative mating, the model does predict an
increase in hours for all groups of wives. Yet, in this scenario, the increase
is strongest for wives married to medium-wage men. By contrast, the
data show that wives married to high-wage men have experienced the
strongest increases in hours worked.
The upper right panel in Figure 5.6 refers to the other extreme case
where we allow for changes in the association between spousal wages but
hold constant the gender-specic marginal wage distributions. In this
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Figure 5.6: Counterfactual experiments.
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scenario, changes in wiveshours are increasing in the husbands decile
position. Yet, not all groups of wives experience increasing hours in this
scenario.
This evaluation of our model suggests that changes in the marginal
wage distributions are responsible for the overall increase in hours worked
by wives. By contrast, the fact that wives married to high-wage men
experienced the most pronounced increase is a result of trends in assor-
tative mating rather than being due to changes in the marginal distrib-
utions.
A potential source of the non-uniform increase in hours is that the
gender wage gap has closed in a non-uniform way. As we used the empir-
ically observed marginal gender-specic wage distributions, our bench-
mark results reported in Figure 5.5 include the e¤ects of the non-uniform
wage-gap closure. In order to study the role of this development, we per-
form two additional counterfactual experiments. In these experiments,
we impose a uniform closure of the wage gap, i.e. we impose that the
wage gap has closed by the same amount (measured in percentage points)
across all deciles.
The lower left panel in Figure 5.6 refers to the case where the wage
gap closes in such uniform way and the association is held constant at
its 1975-79 level. The lower right panel also imposes a neutral wage-gap
closure but additionally allows for changes in assortative mating over
time. The e¤ects of the non-neutrality of the wage gap closure become
apparent when comparing the upper left and the lower left panels in the
gure. With a uniform closure of the wage gap, the model predicts de-
creasing hours for wives of top-wage men, opposed to what is observed
in the data. However, one can see that accounting for trends in assorta-
tive mating is key for understanding the non-uniform increase in wives
hours. Only when we allow the association matrix to change over time,
our model predicts an increasing pattern in the change of hours worked
by women as observed in the data.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated wives hours disaggregated by the hus-
bands wage decile. Specically, we have addressed two empirical obser-
vations that have been documented for the US. First, the aggregate pat-
tern of wiveshours by the husbands wage has changed from downward-
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sloping to hump-shaped. Second, over time, the increase in hours worked
of wives has been strongly non-uniform among all groups of married
women, with increases in hours of wives of middle- and high-wage men
being more pronounced than for wives of men married to low-wage hus-
bands.
We have presented a theoretical model that explicitly considers the
role of assortative mating in terms of wages for understanding these
developments. Assortative mating determines the wage ratios within in-
dividual couples. In our model, the intra-couple wage ratio determines
the e¢ cient time allocation of the two spouses. Only when the wifes rel-
ative wage is high enough, the couple opts for labor-market participation
of both spouses.
Under random mating, every husband is on average married to the
wife earning the average female wage independent of his own wage.
Therefore, the relative wages are lowest for wives married to top-wage
husbands. As a consequence, these wives work the fewest hours. Under
random mating, the pattern of wiveshours by the husbands wage decile
is therefore negative.
Under perfect sorting, by contrast, there exist only marriages where
both wife and husband are from the same quantile in the respective
gender-specic wage distribution. The pattern of wiveshours by the
husbands wage will then also depend on the marginal distributions of
gender-specic wages. When there is a gender wage gap, the wifes
relative wage can be increasing in the husbands wage. As a consequence,
hours worked by the wife can be increasing in the husbands wage.
For intermediate sorting, the resulting pattern of wiveshours worked
by the husbands wage decile is a weighted average of the patterns in
the two extreme cases of random and perfect mating, respectively. The
resulting economy-wide pattern of wives hours by the husbands wage
decile can therefore be hump-shaped depending on the relative weights
of population groups marrying randomly and perfectly assortatively, re-
spectively. Changes in assortative mating thus alter the pattern of wives
hours worked by the husbands wage decile and consequently lead to a
non-uniform change in hours worked by wives.
The patterns in hours predicted by our model depend on the joint
distribution of wages in marriages. In a quantitative analysis, we have
fed the empirically observed joint distributions of wages into our model
and have investigated whether observed changes in these distributions
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imply patterns in hours that are consistent with the empirical develop-
ments.
The data shows a closure of the gender wage gap and a clear trend
towards stronger assortative mating in terms of wages. For 1975-79, the
model predicts a decreasing pattern of wiveshours by the husbands
wage decile as observed in the data. For 2000-06, the model predicts
a higher overall level of hours worked by wives. In accordance with
empirical developments, the model-predicted increase in hours is not
uniform across husbands wage deciles. As in the data, wives married to
high-wage men experience the strongest increases. However, the increase
is not su¢ ciently non-uniform to change the pattern of wiveshours by
the husbands wage from downward sloping to hump-shaped.
A series of counterfactual experiments has shown that changes in
the marginal wage distributions are responsible for the overall increase
in hours worked by wives. By contrast, the fact that wives married to
high-wage men experienced the most pronounced increase is a result of
trends in assortative mating rather than being due to changes in the
marginal wage distributions. Thus, accounting for trends in assortative
mating is key for understanding the non-uniform increase in wiveshours.
Only when we take into account trends in assortative mating, our model
predicts an increasing pattern in the change of hours worked by women
as observed in the data.
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Appendix
5.A CPS data
The CPS data we use are in the format arranged by Unicon Research.7
The CPS is a monthly household survey conducted by the Bureau of
the Census. Respondents are interviewed to obtain information about
the employment status of each member of the household 16 years of age
and older. Survey questions covering hours of work, earnings, gender,
and marital status are covered in the Annual Social Economic Supple-
ment, the so-called March Supplement Files. The sample of the CPS is
representative of the civilian non-institutional population.
Data on hours and earnings is retrospective and refers to the previous
year. The CPS data we use covers the period 1975-2006. While the CPS
provides data on hours and earnings from 1963 onwards, the number of
children in family under age six is not available before 1975. Since the
latter variable is used as an instrument for imputing wages for non-
working individuals, our analysis starts in 1975.
Our selected sample comprises civilians aged 30 to 50. In a set of
robustness tests, we checked that our results are robust with respect to
the specic age range. We drop people who derive their main income
from self-employment and consider only couples where both husband and
wife are present in the sample. We identify spouses by the household
identication number. To control for outliers, we drop couples where
either husband or wife fall in the top 1% percentile of observed wages.
In 1992, the educational-attainment question in the CPS changed
from years of education to degree receipt. Following Jaeger (1997), we
harmonized both series and created a measure of educational attainment
that takes on four categories: dropouts, high-school graduates, some col-
lege, and college graduates.8
5.B Wage imputation
Since our dataset is very large, we use Heckmans (1979) two-step
e¢ cient estimator instead of Maximum likelihood estimation (see
Wooldridge 2002 for technical details). The Heckman two-step model
7See http://www.unicon.com/.
8This education variable has been created from the CPS variables _educ (1964-
1991, 19 categories, Unicon recoded) and grdatn (1992-2007, 17 categories).
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1975-1979 2000-2006
Wage equation estimate std. err. estimate std. err.
log(age wife/17) -0.054 0.149 1.182 0.116
log(age wife/17) squared 0.038 0.103 -0.592 0.077
education level 2 wife 0.156 0.011 0.385 0.014
education level 3 wife 0.257 0.013 0.600 0.014
education level 4 wife 0.495 0.014 0.975 0.014
intercept 1.938 0.056 1.035 0.047
year dummies included
Participation equation
log(age wife/17) 0.105 0.280 0.338 0.235
log(age wife/17) squared -0.390 0.193 -0.172 0.157
log(age husband/17) -1.493 0.301 -0.797 0.256
log(age husband/17) squared 0.843 0.198 0.416 0.164
education level 2 wife 0.306 0.015 0.501 0.019
education level 3 wife 0.451 0.020 0.712 0.019
education level 4 wife 0.769 0.022 0.928 0.021
education level 2 husband -0.051 0.015 0.190 0.018
education level 3 husband -0.070 0.019 0.181 0.019
education level 4 husband -0.232 0.019 -0.111 0.020
2 kids younger than age 6 -0.655 0.013 -0.443 0.011
3 kids younger than age 6 -1.041 0.020 -0.733 0.015
4 kids younger than age 6 -1.332 0.051 -1.131 0.037
5 kids younger than age 6 -1.765 0.173 -1.392 0.131
intercept 0.626 0.090 0.215 0.088
year dummies included
 (inv. Mills ratio) -0.017 0.018 0.295 0.018
Table 5.3: Two-step Estimates of Heckman Selection Model
Method Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1975-1979 Heckman 64090 2.070 0.158 1.790 2.419
OLS 64090 2.057 0.159 1.774 2.408
2000-2006 Heckman 94352 2.183 0.307 1.376 2.618
OLS 94352 2.334 0.277 1.665 2.729
Table 5.4: Predictions of Heckman Selection Model vs. OLS imputation
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can be described as follows. First, we estimate a binomial probit model
that predicts the individuals probability of participation in the labor
market (selection equation). Second, we use the estimated selection
model to construct the hazard rate for sample inclusion. Third, we in-
clude the hazard rate as a regressor in the wage equation. When the
error term in the selection equation is correlated with the error term
in the wage equation, standard regression techniques yield inconsistent
estimates while the two-step Heckman procedure yields consistent esti-
mates.
To identify the Heckman model, we need to nd factors that deter-
mine whether a wife participates in the labor market but are unrelated to
a wifes wage. We assume that the likelihood of working is a function of
the number of preschool children at home (we code the number of kids
as dummy variables). Moreover, we include in the selection equation
quadratic terms in age of wife and husband and the levels of education
of both partners. The number of preschool children and the characteris-
tics of the husband are only included in the participation equation but
are omitted from the wage equation. We also control for time e¤ects.
In the wage equation, we include a quadratic term in the wifes age
and dummy variables for the wifes level of education. By including all
variables that determine the wage also in the participation equation, we
allow the participation decision to depend implicitly on the wage.
We t the Heckman model separately for the periods 1975-1979 and
2000-2006. Table 5.3 summarizes the two-step estimates of the Heckman
selection model. The upper part of the table displays the estimates
for the parameters in the wage equation while the lower part shows
the results for the participation equation. In both equations, we have
included time dummies but their point estimates are omitted from the
table to save on space.
From the selection equation, it can be seen that more preschool chil-
dren in the household signicantly decrease the probability of partici-
pation. The coe¢ cient of the selection term is reported at the bottom
of Table 5.3. While the selection term is found to be insignicant in
1975-1979 it turns highly signicant in the more recent period. This
means that a standard regression not taking into account selection will
produce inconsistent wage predictions for non-working women, which
shows the relevance of incorporating selectivity in the estimation of the
wage equation.
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Table 5.4 compares predicted values from the Heckman model with
an ordinary regression model without selection adjustment. In the pe-
riod where the selection term has been found to be insignicant (1975-
1979), wage predictions from the Heckman model and uncorrected OLS
are fairly similar on average. During 2000-2006, by contrast, simple re-
gression yields predictions that are on average higher than the Heckman-
corrected estimates. Specically, wage predictions of the Heckman model
are on average about 6.87% lower than the regression-based ones. One
can also see that the regression prediction shows less variation than the
prediction based on the selection model.
5.C Association matrices
Table 5.5 shows the association matrix S between spouses wage
decile positions for the period 1975-79. The association matrix for
the period 2000-06 is presented in Table 5.6. The relative changes
of the frequencies of the di¤erent combinations of the wage deciles, 
s2000 06ij   s1975 79ij

=s1975 79ij , can be found in Table 5.1 in the main
text.
husb.s wifes wage decile
decile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
1st 1.61 1.64 1.46 0.96 0.84 0.74 0.75 0.73 0.65 0.62
2nd 1.26 1.39 1.43 0.98 0.90 0.72 0.92 1.02 0.69 0.68
3rd 1.24 1.22 1.20 0.96 0.92 0.82 0.96 1.03 0.87 0.78
4th 1.04 1.06 1.10 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.97 1.03 0.93
5th 0.99 0.95 1.01 1.00 0.97 1.07 0.99 1.03 0.96 1.04
6th 0.92 0.92 0.94 1.08 0.98 1.07 0.97 0.96 0.97 1.18
7th 0.84 0.87 0.81 1.09 1.04 1.14 0.96 1.05 1.02 1.18
8th 0.77 0.77 0.80 1.13 1.13 1.10 1.03 0.97 1.15 1.15
9th 0.72 0.66 0.70 0.97 1.11 1.25 1.14 1.06 1.20 1.19
10th 0.61 0.53 0.56 0.87 1.12 1.13 1.31 1.19 1.45 1.25
Table 5.5: Association Matrix S between Spousal Wages in 1975-79.
(Entries give percentage frequencies of di¤erent decile comibations.)
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husb.s wifes wage decile
decile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
1st 2.36 1.83 1.28 1.02 0.83 0.75 0.57 0.45 0.51 0.42
2nd 1.61 1.62 1.34 1.23 1.00 0.94 0.67 0.54 0.58 0.45
3rd 1.19 1.29 1.22 1.15 1.08 1.23 0.81 0.65 0.81 0.58
4th 1.00 1.08 1.12 1.17 0.96 1.32 1.03 0.78 0.90 0.64
5th 0.83 0.96 1.07 1.09 1.00 1.17 1.03 0.96 1.07 0.82
6th 0.78 0.84 0.98 1.02 1.03 1.11 1.05 0.96 1.28 0.95
7th 0.67 0.78 0.93 0.99 0.99 1.05 1.09 1.07 1.31 1.14
8th 0.64 0.66 0.79 0.91 0.99 0.92 1.15 1.20 1.38 1.37
9th 0.51 0.52 0.69 0.78 1.02 0.82 1.32 1.40 1.20 1.74
10th 0.43 0.43 0.59 0.64 1.09 0.69 1.28 2.00 0.96 1.90
Table 5.6: Association Matrix S between Spousal Wages in 2000-06.
(Entries give percentage frequencies of di¤erent decile comibations.)
5.D Derivations and proofs
Decisions at the couple level
Marginal costs of home consumption To nd the marginal cost
function of home consumption, we determine the cost function rst. To-
tal opportunity costs are given by C = w1h1 + w2h2 (home production
involves labor only but each spouse faces opportunity costs of not work-
ing for pay). For the cost function, we determine the quantities h1 and h2
to produce d units of the home good with minimal costs. This cost mini-
mization problem yields equivalent input combinations as the maximiza-
tion of output for given costs. The optimization problem involves the
home production function f (h1; h2) = (h1)
1=2 (h2)
1=2, time constraints
h1  1, h2  1, and the total cost function C = h1w1 + h2w2. When
solving the problem, one has to distinguish whether the time constraints
are binding or not.
1. If time constraints are not binding, the Lagrangean reads as
L = (h1)1=2 (h2)1=2 +  [h1w1 + h2w2   C] .
The rst-order conditions are
@L
@h1
=
1
2
(h1)
 1=2 (h2)
1=2 + w1 = 0
@L
@h2
=
1
2
(h1)
1=2 (h2)
 1=2 + w2 = 0
159
which can be simplied to
h2 =
w1
w2
h1: (5.20)
This gives a relation between both spouses cost-minimal labor
inputs in home production. To determine each spouses time in
home production for a given level of home consumption d, substi-
tute (5.20) into the home production function:
d = (h1)
1=2

w1
w2
h1
1=2
() h1 = d

w1
w2
 1=2
.
For the secondary earner, one obtains
h2 =
w1
w2
d

w1
w2
 1=2
= d

w1
w2
1=2
.
When time constraints are not binding, total opportunity costs of
home production are thus given by
C (d)=h1w1 + h2w2 = d

w1
w2
 1=2
w1 + d

w1
w2
1=2
w2
=2 (w1)
1=2 (w2)
1=2 d .
Marginal costs in this case are
MC (d) = 2 (w1)
1=2 (w2)
1=2 .
2. Now we consider the case where the time constraint for the sec-
ondary earner is binding. This is at the point where
h2 = d

w1
w2
1=2
= 1 () d =

w2
w1
1=2
.
The production function in this case is
f (h1; 1) = d = (h1)
1=2 :
In this range, to produce d units of the home good, the primary
earners time in home production has to be
h1 = d
2.
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Total opportunity costs in this case are thus
C (d) = h1w1 + h2w2 = w1d
2 + w2
and marginal costs are
MC (d) = 2w1d.
3. When both time constraints are binding, the household can not
achieve a higher level of home consumption. The maximum level
of home consumption is
d = 11=2  11=2 = 1
In summary, the marginal cost function is dened piecewise, see equa-
tion (5.8) in the main text. If time constraints are not binding, marginal
costs are constant. If the time constraint of the secondary earner binds,
marginal costs are increasing linearly. If both time constraints bind,
home production cannot be increased further.
Sum of the marginal rates of substitution In general, the sum
of the marginal rates of substitution will depend on the intra-household
distribution of private consumption, since the individual MRS depend
on both consumption goods. However, with log utility (and thus linear
marginal utility), the MRS can be simply added up,
MRS1 (c1; d) +MRS2 (c2; d) =
 c1
d
+
 c2
d
=
 c
d
,
where c = c1 + c2. The sum of husbands and wifes MRS involves
the couples total level of market consumption c; which is given by the
di¤erence between the couples full income and its expenditures for home
production
c = w1 + w2   C (d) .
Using total costs of home consumption (5.9), this can be written as
c =
8>>><>>>:
w1 + w2   2  (w1)1=2  (w2)1=2  d; d <

w2
w1
1=2
w1  (1  d2) ;

w2
w1
1=2
< d < 1
 1; d > 1.
.
Using this expression for c, the sum of the MRS can be written as in
equation (5.11) in the main text.
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Labor-supply decisions To determine labor-supply decisions, we
derive the households e¢ cient level of home consumption which is de-
termined by the intersection of equations (5.8) and (5.11). Since (5.8)
and (5.11) are piecewise dened functions, one has to solve for the in-
tersections of the di¤erent parts and check whether the intersection lies
within the respective range.
1. The intersection of the rst parts of (5.8) and (5.11) satises:
2 (w1)
1=2 (w2)
1=2 =  
w1 + w2   2  (w1)1=2  (w2)1=2  d
d
() d =  
2 +  
 [w1 + w2]
(w1)
1=2  (w2)1=2
This level of d lies in the interval

0;

w2
w1
1=2
if
 
2 +  
 [w1 + wi;2]
(w1)
1=2  (w2)1=2
<

w2
w1
1=2
() w2 >  
2
w1,
which is condition (5.12) from the main text. If this condition
is fullled, the couple wishes a level of home consumption which
can be produced with both spouses working less than their full
time endowment in home production. Then, both spouses also
participate in the labor market. If the condition is fullled, the
e¢ cient level of home consumption determines the two spouses
time inputs in home production:
h1= d 

w1
w2
 1=2
=
 
2 +  
 [w1 + w2]
(w1)
1=2  (w2)1=2


w1
w2
 1=2
=
 
2 +  
 w1 + w2
w1
h2= d 

w1
w2
1=2
=
 
2 +  
 [w1 + w2]
(w1)
1=2  (w2)1=2


w1
w2
1=2
=
 
2 +  
 w1 + w2
w2
The remaining time is spent on market work:
n1=1  h1 = 2
2 +  
   
2 +  
 w2
w1
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n2=1  h2 = 2
2 +  
   
2 +  
 w1
w2
2. If the participation condition (5.12) is not fullled, (5.8) and (5.11)
intersect in the second part of their piecewise denitions:
2w1d =  
w1  (1  d2)
d
() d =

 
2 +  
1=2
The time inputs in home production of the two spouses are
h1= d
2 =
 
2 +  
h2=1.
Again, the remaining time is spent on paid market work:
n1=1  h1 = 2
2 +  
n2=1  h2 = 0
Derivation of wiveshours by the husbands wage
The integrals in equation (5.17) evaluate as follows, yielding equation
(5.18):
nF (wM)= (1  ) 
Z  
2
wM
wmin
0 dwF + (1  ) 
Z 2
 
wM
 
2
wM

2
2 +  
   
2 +  
 wM
wF

dwF
+(1  ) 
Z wmin+1
2
 
wM
2
2 +  
dwF +  

2
2 +  
   
2 +  
 wM
wM   

=
2
2 +  
+ (1  )  2
2 +  


wmin    
2
wM

  (1  )   
2 +  
 wM 
Z 2
 
wM
 
2
wM

1
wF

dwF      
2 +  
 wM
wM   
=
2
2 +  
+ (1  )  2
2 +  


wmin    
2
wM

  (1  )   
2 +  
 wM  [lnwF ]
2
 
wM
 
2
wM
     
2 +  
 wM
wM   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=
2
2 +  
+ (1  )  2
2 +  
 wmin
  (1  )   
2 +  


1 + ln
4
 2

 wM      
2 +  
 wM
wM   
Hump-shaped pattern of wiveshours by the husbands wage
For 0 <  < 1, the right hand side of equation (5.19) is a strictly
concave function of wM . Thus, when there is a local extremum, it is
a maximum. In this appendix, we show that for any combination of
 , wmin, and , there is a  such that nF (wM) has a local extremum
in the interior of the support of male wages. This is equivalent to the
statement that, for all marginal distributions of wages, there is a degree
of assortative mating such the pattern of wiveshours by the husbands
wage is hump-shaped.
The rst derivative of equation (5.19) is
n0F (wM) =   (1  )
 
2 +  


1 + ln
4
 2

+   
2 +  
 
(wM   )2
. (5.21)
Since nF (wM) is concave, it is su¢ cient to show that there is a 
 such
that n0F (wM) has a root on (wmin + ;wmin + + 1). A root w

M satises
(1  ) 

1 + ln
4
 2

=   
(wM   )2
() (wM   ) =
s

1   
s

1 + ln 4
 2
.
The root lies in the support of the male wage distribution when
wmin <
s

1   
s

1 + ln 4
 2
< wmin + 1: (5.22)
Since
q

1+ln 4
 2
> 0 due to the restriction  < 2 and
lim
 !0
s

1   =0,
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lim
 !1
s

1   =1,
there is always a  2 (0; 1) such that (5.22) is fullled.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
This thesis has presented four applications of heterogeneous-agents mod-
els to the elds of political economy and labor markets. The essays pre-
sented in the thesis have explicitly considered of heterogeneity by income
potentials, expectations, gender and marital status. Such heterogeneity
is key to understand certain phenomena on both the aggregate and the
subgroup level.
Chapters 2 and 3 have presented essays on the political economy in
presence of income heterogeneity. Both chapters have explained puz-
zling observations in voting behavior within simple models of majority
voting by incorporating imperfect information. The model presented in
Chapter 2 can generate a negative relation between income skewness
and redistribution as a result of heterogeneous expectations. The model
presented in Chapter 3 generates welfare-state persistence as a results
of the incentive e¤ects of the welfare state on attentiveness.
Chapters 4 and 5 have presented essays on heterogenous-agents mod-
els which address empirically observed di¤erences in labor supply by gen-
der, marital status, and wage potentials. Chapter 4 has demonstrated
that the distinct trends in hours worked by gender and marital status
can be better understood when one incorporates trade in home labor
between heterogeneous households into a household model of labor sup-
ply. Chapter 5 has focussed on the pattern of hours worked by married
women disaggregated by the husbands wage. It has been shown that
the observed that the observed change in this pattern can be generated
within a standard model of household specialization when taking into
account trends in assortative mating.
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